THE CRETAN GLANCE:
The Syncretic Spirit in the Novels of Nikos Kazantzakis

An abstract of a Thesis by
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The seven novels of Nikos Kazantzakis' great period of 1942-1956, i.e., Freedom or Death, Zorba the Greek, The Last Temptation of Christ, The Greek Passion, Saint Francis, The Fratricides, and the Report to Greco, are examined in order to make evident the spirit of synthesis in perceiving the chaos of life the novels express. The spirit of synthesis is essential to the making of a myth for modern man. Myth is considered to be identical to a religion in that it structures beliefs and attitudes for a social group. Because the novels are heroic in scope and partake of the mythic hero cycle in expression, the delineation of that cycle as offered by Joseph Campbell in Hero With a Thousand Faces is used as a basic guideline to the spirit of synthesis in the novels. Pertinent sections of Kazantzakis' philosophic writings, i.e., Saviors of God: Spiritual Exercises and The Odyssey: A Modern Sequel, are mentioned in order to determine the Kazantzakian framework within which the hero cycle can be applied. Interpretation of the novels and the philosophic writing is done in the light of English language critical writing about Kazantzakis and also the structures delineated in the areas of mysticism and myth offered in the work of Jung, Kerenyi, and Eliade. The major influences on the thought of Kazantzakis, i.e., Bergson, Nietzsche, the Christ and Buddha myths, and Marxist theory, are considered in a secondary light to the mythic structures in order to determine further the Kazantzakian frame of reference.

The monomyth or hero cycle is found to apply in all of the novels under consideration, with emphases which illuminate Kazantzakis' evolutionary and vitalistically spiritual philosophy. The novels, read together as a single work, are seen as a single hero cycle--Kazantzakis' own. Symbols pertinent to this latter hero cycle are examined in order to ascertain Kazantzakis' failure or success in delineating a myth for modern man. The symbols, principally "God" and the "ascent," are dependent upon making new the symbols "death," "freedom," "suffering," and "evolution"; the principal symbols "God" and "ascent" are interchangeable and coequal. It will be noted that these symbols are names of processes; the final symbol is the process of Kazantzakis' own life. All the symbols are those of failure. Kazantzakis, although more honest and Promethean than any other twentieth-century novelist in his attempt to delineate a structuring myth for modern man, falls prey to cultural lack of place for symbols. He is not a myth-maker for modern man on the level of Homer in an earlier time; the ultimate symbol of synthesis, "spirit," is not acceptable to modern man.

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Chapter I

The Cretan Glance

Perhaps more intensely than most of us, Nikos Kazantzakis was a product of his space and time. And conversely, he was more so than most of us passionately and intelligently involved in extricating himself from the limitations which that space and time imposed on him. Thus the seven novels of his great period of 1942-1954 display not only an intense attachment to the soil of his Crete and the heroism of her people, but they also display what can only be called a brutal and fevered attempt to discover and then to illuminate the kind of life prescribed by his "theogony," a process he termed Meta-Communism and propounded in Saviors of God: Spiritual Exercises.[1]

Since Kazantzakis himself described these novels as myths, rather than merely mythic, it is in this light that they will be considered in this paper; that is, as examples of the myth process rather than fiction merely embellished by mythic element

[1] Helen Kazantzakis, Nikos Kazantzakis: A Biography Based on His Letters, trans. Amy Mims (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1968), p. 179. Hereinafter, references to the Biography denote this edition.

It is necessary to point out that Meta-Communism was in no way confined to the economic level as was Marxist theory. Meta-Communism for Kazantzakis denoted a spiritual state and the Saviors of God is a formulation of the accession to that spiritual state.

More specifically, the relationship between these novels and the traditional hero cycle will be examined, for that cycle and the content of the novels are equally indebted to the exploration and elucidation of the totality of the individual psyche.[1]

Kazantzakis has himself denoted, through the use of the phrase the Cretan Glance, the attitude from which he wrote. It is worthwhile to consider the multiple levels of meaning within this phrase, a consideration which will allow not only mention of pertinent background information about Kazantzakis, but also will provide an accesible introduction to the diversity of his mystic system, a diversity which it was Kazantzakis' life-long struggle to synthesize into momentary but upward spiraling harmonies.

The phrase the Cretan Glance is, of course, indebted to the island of Crete itself. Although Kazantzakis traveled widely and wrote travel books on England, Spain, Japan and China, and the Morea, he spent his formative years on Crete. His childhood milieu was later described in the novel Freedom or Death, which he "lived . . . in a sanguinary way . . . all

[1] The basis for this statement is the thesis of Joseph Campbell's Myths to Live By (NY: Viking, 1972), as well as C. G. Jung's theories of individuation and their indebtedness to archetypal images and patterns.

the time [he] was growing up in the tragic atmosphere of Crete. The human beings in this book, the episodes, and the speech are all true."[1] His father was the model for the hero of the novel, Captain Michales.[2] We gather from this that the attitudes included in the novel are typically Cretan, and that the home of Captain Michales was the home of the young Nikos.

It was a Greek Orthodox home, and we may understand Kazantzakis' love of icons in the light of the importance which we are told icons possess in such homes.[3] It is worthy of note, then, that Captain Michales' home in the novel was hung with photographs of Cretan heroes of the war of liberation of 1821.[4] Photographs of the same sort hung in Kazantzakis' boyhood home, also, and were mentioned by a young Nikos as being part of what he was anxious to see at home on a school vacation visit.[5]

[1] Nikos Kazantzakis, letter to Börje Knös of May 9, 1950, quoted by Helen Kazantzakis, Biography, p. 486.

[2] Helen Kazantzakis, Biography, p. 222.

[3] Ernst Benz, The Eastern Orthodox Church: Its Thought and Life, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (1957; rpt. Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor, 1963), p. 2-3.

[4] Nikos Kazantzakis, Freedom or Death, trans. Jonathan Griffin (1955; rpt. NY: Ballantine, 1965), pp. 49, 54, ff. Hereinafter references cited from this edition and denoted by FD.

[5] Nikos Kazantzakis, letter to his mother and sisters, of June, 1908, quoted by Helen Kazantzakis, Biography, p. 43.

Freedom or Death is a portrait of the spirit of Kazantzakis Cretan childhood as well as a history of a people's rejection of enslavement. More importantly, the making of the heroes of past freedom fights into a type of religious icon begins to illuminate Kazantzakis' awareness of the schism between this world and another, an awareness leading to his mature attempt to reconcile these worlds.

The world of Crete of which Freedom or Death offers a picture is one of other dualities than this. The masculine and action-oriented world of Captain Michales is set against the passively and generously strong world of the Cretan women. The Captain's wife, Katerina, provides an effective foil to the fury of her husband: the martrydom of St. Catherine as opposed to the martial nature of the Archangel Michael are iconographical identifications not only of the couple novelistically, but also indicate the cosmic scope in which Kazantzakis saw this duality. The ferocity of the Captain's followers was also offset by the strength of their female counterparts. A story Kazantzakis was particularly fond of telling had to do with the refusal of Cretan women to accede to the demands of occupying forces at the cost of their homes and children.[1] The duality, however, was never

[1] This story in various mutations appears in Freedom or Death, pp. 432 ff., in the Biography, pp. 429-32, and in an article, "Crete," written by Kazantzakis for Holiday, XVIII (1955), 34-9.

lost sight of and the tension between the two poles within Kazantzakis himself was expressed in overt terms: "The cell bequeathed to me by my father, Bernardone, is a cruel one; the cell of Pica, my mother, a tender, passive one. May God grant me a little time before I die to achieve the supreme synthesis."[1]

This passive/active polarity and the expression of it in male/female terms--a polarity which serves as fodder for a great many more superficial writers, more blighted in vision than Kazantzakis--does not overbalance his novels, however. He is after larger concepts, and again it is to his perception of his homeland that we must turn in order to understand the Kazantzakian attempt to make the world the proving ground of the total being, the arena of the highest synthesis, rather than the playground of just the mind on the one hand or the sense on the other. Falling prey to such dichotomy, Kazantzakis could have become either an absurdist or an empiricist, given the times. But while the essence of Kazantzakis is the recognition of such dichotomies, perhaps his value is the attempt to reconcile them in a positive and heroic manner.

[1] Nikos Kazantzakis, letter to Helen of July 15, 1924, quoted by Helen Kazantzakis, Biography, p. 27.

The sense of a unity to be found is also a gift of Kazantzakis' homeland. He describes his own perception of his homeland through the reaction to it by a Dutch writer. He finds it noteworthy to mention that this reaction comes even to one from a ponderous, Teutonic distance from the world of the Mediterranean:

> For the first time in my life I am flooded with deep bliss. I was alone in the Palace of Minos and I capered like a goat. . . . Here the spirit and the flesh are truly reconciled--and not reconciled exactly because they were never separated but blessedly united. I do not understand all this, but out here the point is not to comprehend but to feel, to let sensation suffuse you.[1]

If the soil and people of Crete offered a diversity through which a "blessed" sense of unity shone, it also offered the physical image by which to express this understanding. The image comes from the ruins of the Palace of Minos, from panels of decoration--icons in their own right, if we can ignore Sir James George Frazer and his type of circumscribed magic and treat the panels as H. W. Janson

[1] Nikos Kazantzakis, "Crete," Holiday, XVIII (1955), 39.

treats the cave paintings of Altamira and Lascaux. Basing his assertion on the realism of the animals painted on walls hidden deep within the earth, Janson wonders if the "main purpose may no longer have been to 'kill' but to 'make' animals--to increase their supply."[1] This shift in emphasis allows the cave paintings to become creating images rather than created ones, but with no less a realistic and concrete purpose. The panels of Minoan Crete concerning the bullfight afford us an insight into a disconcertingly honest and rigorous attitude toward life. Kazantzakis wrote,

> The bullfight here was a bloodless game, a sport. . . . The bullfighter took the bull by the horns, the animal shook its head angrily up and down, and that gave the man momentum to leap lightly onto its back. Then he would turn a somersault and land on his feet just behind the bull's tail. And a girl would be standing there, and she would take him in her arms.[2]

The sport described is not intrinsically a bloodless one. It is to be presumed that Minoan bulls were quite as aggressive

[1] H. W. Janson, History of Art: A Survey of the Major Visual Arts from the Dawn of History to the Present Day, rev. ed. (NY: Harry N. Abrams, 1969), p. 20.

[2] Nikos Kazantzakis, "Crete," p. 39.

as specially bred Spanish bulls are today: we remember that the Minotaur was not completely herbaceous. The penalty for clumsiness and hesitancy is equally fatal in both Spanish and Minoan confrontations. The point is that the Minoan bullfighter did not seek blood: the game was played without intent of slaughter. It is the expression on the bullfighter's face that intrigued Kazantzakis into formulating what he called the Cretan Glance, for it is joy and laughter in the game with the bull that lightens the face. Later Kazantzakis identified this attitude as the tragic joy with which the Aeschylean heroes comported themselves in the face of their fate--a fate which was typically as merciless or as seemingly directionless as that force typified by the bull in the panels. It is a recognition of the interdependence of life, and the joy in facing chaos with whatever materials are at hand. The bullfighter's expression became a creating physical image which allowed Kazantzakis to invest his phrase the Cretan Glance with the tradition of the Minoan bull-cult and its heroic and necessitous attitude toward life.

The home, the homeland and its antiquities contributed their levels of meaning to Kazantzakis' phrase. In like manner, Crete's political history allowed another layer of meaning.

Crete stood at the crossroads of east and west. The physical placement of the island was such that it was overrun by invading forces too numerous to mention and sometimes too antique to differentiate. Crete seemingly has always been an occupied island, and its continuity historically has been due to the tenaciousness of the peasants in clinging to their land rather than to a unified line of Cretan rulers. During Kazantzakis' boyhood the island was occupied by the Turks:

> We faced the terrors of life from childhood; and so, very early, we turned from boys into men. . . . Near the coffeehouse . . . beside Morosini's fountain, an aged plane tree used to grow. . . . The Turks used it as a gallows for Christian rebels. And many times, on my way to school in the morning, I saw hanging from its branches, half naked, barefoot, tongues out, the bodies of Christians who had defied the tyrant.[1]

An occupying army brings with it a philosophy, a view of life that is uniquely its own, but which owes its foundations to the view of life that obtained in the army's native land. East and west clashed on Crete; the swords stopped ringing even as the most meaningful undercurrents of

[1] Nikos Kazantzakis, "Crete," p. 37.

thought and habit rumbled to the surface, to meet there and hang in tension with what had been before. The synthesis of this tension of eastern and western modes of thought is included in Kazantzakis' Cretan Glance. The Greek, or western, mode is "to strengthen, at the price of abundant efforts, the I, the inner stronghold which subjects the forces of instability, the primitive demons, to the illumination of the human will. The supreme ideal of Greece is to save the I from anarchy and chaos. The supreme ideal of the Orient is to unite the I with the infinite until it is lost in it. Passive contemplation, the bliss of renunciation, an utterly trustful self-abandonment to mysterious and impersonal forces: such is the essence of the Orient."[1] Having delineated these two modes of thought, Kazantzakis found on Crete a synthesis of them and described it as the "I gazing on the abyss, without perturbation but rather enabled to concentrate better on itself, to become more filled with pride and courage, as a result of this fixed gazing on life and death--which I call Cretan."[2]

The Cretan Glance becomes a rather more philosophic

[1] Nikos Kazantzakis, quoted by W. B. Stanford, The Ulysses Theme: A Study in the Adaptability of a Traditional Hero, 2nd ed. (1963; rpt. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968), p. 238.

[2] Ibid.

phrase at this point than it has been heretofore. It includes a supremely individualistic recognition of diversity, and the disinterested attitude which must accompany this recognition in order to maintain a modicum of ego integrity. The origin of the glance is the third inner eye, a mystic concept, it must be noted, which has survived man's ages with remarkable tenacity. Kazantzakis describes it as being between the eye of the orient or Dionysus and the eye of the Occident or Apollo.[1] He leans heavily on the synthesis effected by Nietzsche in the Birth of Tragedy at this point. The thought of Nietzsche was one of the great philosophic influences on Kazantzakis.

This definition of the relative positions of the ego, traditionally denoted by the use of "I", as standing between east and west can be carried one step further in the theogony of Kazantzakis. Not enough for him this simple and external image. He proceeded in his mind to

[1] Kimon Friar, introduction to The Odyssey: A Modern Sequel (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1958), p. xviii.

peel off the successive layers of meaning and definition until he arrived at a further division of the ego and that which surrounds it. If he sought a unity akin to the oceanic consciousness of which Freud speaks as being the privilege of infants not yet capable of seeing an I-It relationship and therefore claiming all it sees as I (and which consciousness is itself spoken of as the religious experience), Kazantzakis sought that unity on a level microscopic enough to qualify himself as a saint or a shaman--a maker of myths.[1] The traditional isolation of self physically achieved by removing oneself from the usual human relationships to a mountaintop, a cave, or a wilderness, was carried out on a metaphysical level by Kazantzakis, who isolated his self within his own mind. Kazantzakis' confusion in regard to the action/contemplation duality did not allow him to segregate himself physically from his fellows. His metaphysical level of endeavor led him to view the microcosm of his body in the same manner in which the macrocosm of the world is usually seen. Rather than isolate himself from mankind and battle external Gods and demons, Kazantzakis

[1] Pandelis Prevelakis, Nikos Kazantzakis and His Odyssey: A Study of the Poet and the Poem, trans. Philip Sherrard (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1961), p. 38.

found his battle internally with concepts and abstractions.

This is not the usual body/soul duality, for that duality is typically concerned with the merely sexual in opposition to the ideally spiritual. Kazantzakis' microcosm of spirit included a great many things, among them love, time, apperception of danger, and the emulation of self with suffering. All of these are interrelated and all of them are God. And in Kazantzakis' theogony, God is life force, the elan vital, a concept garnered from another great influence on his thought, Bergson. Thus, the Cretan Glance for Kazantzakis personally reaches even into the separation of the I-it within himself so that only the flame of his spirit could be considered I. Man's own self becomes the abyss to be struggled with, and the Cretan Glance takes on metaphysical meaning.

The phrase also acquires its proper sense of constantly evolving synthesis. All of life, including vegetable and animal life as well as mankind and God, are possessed of a life force, and the tension of all their contraries are resolved in the Cretan Glance, which becomes the momentary but harmonious synthesis of the life force, a synthesis which must be rigorously discarded or re-formed immediately upon its having been made, and always in an upward movement. Only thus can man become God truly, and only thus can God

become more perfectly God: God, too, is dependent upon the spiral.[1]

It is on this level, the level of perceiving the self as the abyss and at the same time the God-impulse, that we finally arrive at a proper level from which to consider Kazantzakis' novels, for we have finally arrived at the level of myth. We understand the concept myth to be the dynamic and evolving embodiment of cross-cultural and consistent truths within a framework of culturally differentiated patterns or stories, which owe their effectiveness to the incorporation of actuating symbols. Myth on this level might be either a ritual or a religious system, but it is always a method of dealing with the fragmentation of the self. Because of the upset of viable religious patterns or tradition patterns within western society occasioned by the advent of scientism and Marxist theory, modern man has become more and individually concerned with the discovery of the soul, which is merely another way of saying that each man must now make his

[1] Kimon Friar's introduction to the Odyssey is a clear and accessible overview of Kazantzakis' philosophy regarding the nature of God.

own myth.[1] Jung speaks of the arising of spiritual problems as following the downfall of viable patterns outside the self: "Whenever there is established an external form, be it ritual or spiritual, by which all the yearnings and hopes of the soul are adequately expressed--as for instance in some living religion--then we may say that the psyche is outside, and no spiritual problem, strictly speaking, exists."[2]

[1] Science and Marxist theory are here mentioned because their negative effects were of great concern to Kazantzakis. The manner in which science and the scientific method destroyed the numinous value of Christian symbols--not that they are any more valid than any other system's symbols, but rather that they obtained more specifically in Kazantzakis' world--is well documented. C. G. Jung's The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, Vol. 9, Part I of the Collected Works of C. G. Jung, trans. R. F. C. Hull, 2nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969), is concerned in part with this topic. His Flying Saucers: A Modern Myth of Things Seen in the Skies, trans. R. F. C. Hull (1958; rpt. NY: Signet, 1969), is a discussion strictly limited to the attempt of modern man to see in the saucers the same content previously seen in religious symbols.

For the effect which Marxist theory had upon the numinous value of traditional, historical symbols, see Nicholas Berdyaev, The Meaning of History, trans. George Reavey (1936; rpt. NY: World, 1962), particularly the chapter "On the Essence of the Historical: The Meaning of Tradition."

[2] C. G. Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul, trans. W. S. Dell and Cary F. Baynes (1933; rpt. NY: Harcourt, Brace and World, n.d.), p. 201.

When those patterns are cast aside, one must journey inside the microcosm of one's self in an attempt to re-discover the same images, which now find expression in a meaningful because individual manner. As Kerényi expresses it, "it is a kind of immersion in ourselves that leads to the living germ of our wholeness. The practice of this immersion is mythological fundamentalism and the result of such practice is that our eyes having been opened to the images /that are meaningful/ we find we have returned to the place where the . . . absolute and relative . . . coincide. The /first principles/ of the germ . . . the 'abyss of the nucleus,' opens out there, and there, we must presume, is the mid-point about which and from which our whole being organizes itself."[1] It is in this abyss of the nucleus that we create our own patterns.

Certainly Kazantzakis found the world around him devoid of patterns. "The epoch through which we are passing," he said, "break/s/ molds in political, economic, and social life, in thought and in action in order to achieve a new balance . . . on a higher plane; to create that which we have called a new Myth, and which might give a new and synchronized

[1] C. Kerényi, "Prolegomean," Essays on a Science of Mythology: The Myth of the Divine Child and the Mysteries of Eleusis, trans. R. F. C. Hull (1949; rpt. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 8-9.

meaning to our world at last. Our age is a savage one; the Bull, the underground Dionysian powers, has been unleashed; the Apollonian crust of the earth is cracking."[1]

But in keeping with the messiah with whom Kazantzakis ended his literary career and upon whose epic he pinned all hopes for the production of a masterpiece, Odysseus, Kazantzakis became a traveller also, searching for meaningful patterns of existence through the modes at his disposal: politician, revolutionary, scholar, and writer. The well of words into which the narrator of Zorba the Greek fell repeatedly only to find himself in need of rescue was Kazantzakis' well also. It is commonly understood that the narrator of that novel is merely a persona for Kazantzakis himself in the role of contemplative man. He described the process thus:

> Recently I've reached some unexpected conclusions about the Communist ideology, leaving my old theories behind. Always the same thing. In the same way at an earlier time I escaped from science, by which I'd been possessed, and later on from philosophy. And so now I'm going to emancipate myself from art too--only by working for it passionately, dedicated to it in my entirety will I succeed in liberating myself from it. This, I

[1] Nikos Kazantzakis, quoted by Kimon Friar, introduction to The Odyssey, p. xix-xx.

think, is the method of God.[1]

The dedication to art as a godlike means to the liberation of the self is an outgrowth of an earlier decision to follow "the third path" of art, expecting never to be artistically perfect, but allowing himself imperfection in that arena because his "intention transcend/ed/ the limits of Art."[2]

His intention was nothing less than the formulation of a new religion, a new viable pattern; one which would comfort the masses while allowing the onward and upward movement of superior souls. Art became the only means available to and congenial with Kazantzakis in the making of his myth.

It is this attempt at formulating a myth which makes Kazantzakis a heroic figure, just as it is the incorporation, consciously or unconsciously, of mythic patterns or symbols which makes any writer meaningful outside his own particular time and place, for it is only the inclusion of these things which makes him accessible. The particular pattern of the hero cycle is an outward projection of the inward process of the integration of the self.[3]

[1] Nikos Kazantzakis, letter to Helen of May 2, 1925, quote by Helen Kazantzakis, Biography, p. 120-21.

[2] Nikos Kazantzakis, conversation with Manolio Georgiadis of August 18, 1921, quoted by Helen Kazantzakis, Biography, p. 77.

[3] Again, this statement is based on the thesis of Joseph Campbell's Myths to Live By.

It is an assumption of this paper, therefore, that Kazantzakis made use of his search for unity, which he termed the Cretan Glance, and which can therefore be understood to be made up of the multiple levels of meaning discussed, and which owe their existence to the unique condition of Kazantzakis' birth, in an attempt to discover a viable myth for modern man.

It is the purpose of this paper to discover within the seven novels of the period from 1942-1954, i.e., Zorba the Greek, The Greek Passion, Freedom or Death, The Last Temptation of Christ, Saint Francis, The Fratricides, and the "autobiographical" Report to Greco, evidences of such a search for unity and totality. The seven novels will be examined in the light of the mythic hero cycle, in order to discover the peculiar components of such a cycle in Kazantzakis' world view and to elucidate those symbols which seem to hold prominence of attention and therefore greatest meaning. Since the novelistic treatment of any mythological pattern is dependent upon a particular philosophy, Kazantzakis' Saviors of God: Spiritual Exercises will be used to elucidate that philosophy, as well as those sections of the Odyssey which incorporate that philosophy.

Chapter II

The Heroes

Hardly had Zorba the Greek, The Greek Passion, and Freedom or Death been published in the United States in the late 1950's than critics responded. Popular critics tended to voice indignation and bandy tag phrases: Kazantzakis was Greek and therefore epic or Homeric, but never Olympian. Academic critics discovered gleefully that Kazantzakis had himself named his own influences: the bodyguards Nietzsche, Bergson, Christ, the Buddha and Zorba. They took him at his word and wrote articles explaining these influences. Granted, this was redundant. Worse, this was destructive insofar as it determined that Kazantzakis' avowed concern, the synthetic approach, was needful of being broken down, analyzed into tidy compartments, made antiseptic and "clean." But this solid criticism was published, and having done with mentioning that, we may safely ignore most of it.

Out of this verbiage there are several interesting voices: Leslie Fiedler is sometimes boorish, but never boring.[1]

[1] Leslie Fiedler, "Horse-Opera in Crete," New Republic, 134 (February, 1956), 19.

There are, happily, also some coherent and aspiring ones: Colin Wilson's remarks manage to catch something of the flavor of Nikos Kazantzakis' sweeping Zeuslike past on eagle's wings with the necessary amount of dignity to enable one, with dignity, to stumble on in his wake.[1] More to the point, there is even one voice which takes Kazantzakis to mean what he says when he says he seeks a new myth.

In "Kazantzakis and His Heroes," Alexander Karanikas discusses three of Kazantzakis' novels; Zorba, The Greek Passion and Freedom or Death.[2] He finds Kazantzakis' use of myth to be close to the "Marxist conviction that all knowledge from the past, including the myths, can be consciously and rationally used to disturb the intellectual status quo and ultimately change society."[3] With a slight shift of emphasis, one can agree with Mr. Karanikas. To change one insofar as guiding one to a viable ideal has always been the function of true myth; and having changed one, it is possible for that one to change many. Mr. Karanikas discusses other things, such as why the New Critics will not speak of Kazantzakis and how juvenile many of the

[1] Colin Wilson, "Nikos Kazantzakis," Mediterranean Review, I (Fall, 1970), 33-47.

[2] Alexander Karanikas, "Kazantzakis and His Heroes," Athene, XVIII (Spring, 1957), 4-9.

[3] Karanikas, p. 4.

Kazantzakian heroes seen to behave, and concludes that the "myth-making function of Kazantzakis . . . needs extended analysis and evaluation as a real contribution to world literature."[1]

Since such a paucity of such analysis and evaluative material exists, it is necessary to find an evaluative and analytic structure outside of literary criticism proper.

In Hero With a Thousand Faces, Joseph Campbell offers such a structure as he explores the meaning of the monomyth, a designation borrowed from James Joyce, which is the hero cycle. From viewing this cycle incarnate in a human figure, i.e., the psychological level, Campbell proceeds to a consideration of the application of the features of the monomyth to figures and concepts ahuman on a cosmological level. For the present, we shall concern ourselves with the former level and shall take as our guide Campbell's summary of the cycle as follows:

> The mythological hero, setting forth from his commonday hut or castle, is lured, carried away, or else voluntarily proceeds, to the threshold of adventure. There he encounters a shadow presence that guards the passage. The hero may defeat or conciliate this power and go alive into the kingdom of the dark (brother-battle, dragon-battle; offering, charm), or be slain by the opponent and

[1] Karanikas, p.9.

and descend in death (dismemberment, crucifixion). Beyond the threshold, then, the hero journeys through a world of unfamiliar yet strangely intimate forces, some of which severely threaten him (tests), some of which give magical aid (helpers). When he arrives at the nadir of the mythological round, he undergoes a supreme ordeal and gains his reward. The triumph may be represented as the hero's sexual union with the goddess-mother of the world (sacred marriage), his recognition by the father-creator (father atonement), his own divinization (apotheosis), or again--if the powers have remained unfriendly to him--his theft of the boon he came to gain (bride-theft, fire-theft); intrinsically it is an expansion of consciousness and therewith of being (illumination, transfiguration, freedom). The final work is that of return. If the powers have blessed the hero, he now sets forth under their protection (emissary); if not, he flees and is pursued (transformation flight, obstacle flight). At the return threshold the transcendental powers must remain behind; the hero re-emerges from the kingdom of dread (return, resurrection). The

boon that he brings restores the world (elixir).[1]

It is possible to use this structure not only to analyze the myth-making of Nikos Kazantzakis, but also to evaluate his success, even in the face of Kazantzakis' use of a multiplicity of relationship configurations.

It is convenient to separate the novels of Kazantzakis into three groups on the basis of relationship configurations: the political novels, the spiritual novels, and those of autobiography. These groups are by no means exclusive of one another; however, the arena of the hero in each novel does invite such grouping on first glance. One can be heroic only in the light of his relationship with something else, and there are three different kinds of relationship: that of the finite one with the finite many, or a hero-society relationship; that of the finite one with the infinite one, or a hero-god relationship; and finally, that of the finite one with the finite one, or a hero-self relationship. Unique to the first are problems of private and public will, societal

[1] Joseph Campbell, Hero With a Thousand Faces (1949; rpt. NY: World Meridian, 1970), pp. 245-46. Hereinafter citations refer to this edition and are denoted by Hero.

order, and freedom and morality; to the second, freedom and necessity, spirit and flesh; and to the third, thought as opposed to action, the process of becoming and the quest for identity.[1]

Thus, the political novels, or those dealing with the hero-body politic relationship are Freedom or Death (1950) in which the hero, Captain Michales, is involved in the struggle of his Cretan people for freedom from the ruling Turks, and The Fratricides (1954), in which Priest Yanaros is involved in the struggle of his land-owning flock in the face of Marxist insurgents. The spiritual novels are those which deal with a hero ostensibly outside the "I" of the author and who is involved in a relationship with an infinite one: that is, The Greek Passion (1948), in which Manolios as hero takes as his concern the patterning of his self after Christ, The Last Temptation of Christ (1951), in which Christ struggles with his unmanifest father to fulfill the prophecies for his people, and St. Francis (1953), in which Francis also seeks the unmanifest father. The autobiographical novels are Zorba the Greek (1943) and Report to Greco (1953), in which the narrator is a more or less disguised persona

[1] Victor Brombert, "The Idea of the Hero," The Hero in Literature, ed. Victor Brombert (NY: Fawcett, 1969), p. 12-15.

for the author, in a more or less overt journey of individuation--a hero-self relationship.[1]

The crux in each group is, however, the hero's ability to integrate his self before he can effect changes in his society. The emphasis must be placed on the issues with which the author works in each case even though the problem is basically the same.

A. The Novels of Politics

Freedom or Death, although published in 1950, was a work of much longer concern to Kazantzakis. He worked and re-worked, cast and re-cast, mulled the implications of what he finally published from the time he was a child.[2] Even a sketchy history of its composition indicates that his

[1] The dates of the novels are taken from Sandra Parker, "Kazantzakis in America: A Bibliography of Translations and Comment," Bulletin of Bibliography, XXV (Sept.-Dec., 1968), 170. She notes she has repeated Prevelakis' chronology, which is taken by most authorities to be the most correct one.

[2] In addition to the discussion of Freedom or Death above in which Kazantzakis states that he lived the novel in a sanguinary way from the age of four, it can be further stated that in 1940 Kazantzakis returned to Crete to refresh his memory of place in connection with a book titled My Father (Biography, p. 387). In 1948, Kazantzakis wrote to Borje Knos thanking him for his translation of Grandfather, a novel later published as Freedom or Death. Whatever else one gleans from this, it is a certainty that this novel was the beginning point of Kazantzakis' search for heroism through the ranks of his forebears, and that, whatever its date of publication, the search had gone on for years previous to it.

subject matter was worked until it did not allow any further evolution. Since it was the story of Kazantzakis' Cretan forebears, particularly his mother and father, it is logical to assume that his involvement with them did not allow him the necessary distance from his material to make a work of complete objectivity, nor to fully elucidate the hero cycle through the figures of his family. The novel does, however, offer a convenient starting point from which to discover Kazantzakis' growing awareness of the monomyth, a psychological structure for all that one eminent critic finds Freedom or Death to be "an obvious pastiche of Byronic stereotypes and costume drama out of Sir Walter Scott," which does not fulfill the novel's "one obligation . . . to illuminate the dark underside of the psyche, to explore the duplicity of human motivation."[1] If Freedom or Death fulfills any obligation, it fulfills that one.

The hero of the novel, Captain Michales, is called to his adventure in a manner typical of the mythic pattern. As Campbell describes it, the call is delivered by a herald: "As a preliminary manifestation of the powers that are breaking into play . . . [a 'herald' appears]; the crisis of his appearance is the 'call to adventure.' The herald's summons. . . . may sound the call to some high historical undertaking." (51, Hero) The herald announces an adventure

[1] Fiedler, loc. cit.

which is, in essence, a breaking of old norms and patterns of behavior in order to gain new insights and evolve new behavior consistent with them, and thus is often a "representative of /the7 unconscious" (52, Hero). As such, it is "often dark, loathly, or terrifying, judged evil by the world" (53, Hero). The herald and his call rejected, "the hero /may7 return . . . for a while to his familiar occupations /but find them7 unfruitful" (56, Hero). Whatever the reaction of the hero, the first stage of the mythic pattern is this call which "signifies that destiny has summoned the hero and transferred his spiritual center of gravity from within the pale of his society to a zone unknown." (58, Hero)

The unknown zone does not necessarily refer to exotic terrain. The unknown zone is an ahistorical time. Although the hero may walk among his usual friends, he is projected into what has been called a mythical time.[1] This time is "a time that is qualitatively quite different from profane or passing time. It is all-at-once instead of one-thing-after-

[1] Mircea Eliade, Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return, trans. Willard R. Trask (1954; rpt. NY: Harper and Row, 1959), p. 76. See the chapter "The Regeneration of Time."

another,' past and present and future merging and becoming one--the eternal instant."[1] Thus, everyday events can become mythic ones; the unknown zone can be as familiar as one's own home.

The figure of Captain Michales is such as to stand already above others of his countrymen; his is the status of Captain, of palikar, while at the same time being a blood brother of Nuri Bey, the leader of the Turkish community equivalent in stature and secular function. Michales' stature is recognized by other characters in the novel and by Michales himself: "I've given my word," he thinks to himself, "and I must keep it, even if /my brother/ is older than I. I'm the head of the village." (81, FD) This attitude in a patriarchal society which gives place of honor to the first-born son is a recognition of self-worth justified by others.

The Captain begins to gain mythic heroic stature, however, in that in his figure are concentrated not only the dregs of past efforts to freedom, but also the seeds of the future--the possibility of a new way to find freedom through cooperative effort with the Turkish enemies; a possibility which is at bottom a necessity for a mythic hero

[1] J. B. Priestley, Man and Time (1964; rpt. NY: Dell, 1968), p. 121.

for it is the possibility for a realignment of viewpoint. He is already the enemy's brother, he is powerful within his own camp, and most importantly, he is capable of doubt; he is not reactionary through lack of perception. He is, then, of stature to be summoned by destiny.

His summons to heroic adventure comes about because of his close relationship with Nuri Bey. Captain Michales' brother, Manusakas, becomes drunk, "hoist /s/ an ass onto his back and /goes/ into the /Turkish/ mosque to pray" (28, FD). The Turks are insulted and the Greeks arm themselves in the face of Turkish threats. Nuri Bey calls upon Michales to calm the situation. The Captain, displeased, asks himself again if it is hatred or fondness he feels for Nuri (31, FD). The Bey, sensing his request to be ill-received, casts about for a way to ingratiate himself with Captain Michales and thus gain his objective: peace on Crete with no upset in the power structure. He discovers something to gladden the Captain, "something no Turk has every done for anyone except his brother" (26, FD). His singular honor to his "brother" is the showing of his wife, Emine, a Circassian woman who does not share her husband's cultural or religious background, nor the background of the very patriarchal Captain. Emine is outside the spheres of influence which have shaped both men's responses to life and to themselves. While waiting for Emine to appear,

Michales plays with his rosary, breaking two of the beads after his first glance at her (38, FD). This is an indication of the disruption of his emotional equilibrium.

Emine plays her mandolin for her husband's guest. The Captain's response is hardly what the Bey wishes, for Michales dreams of havoc:

> The notes of the mandolin became faster. She swayed in the half-light like some wild beast, and drew a deep breath. And suddenly there shot from her pulsing throat a fountain out of the bowels of the earth--the woman's voice. The house shook and Captain Michales' temples were pierced. What an uproar there was! What ecstasy in his fists, his throat, his loins! The mountains laughed and the plains turned scarlet with Turkish soldiers. Over them stormed Captain Michales on Nuri's charger, behind him thousands of Cretans in black headbands, before him no one. The villages shouted, the minarets snapped like felled cypresses, the blood rose as high as his horse's belly. . . . (39, FD)

Even more telling is the Captain's reaction to Nuri's request that he drink to Emine's health. The Captain sticks "two fingers into the overfilled glass" and presses them apart, breaking the glass (40, FD). This reaction and his

subsequent behavior indicate that the real call to adventure is delivered by Emine and it is an adventure of a grander depth than that of the Bey's timorous request, a request which in any case has already been tacitly refused. Emine is the herald of the Captain's call to adventure in which he must reconcile within himself the warring elements of masculinity and feminity, the first example of what has been called the one constant struggle in Kazantzakis' novels.[1]

Emine fulfills the requirements of the herald, for to the Captain she is both seductive and loathly. She knows of Captain Michales through the Bey; knows of his "heroic deeds, his drunkeness and wildness. . . . that he would never say or listen to a word about women" (39, FD). His wife, Katerina, also knows of these things and at a rather more painful closeness. Her recognition of the Captain's attitude towards women is a total one: "Since no son had been granted to her father . . . Katerina had enjoyed a son's masculine freedom and favor. But with her marriage she fell into the claws of a lion. In the first years she showed defiance and put up a resistance. But in time she bowed her head. He was Captain Michales. Who could fight him? Strength and independence slackened. She grew softer." (44,FD)

[1] Adèle Bloch, "Dual Masks of Kazantzakis," Journal of Modern Literature, II (November, 1971), 192-93.

Even their daughter, Renio, is banished from her father's sight upon her reaching puberty, as though temptation can be removed along with the object of temptation. Her father fails to recognize her when he sees her at a family wedding and expresses interest in her until he discovers she is his daughter (202,FD).

Even taken out of the realm of familial relationships, the Captain's attitude in regard to the place of woman and the womanly is an example of his deep distrust of anything feminine. Upon being told the story of Othello, the Captain approves of Othello's jealous murder (139,FD). Thus, women are, to Captain Michales, loathly creatures. Emine is an aggressively sensual woman, a fit representative of the loathsome-seeming powers of the subconscious.

Emine fits the character of the herald even more when we remember that any ambivalence of attitude to things Turkish is confined within the Captain to his blood brother only. Other Turks are hateful to him. Emine is Turkish because of her marriage to the Bey. Before the Captain enter's the Bey's home, he breathes the air "against his will, with head bent" and wonders why he is there, what he is after: "Turks' stink?" he questions himself (26,FD).

Further, Captain Michales meets Emine after passing under the eyes of the "Three Graces," a sarcastic nickname for three old maids, Aglaja, Thalia and Phrosyne, sisters barren

of grace in any form, who peep from behind their door to spy on the events surrounding the Bey's house. In their gracelessness and malevolency, these three constitute a group of fates and mention of them serves to concentrate importance on the world they survey.

The situation posited by the Bey's call upon Captain Michales is a situation involving questions of public (peace) and private (pride) will. The order of society is ostensibly the crux; however, because of the personal reaction of Captain Michales to meeting Emine and the locale of the meeting, the ostensible crux can be relegated to a secondary position. The hero, Captain Michales, finds himself in a personal situation in which his pattern of life and his perception of his own power is called into question. Rather than being a novel of politics and the political hero, we find that Freedom or Death is the first striving toward the building of a traditional mythic hero on the part of the writer.

Captain Michales' behavior in the days following his meeting with Emine bear out this interpretation. Campbell mentions that an outgrowth of the meeting with the herald may be a return to former patterns of behavior, but that they now prove fruitless. And thus it is with the Captain. Leaving the Bey's house, he goes home by the longest route, walking "like a hunted wild beast" (43,FD).

Seeing two Turkish women, he smells the scent of musk and growls, "All the devils are on my track. . . . but they shan't succeed!" (44,FD). In the days that follow, the Captain finds that the devils are succeeding only too well, and his response is to summon his grotesques, the friends with whom he twice yearly feasts and drinks away his frustrations. It is a feast not only during fast days, but also well ahead of the twice yearly schedule (51,FD). This time the feast does not fulfill its function, for on the third morning, the Captin's friends are released to return home, rather than being kept for the usual eight days (144, FD).

The repose of sleep also does not ease Captain Michales. He dreams of "shameless" things--that is, of Emine. Sleep becomes "a Turkish creature, a mad one, and he did not trust it" (54, FD). The forgetfulness of sleep and the forgetfulness of riot do not banish Captain Michales' new demon, a demon which "did not bellow, did not threaten; it laughed. Its breath did not stink, it smelled sweet. For the first time Captain Michales was afraid" (114,FD).

Even religion does not afford solace. On Maundy Thursday, Captain Michales "for the first time in his life" does not go to communion, and vows that he will not do so until the evil spirit within him is vanished (192,FD). As Holy Week draws to its close "only two in all Megalokastro were not with God in their thoughts" (193, FD). One, Captain

Polyxigis, having taken Emine for mistress, lies in her arms. The other, Captain Michales, sits "upright in his bed in the dark and smoke/s/ one cigarette after another. Like a dog, his thoughts /run/ through the narrow alleys and stop . . . barking, in front of /Emine's/ green door" (193-94, FD).

The Captain's sole solace is the riding of his beloved mare, which he does furiously. The mare is identified with Emine in terms of life force. Just as Emine awakens demons in Captain Michales, so has the symbol of the horse done in times past for other people.[1] Emine eyes men and sniffs their odor as the mare does with the Bey's stallion. The "Three Graces," the Hags, hear the Captain's mare approach the Turkish quarter, and comment:

> "Quiet, quiet!" said Phrosyne, "just listen to how Nuri's horse is neighing!"
>
> From the precincts of the Turkish konak the noble steed could be heard greeting the lusty mare.
>
> "Emine's whinnying," said Thalia with a giggle. But immediately her tongue stuck in her throat, and both her sisters cried out; for as the mare heard the stallion's neighing, she reared, as if she

[1] J. E. Cirlot, A Dictionary of Symbols, trans. Jack Sage (NY: Philosophical Library, 1962), p. 144-45.

wanted to dance.

"That's death for Captain Michales," cried the three. (159, FD)

Both the mare and the woman become pregnant: both can be regarded as representing the force of the Captain's unconscious mind. The only exception is that the mare recognizes the strength of her "pitiless master" and obeys him, whereas Emine does not (159, FD).

The fruitlessness of Captain Michales' wonted habits and behaviors is evidence of his reluctance to honor his heroic summons. The answer at which he finally arrives, precipitated by actions of those still living in profane time around him, is to refuse the summons and resume even more of his old ways of perceiving.

Campbell tells us that even should a hero be summoned, he may choose to ignore or refuse the summons. In the case of a refusal, the "subject loses the power of significant affirmative action. . . . his world becomes a wasteland of dry stones and his life feels meaningless--even though, like King Minos he may through titanic effort succeed in building an empire of renown. Whatever house he builds, it will be a house of death" (59, Hero). The Captain begins to build his house of death, even as prophesied by the Hags.

He is precipitated into rejecting his call to adventure because of the actions of others. Nuri Bey kills the

Captain's brother, the offending Manusakas, and is emasculated himself in the process. The Captain is told of this as he stares at the sea. His inner struggles have brought him to this pass:

> He stared, but saw nothing: his gaze was directed within. His body had grown slack in the last few days, and his mouth was bitter and firmly shut. Passing Turks cast evil glances at him, and many of his Christian friends avoided him. They guessed at a dark power in him, and dared not come near him. (218, FD)

Such soul searching might have proven profitable in terms of the Captain's ultimately arriving at a synthesis of the powers struggling within him. He is interrupted, however, and gladly turns to the business at hand--vengeance.

> He shook his head and stoodup. His decision was suddenly made. He shut the shop and stuck the key in his belt. He did not go into Broad Street, but made his way through the narrow alleys. Out of the Greek quarter, he came into the Turkish. The Hags were not yet at their peepholes and did not see him. In front of the green door he halted. Like a falcon his gaze shot up to the high, blind walls and perched on the tiny balcony with its closed lattice. But suddenly he wrenched his gaze

> away, with rage and disgust in his heart, as though he had defiled himself, and let his eyes once more sweep over the rough walls. This evening he was not concerned with women and balconies. The falcon of his spirit swept over the head of Nuri and longed to strike its claws into his eyes and his brain. (219, FD)

The Three Hags no longer see the Captain at this juncture: he is no longer within the sphere of myth.

Because he rejects any ameliorating synthesis of the masculine/feminine duality, the Captain's destructive potentialities are unleashed. He begins to dress like Charos:

> Captain Michales arrived at Manusakas' yard. He wore a black shirt, black headband and black boots, like Charos. He shoved the women aside . . . went in, bent down, kissed the dead man and stood for a long time gazing at him silently. . . . /The others/ stood in a circle and watched how the two brothers spoke together without saying a word. (227, FD)

This Charos is no kindly guide to the underworld: this Charos is a survival of an ancient religion; the "strong and cruel robber, who mercilessly snatches men away from their life."[1]

[1] Jonathan Griffen, translator's note, Freedom or Death, p. 197, quoting Nilsson, A History of Greek Religion (Oxford, 1925), p. 303.

The Captain arrives at his house of death through alleys of frustration. The Bey is ill and therefore no "manly" match for the Captain: vengeance is frustrated. When the Captain hears that Emine has been captured by the Turks, he goes to recover her, leaving his armed forces leaderless: the Christ the Lord Monastery, his stronghold, is destroyed; the revolution is broken in impulse. He achieves his personal death in a senseless manner. He leaves behind no elixir which will help those who follow him, but dies in the manner best calculated to insure that the legend of his death will act as venom for future generations. His son, Thrasaki, resembles his father more and more: animality and self-will become his guiding impulses. This is a violation of Kazantzakis' rule:

> Your first duty, in completing your service to your race, is to feel within you all your ancestors. Your sacred duty is to throw light on their onrush and to continue their work. Your third duty is to pass on to your son the great mandate to surpass you.[1]

The light, of course, is the light of the militant spirit, quite a different thing than the light of the funeral pyre

[1] Nikos Kazantzakis, The Saviors of God: Spiritual Exercises, trans. Kimon Friar (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p. 74.

or of burning Turks. Michales' great mandate to Thrasaki is not to surpass him save in ferocity and beastliness, certainly not in any spiritually evolutionary manner.

Captain Michales is an Achilles, as described by one of the "wise fools" who abound in the pages of the novel. And his Achilles heel is his refusal to recognize the demands of the feminine half of his psyche. Campbell speaks of the sacred marriage as part of the rewards to be gained by the questing hero:

> The mystical marriage with the queen goddess of the world represents the hero's total mastery of life; for the woman is life, the hero its knower and master. And the testings of the hero, which were preliminary to his ultimate experience and deed, were symbolical of those crises of realization by means of which his consciousness came to be amplified and made capable of enduring the full possession of the mother-destroyer, his inevitable bride. (120-21, Hero)

What is implied here is that reconciliation of the masculine/feminine polarity must be achieved by the hero within himself after the preliminary knowledge of such duality has broken in upon a hitherto unaware consciousness. Campbell says further that "generally we refuse to admit within ourselves . . .

the fullness of that pushing, self-protective, malodorous, carnivorous, lecherous fever which is the very nature of the organic cell" (121, Hero). If the recognition of this is suppressed, "woman in particular as the great symbol of life . . . becomes intolerable" (122, Hero). Captain Michales' action in the putting away of his daughter, Renio, recalls similar stories from the lives of Western saints, all equally saddening in the waste of life because of false mastery (123, Hero). His murder of Emine is an action of ignorance and denial. He regrets it and attempts to avert her death in mid-murder. Campbell says that "regrets are illuminations come too late" (121, Hero).

The conscious regrets are, however, only short-lived. The Captain has Crete to think about and his forefathers to invoke. There is no thought in his mind for the present or the future because he concentrates on the past. He speaks with Captain Polyxigis about the death of Emine, a death Polyxigis deeply and humanly mourns:

> Captain Michales' heart contracted. Not for the sake of the woman he had killed. She had had to be killed, so as not to divide the two men. Since the night of the murder his heart had been lightened. He was no longer ashamed when he was alone. His spirit had shaken free of the Circassian,

and he fought for Crete single-mindedly. He was sorry only for the good palikar, who was pining away for the loss of a woman.

"Captain Polyxigis," he began, "I have something to say to you. Forgive me, but it is shameful to be thinking of a woman while Crete swims in blood. I tell you, on my honor, if a woman stood in the way of my fulfilling my duty, I would kill her with my own hand."

"Captain Michales, you're a wild beast. I'm a man," answered Captain Polyxigis. (392, FD)

Kosmas, the nephew who returns in time to die in battle with Michales, also describes the Captain as a beast: "He's like my father--a wild beast," he says (408, FD). Earlier, upon returning home, Kosmas' mother, told that her daughter-in-law, Naemi, is pregnant, frantically asks Kosmas if he had asked his father's premission. This father, too, had locked his daughter up in her room, and this father's ghost takes advantage of Kosmas' adsence to stalk into Naemi's bedroom and cause her miscarriage. These are the forebears to whom Captain Michales feels allegiance.

With the wisdom of those who watch, the Metropolitan and the schoolmaster, Tityros, tell Kosmas what they see:

"It was his fault that the Christ the Lord Monastery was lost," the Metropolitan had told him.

"And now he wants to wash away his dishonor. That's why he won't give in. Perhaps he wants to be killed, to pay in full."

"But if the well-being of Crete requires otherwise?" Kosmas had asked.

The Metropolitan has hesitated, weighing his words. "God forgive me," he had murmured at last, "but I believe your uncle has a demon inside him, whose name is not Crete."

"There's a dark moment in his life," his other uncle Tityros, had confided to him. "A mystery about Captain Polyxigis and a Turkish woman. There's a lot of talk about it. His heart is wild, it no longer follows his brain."

"He was jealous about Arkadi," the gnome Charilaos had told him mockingly. "So the rascal took it into his head that he too would blow something sky-high, so that people should sing a song about him!" (480-81, FD)

Captain Michales, through whatever motivation, finds himself not even capable of the preliminary step to creating anything, destruction. He merely regresses into the Cretan past. Failing to find within himself the understanding that the world, all of life, is a synthesis of both masculine and feminine, he ends by destroying his own life meaninglessly and

the lives of many of those who surround him. As "the modern Achilles . . . /he/ is too preoccupied with destroying and being destroyed to concern himself with understanding this experience."[1]

The hero of The Fratricides, Yanaros, is, on the other hand, ultimately concerned with understanding his experience.[2] A religious man, Yanaros is predisposed to the mystic interpretation of experience, and as we have seen, that interpretation is not only the way of the hero but also the way of expressing the hero's deeds. He is, however, concerned with questions which place his actions within the sphere of the hero-society relationship: he is concerned with societal order and his view of freedom has ultimately to do with the morality of freedom.

Yanaros is, literally translated, "Big John."[3] Near the end of the novel he recognizes his role in life to be akin to that fulfilled by John the Baptist:

[1] Tom Doulis, "Kazantzakis and the Meaning of Suffering," Northwest Reivew, VI (Winter, 1963), 46.

[2] Nikos Kazantzakis, The Fratricides, trans. Athena Gianakos Dallas (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1964), p. 233. All subsequent quotations from this novel refer to this edition and are denoted by Frat.

[3] M. Byron Raizis, "Kazantzakis and Chaucer," Comparative Literature Studies, VI (June, 1969), 143.

> I will become a herald of God, he thought, and shout like St. John the Forerunner in the wilderness. He had shouted and shouted until gradually the stones developed ears, heard him, moved, became friends, and embrace one another; and Christ's church was built. (233, Frat.)

Yanaros' slow and painful acquisition of this recognition is indebted to the events of the traditional hero cycle: more specifically, to that hero cycle central to Christendom, and this partly because he grows to understanding in the novelistic time scheme of Holy Week. He is unable to fulfill the function of the hero in entirety for he fails to bring back to society the elixir of his transformation.

For all that, Father Yanaros does indeed fulfill several requirements of the hero. The world in which he lives is a wasteland:

> The sun had set in Castello. It had flooded the rooftops and now overflowed, spilling onto the dipping, narrow back streets, pitilessly uncovering the harsh ugliness of the village. Stark and ashen, the houses were barren, stone piled on stone, their doors so low one had to stoop to enter--and within was darkness. The courtyards smelled of horse manure, goat droppings, and the heavy stench of man. Not a single house had a tree in its court-

> yard, or a songbird in a cage, or a flowerpot in the window, with perhaps a root of basil or a red carnation; everywhere, only stone upon stone. And the souls who lived within these stones were hard and inhospitable. Mountains, houses, people--they were all granite.
>
> Rarely, even in the good years, was the sound of laughter heard in this village; it seemed indecent, an act against nature; the old men would turn and wrinkle their brows, and immediately the laughter would cease. (7, Frat.)

As Jessie Weston has pointed out, it is just such a wasteland which is in need of a revivifying hero.[1]

When civil war breaks out, the people see it as mystic: "Murder, that most ancient need of man, took on a high mystic meaning." (8, Frat.) Bloodshed, particularly in agrarian societies, has always seemed an efficacious method of righting an imbalance in nature. In this society, where the King, wasted and impotent, is symbolized by the armed forces which attempt to maintain the status quo in the face of armed insurgents, who are Marxist and no more individual than the forces of the "king," we have two contentious masses.

[1] Jessie Weston, From Ritual to Romance (1920; rpt. Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor, 1957). Particularly chapters I-VI.

These masses involved in the murder of each other attempt blindly to enact a ritual which will better their lives, free their land from blight. Among these masses there stands no character who has developed his own ego far enough to annihilate it and bring harmony, first to himself and then others. This war is an outbreak of senseless bloodshed, ineffective murder, and more importantly, only the promise of more of the same. Campbell speaks of the situation thus:

> Totem, tribal, racial, and aggressively missionizing cults represent only partial solutions of the psychological problem of subduing hate by love; they only partially initiate. Ego is not annihilated in them: rather, it is enlarged; instead of thinking only of himself, the individual becomes dedicated to the whole of <u>his</u> society. The rest of the world . . . is left outside the sphere of his sympathy and protection because outside the sphere of the protection of his god. . . . Instead of clearing his own heart the zealot tries to clear the world. . . . The fire of a perpetual holy war is hurled . . . against whatever uncircumcised, barbarian, heathen, "native," or alien people happens to occupy the position of neighbor. (156, <u>Hero</u>)

In the midst of fratricide, posited already on a mythic level, only one individual stands apart, Father Yanaros. His concerns are larger than a blind re-enactment of a not-understood mental and psychic state:

> One man stood among them, unarmed and disillusioned, his arms outstretched and empty: Father Yanaros, the village priest. He stood alone, looking to the left and to the right, not knowing which way to turn, constantly asking himself that same agonizing question: "If Christ came down to earth today, whose side would He take? Would He go with the blacks? With the reds? Or would He, too, stand in the middle, with arms outstretched, shouting, 'Brothers, unite!'. . . Father Yanaros, God's representative in Castello, stood in just this manner and called to the people. (9, Frat.)

In addition to his standing alone and questioning, Father Yanaros is conversant with the experience of Paradise, knows it to be ephemeral, and half-understands it to be difficult to maintain in that it is an active state, one of becoming and not of being. He thinks of the dance of the Firewalkers, an ancient legacy from some dimly remembered pagan rite incorporated into Christendom, and he knows that "Paradise is this fire, and God is this dance, and they last not just

a moment, but forever and ever" (11, Frat.). Yanaros recognizes the mythic moment.

In the past, Yanaros has rejected all paths of life save the path blazed by Christ. Now, the problem he faces is to discover the relative morality of two paths, both of which seem equally Christlike--that of the Marxist rebels and destruction, or that of leading his flock to peace and maintenance of what obtains. He looks to God for the answer and discovers that God is incapable of communicating an answer. He looks to the things of God: the Firewalker icon which is dependent upon an earlier face of God and the icon of the Second Coming, which is dependent upon a future manifestation of a face of God. Because of this futurity the latter icon shifts its message in the course of the novel from mercy to justice to indecipherableness to innocence with the threat of strength: the innocent lion as opposed to the lamb. The icons do not answer the question of the moment.

Within this confusion, the call to adventure is delivered to Yamaros. On Holy Wednesday, a young monk appears at his door. The monk is wounded and asks for help. His appearance is that of Gabriel:

> And in that moment a flash appeared, illuminating Father Yanros' mind; now he remembered! Years ago, when the Metropolitan Bishop of Yannina ordered

> a painting of the Annunciation, Father Yanaros had painted the Archangel Gabriel in the image of this young monk, with these same deep-blue eyes. (57, Frat.)

The annunciation of this monk is akin to that delivered by the Archangel first to Elizabeth and then to Mary. The Archangel Gabriel is mentioned by name few times in the Christian tradition: "In Scripture he is set forth only as the representative of the angelic nature in its ministration of comfort and sympathy to man."[1]

In this sense, the call to adventure becomes even more apparent. Yanaros is summoned by one who comes from Father Arsenios, the carver of the Second Coming icon, a great and honored friend of Yanaros who is now demented and demoniacally possessed, but who has sent the monk with instructions to save Yanaros. The monk's message is one postulating the necessity of choice: "There was a time when you could be on the other side of the looking glass, Father Yanaros, but bad times have fallen upon us--don't you realize that? You cannot sit back with folded arms." (61, Frat.) And his advice, which has already saved him, is to join the rebels. The monk tells Yanaros that the Great Comforter has come and that he is Lenin:

[1] William Smith, Smith's Bible Dictionary (NY: Pyramid, 1967), p. 196.

> "I found the Comforter among the guerrillas . . . but they do not know who sent him and they call him Lenin. They don't even know why he was sent; they think that he came to create a new world, a more just world. But he did not come to create. He came to destroy! To destroy the old world and prepare the way for the One who is coming. . . . Christ!" (67, Frat.)

Yanaros' reaction is horror: the very ideas put forth by the monk are heretical and loathly to him.

This is a call that Yanaros has awaited and yet the method of answering the call is still not clear to him. Yanaros, the latter day Baptist, struggles through the rest of the night and concludes that he must reject the most obvious method of answering the call:

> But as logic stirred within him, Father Yanaros tossed his head back in anger. "Get thee behind me, Satan," he shouted and spat in the air. "My post is here in Castello, and this is where I will fight, a man among men! The time is gone when man could find salvation in the wilderness. The modern Thevai is the world; courage then, Father Yanaros, God is a fighter, and so is man; then fight beside Him!" (72, Frat.)

The logic of Yanaros' mind is the nature of the first

threshold guardian. Campbell mentions that certain figures in dreams, such as watchmen, police officials and officers, can be interpreted as threshold guardians. But in addition to these dream or subconscious guardians, the function of the Freudian superego is to serve also as threshold guardian. The superego is those learned and order-maintaining responses and defenses which can be simplistically termed conscience, and as such, it is wholly conscious. Thus, Yanaros' logic can be viewed as the guardian's voice lulling the would-be hero from the "wilderness" of his hero-trek.

The call is denied for the nonce and the dawn of Holy Thursday comes. All nature prepares for the crucifixion which will scapegrace their debts:

> Dawn came; it was Holy Thursday; Christ went from Anna to Kayafas, beaten, cursed, crowned with thorns. The gypsy blacksmiths had already begun to pound the nails for His crucifixion; the angels, too, had begun to look down from the sky at Virtue being crucified on earth. And Gabriel the Archangel sat among them, with folded wings; and his eyes filled with tears. The air was still, melancholy, this Holy Thursday, as if it were the Archangel himself. (73, Frat.)

Yanaros, sleepless through the night, prepares to engage in his usual activities. It is not possible:

> For a moment his mind had scattered; the weight that had crushed him the night before was exorcised; he decided to enter the church and prepare the cross for evening. They had brought him wildflowers from Prastova to decorate the crucifix for tonight and the sepulcher for Good Friday. He opened the door of the church and glanced inside; the light entered from the window and fell on the icon of Christ. He could not make out the calm form, the blond beard, the long fingers which held a green sphere--the earth. Quickly he closed the door, as though ashamed to appear in this condition before Him. He sat back down on the ledge. (74,Frat.)

This is the fruitless attempt to perform perfunctorally in the face of crises of which we have spoken as falling to the lot of the call-denying hero. Yanaros returns to the courtyard. He sits among the graves and ponders his dilemma, a Golgotha vigil. He remembers a parable and wonders if God does not work in ways Machiavellian; ways more condusive to man than concurrent to angels.

It is as if this openness to diversity, which itself is the root of Yanaros' doubts, is also the indication of willingness to consider more fully the call given him. Campbell says that even though the called hero may appear to

have refused the call definitely and for all, in certain cases he will be bedeviled by those powers which wish him to answer the call: "Well able is Allah to save." (74, Hero) This is the case for Father Yanaros.

Minutes later, he runs to minister the sacraments to the dying. The spirit of his belief is high and at this point the grace of that belief lends him strength: "He felt a fierce, blind strength flowing from the Holy Chalice into his hands, his arms, and through his whole aged body; the burden made him lurch and stumble over the stones." (81, Frat.) Returning from his mission, having reacquainted himself with the activities of the priest, he feels himself with God: "He felt that he was holding God by the hand, leading him through the desolate alleys of Castello, showing him the pain of man." (85, Frat.) As he walks he considers that

> "if you're a lamb, you're eaten up; if you're a wolf, you do the eating. My God, is there no third animal, a stronger, kinder one? And a voice inside him replied, 'There is, yes, there is, Father Yanaros; be patient. Thousands of years ago it set out to find us, to become human; but it hasn't arrived yet. Are you in a hurry? God is in no hurry, Father Yanaros.'" (86, Frat.)

Yanaros' question of what path to choose, what actions to

assume, is still unanswered and it is the nature of God to allow man to lead Him.

The journey of Yanaros through the village streets is one of rejection by the people and also by the other pole of the question which besets him, the Marxist schoolmaster, who refuses to talk with Yanaros. To one who walks in the middle might come understanding and respect in time of peace. Yanaros' time is not peaceful.

Part of the assurance and creature comfort which the schoolmaster might have been able to afford Yanaros is given novelistically in the words of Leonidas' diary wherein is given a justification of destruction:

> I've come to the conclusion that the cruelties and injustices we commit will not be in vain--for they wake the soul of the one who has been wronged, they rouse it and set it on fire. All these Castellians could have passed their lives in slavery and stupor; but our beastliness is a good thing; we won't let them rot with patience and cowardice; the slaves that we kick around will rise one day, and all the hills will fall and crush the valleys; and their captain will be--God willing--this baby, held in the arms of this silent, proud mother today. (103, Frat.)

Leonidas, a rebel, hopes the revolution will perform the work

of awakening souls. Kazantzakis poses for us dramatically the question which Yanaros embodies: how, in action, does mankind become more than a worm with potentiality for being a butterfly. How does he indeed become a butterfly.

It is this question which Yanaros takes again to his mentor--God: there is no answer within mankind, including at this point himself. He goes into his church with its Pancreator [sic] dome of a refugee Christ. He sees again the icon of the Virgin, her face split since one day Yanaros had prayed for peace while at the same time several thousands of Chinese had been killed by a fire from heaven. There is, the message is, to be no peace while there remains even the possibility of destruction to any man. Yanaros prays to Christ and Christ answers: "He heard a deep, mournful voice and he recognized it; it was the voice of Christ! Christ always speaks from within, from our insides; and He always speaks in that deep, mournful tone." (147, Frat.)[1] Christ's message is not determinant: he tells Yanaros that man is the pilot fish of God; that Yanaros must determine for himself

[1] The hearing of voices is this case does not indicate that Yanaros is either a funny little old man or a strangely overwrought cleric. In Myths to Live By, Campbell compiles evidence to validate the importance of this kind of phenomenon in the mythic process, particularly see chapter 10.

the path.

Magically aided over this terror by renewed contact and friendship with God, Yanaros gains courage and also the ability to recognize the eternal in the ephemeral: he steps into mythic time. Upon seeing five bereaved women in the church, Yanaros recognizes them as the "five great Hellenic mothers" (151, Frat.). These are, as God was, confused regarding the events of the day. To them Yanaros delineates three paths, only one of which is useful:

> What third path? There is no third path! It hasn't opened yet. We have to open it with our labor, pushing onward to make it a road. And who are the "we"? The people! This road begins with the people, goes ahead with the people, and ends with the people. Many times lightning tears through my mind. "Who knows," I say, "perhaps God is pushing us to the edge of this tragedy to force us to open this third road--whether we want to or not--to save ourselves." Mothers, I don't know what stand to take, how to judge. But if you ask my heart, it says that this is the reason, this is what God wants. "Grow up," He tells us. "Don't keep hanging on my coattails like children; stand up and walk alone!!" (155, Frat.)

By the act of verbalizing his confusion, after being

aided by the supernatural presence of God within him, Yanaros is finally able to cross the first threshold: he makes a preliminary decision: "You said I am free todo as I choose, so, then, I will do as I choose; I'm going up to the hill." (157, Frat.) His purpose in doing so, however, is nominally to bring peace to his village, not to join the rebels. This is a tacit rejection of the specific call, for to supplant God with Lenin is not within his ability. Yanaros, Big John, is able to prepare the way for God, but not for another Forerunner, Lenin. The two Forerunner's paths are still inimical; the crux is the place of destruction in the preparation for God.

His decision is reached on Good Friday. He remembers a time past when in the monastery on a Good Friday. He watched his fellow monks and fell into a reverie in which he shared the pain of the crucified figure and wished to hurry the Resurrection. This close identification with Christ's suffering remembered, Yanaros makes another decision: he as priest will not resurrect Christ ritually while a fratricidal war rages. Yanaros tells his people of their responsibility to stop the war and they stone him.

That night, the earth smelling of "sulphur and God's presence" (168, Frat.), Yanaros begins his ascent. With him goes God:

> He felt the Invisible around him, as hard as the

> stone, scented like the thyme; the uninhabited hilltops filled with God, and Father Yanaros' heart neighed like a stallion; he was not alone and desolate in the world; all of God was with him; he suddenly felt a supernatural strength in his heart and in his hands; he gained new courage, and the stones began to roll under his boots again. (169, Frat.)

The presence of the supernatural is Yanaros' "helper" in his tests to come.

He walks with courage until he reaches the side of the hill where he comes upon the destroyed Chapel of the Forerunner, where bitterness and weariness overtake him. Here had seven Greek women rebels been killed by the national forces. Yanaros' reaction is fervant:

> "I don't ask," he murmured, "I don't ask who is justified, and who is not; I don't know--I've lost all sense of reason: I'm old. But my heart cries within. 'One day,' it shouts, 'a new church may be built over these ruins of the Forerunner, for the seven female forerunners!'" (172, Frat.)

Here begins Yanaros' road of trials. Already he promises to build a new religious shrine on the blood of the rebels--a tacit recognition of the rightness, not perhaps of their position, but of their degree of commitment to action. His

self and its dependencies are no longer the determinants of his actions.

At the end of the road, on the mountain top with his son, Captain Drakos, and the rebels, lies promise of success. Mythically, in this case, this is the recognition of the interdependence of all life. Before then, however, the road must be traversed and all its dangers overcome. Yanaros is interrupted in his actions at the desecrated shrine by the national force's captain's defecting wife, now a mistress to one of the less worthy rebel leaders, Loukas. His response to her taunts evoke this secondary reaction: "What strength," he murmured, "what life, what youth! Why do I demand virtue and honor of such a body? Let her get it out of her system first; let her eat up the world and become satiated and have her mouth fill with ashes! Then, virtue and goodness will appear from the ruins." (173, Frat.)

Campbell, in speaking of one of the possible nadiros of the hero cycle, discusses the meeting with the goddess. This particular nadir refers to the reconciliation of male/female dualities in one personality. Although this is not the immediate goal of Yanaros' path, what Campbell has to say about the attitude necessary for successful completion of the meeting with the goddess evidences partial transformation of Yanaros into hero already:

> Woman, in the picture language of mythology, represents the totality of what can be known. The hero is the one who comes to know. . . . By deficient eyes she is reduced to inferior states; by the evil eye of ignorance she is spellbound to banality and ugliness. But she is redeemed by the eyes of understanding. The hero who can take her as she is, without undue commotion . . . is potentially the king. (116, Hero)

This perception of the woman is Yanaros'.

This, although it appears an unnecessary diversion, is a convenient place to introduce the concept of the meeting of the goddess, and its bearing on the mythic perception of the world. The Fratricides is an extremely complex novel: it could not be otherwise coming as it does at the end of a long career of admittedly convoluted Kazantzakian effort to understand the world and his place in it. Not only is Yanaros' reaction to the rebel's whore noteworthy in itself as a marked departure from the attitude usually found evinced toward women in the patriarchy of Greece, it becomes doubly important when compared to the attitudes and behaviors evidenced by Yanaros' son, Drakos, later in the novel at a point where serious claims could be made to the effect that Drakos becomes hero rather than his father, and that the whole structure of the mythic content of the novel is pointed

toward the dramatization of the evolutionary nature of spirituality--mythically speaking, atonement of the father with the son, rather than the son's atonement with the father. These speculations do bear on the role played by Yanaros and will be discussed later in that capacity.

Yanaros returns to his dedication of the chapel after the woman leaves, this time completing it by inscribing a cross. He begins to climb again, and is interrupted by Dimos, a shepherd turned rebel. This tester adds to Yanaros' doubts, for he "used to be a goat. . .hardly spoke, . . . only bleated" (176, Frat.). Dimos has grown into something better than he was before, perhaps because he has chosen an ideal and acted upon it, perhaps because he unwittingly chose the right path--that of the rebels.

Yanaros arrives at the top of his sacred mountain and finds a "hilltop . . . aflame; a great light, a great joy spread out, as though Christ had risen, and the faces of the people reflected the glow" (178, Frat.). The rebels dance, they speak of the unity of mankind; one dresses as a priest and blesses the others. And Yanaros' "mind floated over deep waters; he closed his eyes and listened to the noise around him--the laughter, the crackling fire. Where was he?" (186, Frat.). Yanaros is still involved in the initial stages of his hero journey. He has crossed the threshold, and finds himself in "a dream landscape of curiously fluid,

ambiguous form . . . /while/ covertly aided by . . . the supernatural helper whom he met before his entrance into this region" (97, Hero).

Thus, he continues to question and equivocate with his position. He looks at the young rebels around him, remembers Christ thrashing the merchants from the temple, and thinks: "Ah, if such a God would come down to earth . . . how quickly I would wear the rifle belt, even if I am seventy, and I would seize the flag and leap into the assault with them." (186, Frat.) The path, although the first step has been taken, still remains unclear to Yanaros. It is a question of the morality involved in the choice.

The question of that morality assumes larger importance in the novel: it is the question not of ends, but of means. The justification of destruction contained in Leonidas' diary, that cruelty may beget people equipped to do away with cruelty, is one viewpoint. This viewpoint is dependent upon an attitude which Leonidas also discusses in his diary; one that posits a philosophic stance. One must have an ideal, so says Leonidas, but without acting upon that ideal, one has nothing. Captain Drakos, too, wishes to find an active form for his ideal and his consideration of the problem is not so simplistic as Leonidas':

> "Change the world, you say? Bring freedom and justice, you say? But how can you change the world when you cannot change man? The heart of man? Have we changed, we, the new people? Did we become better men? The hell we did! The small, humble people, yes, but the leaders, God damn them! Look at Loukas, my right-hand man! Jealousy, hatred, spying; ready to put the dagger in my back! The fish begins to stink from the head, as the saying goes." (199, Frat.)

It goes without saying that anyone who wishes to change the world must somewhere take responsibility, not for the change, which is easily enough done, but for what the change will do to the people who must go through it. This sense of responsibility is most likely to provide a foundation for the morality of revolution. Yanaros and Drakos both feel this responsibility deeply, but with different emphases: Yanaros feels all are his people and he must answer for them at the Second Coming, whereas Drakos "must answer /for his comrades7 here on earth at the First Coming" (306, Frat., Kazantzakis' italics). This difference in emphasis brings the problem into sharper focus, for essentially it brings into question which people can be considered expendable. The other viewpoint is Yanaros' wish to save all people from

destruction at any price.

This question must be answered in Yanaros' confrontation with his son. The two are parallel in many ways. Both have been inspired to ideals by the stories of wandering Jews, a symbol heavily indebted to the idea of homelessness and the state of being a refugee, of inherited guilt and of suffering.[1] Both doubt their methods, their paths, but not their ends--order based on love, but order brought about by justice for Drakos and by mercy for Yanaros. Both are deeply a part of their worlds: Yanaros is part of the village from the waist down (61, Frat.), and Drakos part of the mountain from the waist down (193, Frat.). But while Yanaros can love and minister to others even though he is reviled, Drakos can love only to hate the next moment: Loukas' mistress, the Captain's wife, finds herself Drakos' beloved one moment and a slut the next (202-3, Frat.). Drakos and Yanaros are worthy adversaries.

The night before the dawn of Holy Saturday and its celebration of the resurrected Christ is spent by Yanaros in returning to his village. In the pre-dawn hours, the old man dreams of the future: "This was no sleep; the old man had entered the horrible future, and his whole body,

[1] See Campbell, Hero, p. 237.

from his head to his toes, began to tremble. He dreamt that the sixth seal opened and that he embraced a rock, thinking it was God; and he held it tightly to save himself; and his eyes were bulging as he looked." (209, Frat.) The "dream" continues. Yanaros sees seven angels; five of them are spoken of and all five are angels of destruction. Finally God awakens Yanaros, and Yanaros intellectualizes that this awakening means that God wishes that he "not see or talk against God's workshop" (210, Frat.). Yanaros' interpretation is antithetical to Kazantzakis' own honoring of Odysseus' role as savior through the means of destruction.[1]

But Yanaros is of heroic stature and on Resurrection day, he imparts to the questing Kyriakos a strength which allows Kyriakos to "tell the captain that /Yanaros/ cannot serve two masters--and that /he/ will go to him when God commands" (213, Frat.). Yanaros is also capable of exerting leadership to the point of bringing his congregation to a feverish pitch of emotion. Supernatural forces still aid him, and Yanaros is possessed by the madness "given us by divine gift."[2]

[1] Nikos Kazantzakis, The Odyssey: A Modern Sequel (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1958). In Books XXII-XXIV, Odysseus levels destruction at the world until he, alone on an iceberg, considers the meaning of death and achieves insight. The importance of the transmutation of matter into spirit is primary: destruction is a necessary first step, and it achieves to the level of being an ahumanistic principle.

[2] E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951). Particularly Chapter III. The quote is from Socrates' Phaedrus and is found on page 64.

His congregation also becomes possessed and begins a procession to the barracks of the national forces in the rain, the harbinger of renewed life. Along the way, others in the village are affected and they, too, join this procession of love. Yanaros, sure when he came down the mountain that his path was correct but upset after his destruction dream, still follows in the path he feels God directs him to. The people, led by Yanaros, go to the national forces to inform them the village will be turned over to the rebels so that peace can reign. He has returned to his people to bring them the elixir of the hero, but ironically, it is a wisdom which Yanaros does not understand.

The priest, coming in the name of love and peace, is met by bullets. The government forces do not share the mass hysteria and they want no part of peace. Night falls: a set-to, and the villagers are victorious. The forces of love (which have evidenced themselves with a remarkable capacity for destruction) upset the destructive forces of the status quo: militant love wins.

Yanaros, alive, feels happiness and cheerfully assumes a St. John role. Ironically, again, he does not realize that his "peaceful resolution" of this night was not exactly peaceful, nor was it, tactically speaking, anything other than an extension of the rebel forces. His plan had been to peacefully turn the control of the village over to the rebels.

In the meantime, however, dissension has broken out between Loukas and Drakos. Drakos sees his role in the party and the revolution as being first to bring order and justice and then freedom. Loukas sees the end, party victory, as justifying any means, which reduces conceptual words to meaningless sounds. Lenin as Christ is as open to diversity of "paths" as Christ himself. Human fallibility again tends to muddy the ideal.

The confusion as to how to actuate the ideal is recapitulated when the rebels come to occupy the village. Drakos' wish for order and justice encourage his action of assassinating the village's "enemies"--the land-owning bastions of the status quo, themselves the villagers. To Loukas, the assassination is right and Drakos may not change his procedure without losing control of the rebels. To Yanaros, however, this is unjust, and injustice cannot establish justice. The argument is further delineated in terms of freedom. Drakos sees freedom as coming at the last, after the dirty work: Yanaros sees it as the first fruits of any endeavor. Loukas is not concerned with such intangibles.

Yanaros is not able to push his argument to acceptance. He watches the execution; then turns to go in company with his Invisible One. He has finally determined his path. And this path, after all the hedging and confusion and foredoomed failure to bring back the word, is determined on the basis of

the rule of the heart, with no room for logic:

> "I am leaving," he shouted. "I will do as I said, I will go from village to village and I will shout: 'Brothers, do not believe the reds, do not believe the blacks, unite in brotherhood!' A village without a village idiot is nothing; I will become the village idiot, the lunatic of Greece, and I will go about shouting." (251, Frat.)

He will become the St. John of the armed Christ (252, Frat.). As Drakos watches his father leave, he admires him and sees him as an old archangel. A shot is fired and Yanaros is dead, murdered by Loukas, for whom the ends ever justify the means.

Kazantzakis leaves it there, with hints to assure us that heroism will out contained only in the knowledge of Drakos' introspective habits and that in the end, he admired his father. Yanaros as hero has passed on the sense of the possibility of the elixir to his son, which indeed was his duty as a human being. Perhaps this is all that is possible for any hero to give, and all that should be desired: evolution does not mean spontaneity, and suffering and striving is the method of evolution--the only possible method for Kazantzakis. Yanaros as mythical hero was called, followed the call through the road of trials, found an answer with which

he equivocated long enough to allow him to pass on his wisdom only in his death. There was to be allowed him no "freedom of the two worlds": the ability to direct mankind by wisdom gained through dual perspective. Heroic in himself, he did not fulfill the hero's function in action. Because the people were not ready for his wisdom does not alter the judgement. A hero alters the people. This seemed always to be Kazantzakis' problem: to provide "real" people in a "real" world with a "real" novelistic life in order to make living a mythic truth.

In these two novels, Freedom or Death and The Fratricides, we have an interesting parallel. In the former, the hero, the man of action, fails because he finds recourse only in action. In The Fratricides, the hero, a much larger man, fails because he cannot find recourse in action. The novels sandwich Kazantzakis' novelistic career: they do not provide a pattern for his new myth.

But Kazantzakis' final novel ought to put to silence any questions as to the place of Marxism in his theogony. It is the militancy of the spirit to which he feels allegiance, and not to the militancy of mutable economic and social orders, open as they are to misinterpretation and erroneous action. The issues raised are those of immediate concern to individuals for all that they are couched in terms of social and fratricidal bloodshed and strife. The fratricides

are those who murder the brotherhood of man, not just their brothers, although the latter is irrevocably antecedant to the former.

At the end, of course, Yanaros has evolved. He has become the "champion of things becoming, not of things become, because he is" (243, Hero). And what he is, in this case, is something more than is indicated on the surface.

The novel is one of those that suddenly begin to bloom all over the place. In particular, the question of what exactly was experienced on the mountain top by Yanaros looms large. We have said before that a case could be made for Drakos' assuming the role of hero in the novel. There is always a certain degree of opacity to characters who are formulated to illuminate first and foremost philosophic convictions: they tend to function only in a limited area and do not live beyond the pages of the novel. But characters who have been defined so as to allow them maximum specificity and at the same time to enable them to dramatize philosophic stances tend to be better than this. And when one accedes to this level of characterization, one can expect not opacity but a certain kind of luminousness. The painters of Orthodox icons sought to maintain a two-dimensional quality in their work: a mirror image rather than a naturalistic one. For all that The Fratricides contains a great deal of naturalistic

detail--it is almost hyperbolically naturalistic--one has the feeling that what Kazantzakis sought in the novel was this same quality of two-dimensionality.

We have still the question of what happened mythically on the top of the sacred mountain. Through their conversation the father and son both achieved a degree of certitude about how they should function in the future. Neither shows that certitude in his dialogue, but the fact of the certitude remains, if we read correctly the attitudes of both after their conversation. Yanaros, in particular, feels quite confident and sure of himself as he goes down the hill to assume his responsibilities in the Resurrection.

Campbell has delineated several transformations of the hero. One of them is the "hero of action . . . containing into the living moment the impulse that first moved the world" (345, Hero). The novel's emphasis on action, on determining the right and good action, an emphasis which seemingly leads to nothing but death and confusion, leads one to believe that The Fratricides has moved from an earlier overtly nihilistic stance on the part of the author to what appears to be a nihilistic stance, but what is, in reality, the dramatization (and therefore by its very nature dependent upon action) of one of the more sophisticated concepts in mythology: that action is the dynamic representation in the world of what Campbell terms the One Presence. And as a

representation, rather than being the thing itself, the novel can be viewed as religious iconography. We remember always that Kazantzakis' hope was to serve the function not of artist, but of the founder of a religion. If we view The Fratricides as an adventure of "the going to the father . . . the invisible unknown" (345, Hero), the novel begins to fall into a semblance of understandibility. Yanaros speaks continually of trying to find the path to the Father, of attempting to ascertain what it is that the Father wills.

Campbell says that "where the goal of the hero's effort is the discovery of the unknown father, the basic symbolism remains that of the tests and the self-revealing way" (346-47, Hero). We have seen that to be in our discussion of Yanaros' path. The ultimate goal of such a discovery is the further understanding that behind all appearances of diversity, behind all digressive and subtractive appearances, lies one thing only--life force, One Presence--and that because of the nature of the perceiver who is dependent upon that one thing, he, the quester, and the father, the quested, are one.

This, surely, is the understanding to which Yanaros accedes in his night on the mountain top. The rebels mock Resurrection cry that is echoed by the hills with laughter is a recognition that all life is not only interdependent, it is all the same thing, whatever it looks or seems like.

Kazantzakis has taken this truth one step further than other mythologies, and this step is entirely in line with Kazantzakis' personal philosophy as to the necessity of spiritual evolution--of the son surpassing the father. Yanaros is atoned on the mountain top not with the unseen presence which is his eternal father: that atonement is already achieved in the village through his conversation with God. The atonement of Yanaros on the mountain top is with the seen presence which is his son--his son becomes his eternal father.

Having achieved this atonement with the son, Yanaros returns to the village to carry on his work as redeemer of the wasteland which obtains. The wasteland from this point of view can be understood in terms different from Weston's theory of the king's impotency being reflected in the land. The wasteland of Castello is caused by a moral fault on the part of all mankind, an approach more in line with the terms of the novel:

> Yet from the standpoint of the cosmogonic cycle, a regular alternation of fair and foul is characteristic of the spectacle of time. Just as in the history of the universe, so also in that of nations: emanation leads to dissolution, youth to age, birth to death, form-creative vitality to the dead weight of inertia. . . . The golden age, the

> reign of the world emperor, alternates, in the pulse of every moment of life, with the waste land, the reign of the tyrant. The god who is the creator becomes the destroyed in the end. (352, Hero)

In this sense, even creation and destruction are one and the same--and the "hero of yesterday becomes the tyrant of tomorrow, unless he crucifies himself today" (353, Hero). If we are allowed a compression of time, the last pages of the novel do evidence such a chain of events. Yanaros, angrily assuming at last the mantle of hero and beginning to depart, can in a sense be considered to crucify himself, for he encourages his own murder, given the situation.

"From the point of view of the present there is such a recklessness in /the/ deliverance of the future that it appears to be nihilistic." (353, Hero) So the novel appears, but its concentration upon the meaning of the Second Coming icon bears out the above interpretation. The Second Coming is the same as the First Coming, all that is needed is to reverse the usual viewpoint and see the incarnation of Christ in futurity rather than in the past--the final statement of Kazantzakis' evolutionary theogony.

It is the wisdom of the beginning and end of the world that Kazantzakis has offered in The Fratricides, a work of religious iconography. He has achieved a mythic vision, one

with a challenge. From its ostensible concern with societal order, the novel moves beyond to a sphere in which that order becomes a meaningless division.

B. The Novels of Spirit

"Hero together with saint: such is mankind's supreme model."[1] So Kazantzakis declares in maturity. Even as a child, he was intrigued by the lives of saints, occasionally sharing these stories of privation and martyrdom with relatives who were so effected that people walking past the open windows of the house wondered who had died to call for such mourning from the family. This infatuation led to the publication in 1948 of the first of what can be called the saint's lives of Kazantzakis' own creation, The Greek Passion.[1] This novel and the 1951 Last Temptation of Christ both use as a basis the passion of Christ. Each of them, however, placed a different emphasis on the progression of the hero,

[1] Nikos Kazantzakis, Report to Greco, trans. P. A. Bien, (1965; rpt. NY: Bantam, 1966), p. 65, 73 ff. Hereinafter citations refer to this edition and are denoted by Report.

[2] Nikos Kazantzakis, The Greek Passion, trans. Jonathan Griffin (1953; rpt. NY: Ballantine, 1965). Hereinafter citations refer to this edition and are denoted by GP. M. Byron Raizis' article "Symbolism and Meaning in Kazantzakis' Greek Passion," Ball State University Forum, XI (Summer, 1970), 57-66, is a useful plot synopsis, dealing largely with name symbolism.

and on the role which it is possible to declare to be that of the hero. The 1953 Saint Francis more directly speaks of the role of the hero in his manifestation as saint, and seemingly offers a repudiation of philosophic stances achieved in the two earlier novels.

The frame of The Greek Passion is the casting and proposed re-enactment of the passion of Christ, a thing done every seven years in the village of Lycovrissi. Manolios, a poor but worthily innocent shepherd, is chosen to play Christ. The village elders find him acceptable on the following grounds:

> He is mild as a lamb, he can read, has been in a monastery, too; has blue eyes and a short beard as yellow as honey, a real Christ like an icon. And pious into the bargain. . . . [If he is crazy, there is no harm, for] it's enough that the soul be pure.
>
> He can stand the scourges, the crown of thorns and the weight of the cross. What's more, he's a shepherd. (26, GP)

Manolios accepts the role, after momentary considerations, when he sees a rainbow and acquieses to the will of God that he do so, of which the rainbow is a sign. This is the call to adventure, and Manolios shows little hesitation in accepting it, for all that it proves to be a somewhat more

demanding part than he imagined.

Very often, says Campbell, the "first encounter of the hero-journey is with a protective figure . . . who provides the adventurer with amulets" (69, Hero), which will help him supernaturally through the trials to come. Manolios, nominally accepting a role, but assuming instead a complete spiritual identification with Christ, makes his own amulet. He carves a mask of Christ, a mask which is to be worn during the performance of the passion play.

This amulet, however, is not made until Manolios experiences a crucifixion of light as he sits by the well in front of the Chapel of St. Elijah, an extremely apt location:[1]

> For a long moment he remained like that, in ecstasy; all of a sudden he felt his hands, his feet, his heart pierced by fearful pains, as though he were crucified upon the light. Months later, at a fatal hour, this moment of ecstasy in front of the rim of the well came back to his mind, and he suddenly realized that this moment had been the

[1] A common mystic experience, the "Vision of Adonai," is discussed by Harold Bayley in The Lost Language of Symbolism (1912; rpt. 2 vols. in 1, NY: Barnes and Noble, 1968), I, 154-55 ff.

> greatest joy of his life. No, not a joy: something deeper, more cruel, passing all human joy and pain. (99, GP)

The experience is the intimation of what will follow and strengthens Manolios in his resolve not to marry Lenio, a lusty peasant girl betrothed to him. It does not prevent him from feeling still and strongly the urges of the flesh. Driven to going down the mountain to visit Katerina, cast as the Magdalene due to her status as comforter of the village, Manolios' face erupts into a bloated mass of running sores. This is the "saint's disease" which Kazantzakis himself experienced.[1] We are told in the novel that only saints and ascetics are affected.

Nikolio, the goat boy who conjures with music like a latter day Pan, dreams of Lenio like a latter day adolescent, and battles with rams, is enough versed in the realities of nature to allow him to discern immediately the reason for the affliction: "The Devil must have set upon you and left you with that mask, God protect us! The Devil, I tell you, that's sure!" (135, GP) The "devil" is the subconscious and human matter burning itself out through Manolios' face in order

[1] Helen Kazantzakis, Biography, p. 81. The sexual mask spoken of here is identical to Manolios' facial eruptions.

that he may become spirit, a devil which evidences itself in such a way as to become protective.

Manolios feels relieved at this visible manifestation of matter that his steps to spirit must lead him through.

> He felt strong and had no pain anywhere. He was not shivering any more and, strangely enough, was filled with an inexplicable joy. . . . He picked up his little looking glass again, and went over to the window and looked at himself: the swollen skin had cracked, a yellowish, thick matter was oozing out and coagulating in his mustache and beard. His whole face was blood red, like meat. (135, GP)

He feels himself able to resume work on the mask he is carving to wear during the performance: "He had all of a sudden felt the holy image arising within him and filling his heart. He could make it out clearly, contemplate all its features. His gaze bent upon it, he began again, with emotion, passionately, to fix it in the wood." (136, GP)

The mask itself is a recognition of the interdependence of joy and suffering: "Slowly Manolios balanced the holy face between his hands and admired the Lord's mouth. Full face, it smiled; turned to the right in profile, it was weeping; turned a little to the left, it tightened, resigned

and proud." (137, GP) It is a mask which is dependent not only upon the visage of Christ, but also upon a more ancient and less denoted face of God.[1] Manolios caresses the mask with calmness and serenity, accepting deeply and totally now the role he is to play, feeling comfortable in his identification with Christ, one face of the ultimate God.

In essence the feverish night-time trip down the mountain to Katerina was a way of expelling the "monster of phenomenality" (89, Hero). The threshold guardian, as we have seen, is often associated with libidinous drives. In order to mortify those drives and render himself self-denying and thus divine, "as divine as is the world itself when known, not as final, but as a mere name and form of that which transcends, yet is immanent within all names and forms" (89, Hero), the confrontation with those drives is necessary. The monster of phenomenality is essentially the

[1] Compare with the mask of the Dionysus in Kazantzakis' play, "Melissa":

> "When you looked at it from the right it was laughing; when you looked at it from the left it was weeping; and from the front, his face appeared calm, impassible, beyond joy and pain."

From Three Plays, trans. Athena Gianakos Dallas (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1969), p. 135.

The strong association of Dionysus with the nether world, itself associated with the dark world of the subconscious chaos, indicates the reconciliation of Manolios' opposing selves, since the view of the mask arose spontaneously to his inner eye, thence to his hand. The aptness of the symbol mask is underscored by the place that masks played in ritual associated with Dionysus, from which some critics think arose the dramatic form.

ability to perceive only dualities, which is not the heroic attitude: "The pairs of opposites (being and not being, life and death, beauty and ugliness, good and evil, and all the other polarities that bind the faculties to hope and fear, and link the organs of action to deeds of defense and acquisition) are the clashing rocks . . . that crush the traveler, but between which the heroes always pass." (89, Hero) The mask motif is illustration of Manolios' successful passage between the rocks; he recognizes the basic unity of life intuitively after supernatural manifestation in the form of the saint's disease.

Manolios retires to his mountaintop sheep-fold. He shows himself to Lenio so that she may willingly seek marriage elsewhere. He studies, both himself and the Bible. He confronts Christ, a confrontation that furthers his feeling of rightness:

> He had lit the candle and, kneeling in the half-light, contemplated Christ during the whole day, hesitating but not daring to speak to Him. He did not know how to express what he had to say to Him. Christ, on the side, watched him but kept silence for fear of frightening him.
>
> Christ and he thus passed the whole day facing one another, without a word, like two great friends, whose hearts are overflowing, but whose mouths are

drawn tight by emotion.

> As evening fell Manolios stood up and kissed the hand of Christ. They had confided everything to each other, and had nothing else to say; Manolios opened the little door and made his way toward the village.
>
> "I said all I had to say," he thought, comforted; "we are agreed, He has given me His blessing. I've now only to go." (181, GP)

Finally, he confronts Katerina and the brother/sister lietmotif which has accompanied their conversations becomes reality: Katerina promises to sin no more having been liberated by sistership with Manolios. Manolios has been caught back from traveling afield to find himself: his journey is, and properly so for one who sets his feet on the saint's path, inward. From seeing Manolios' journey as an attempt to deny phenominality, we begin to see that his proper journey is that of self-annihilation, a journey which finds its end in the self-martyrdom of Manolios. The saint's journey is directed toward this end of self-annihilation. The confusion inherent in the novel later becomes one of synthesizing the saint's path of self-annihilation and martyrdom with the path of the hero of action who operates within the phenominality of the world but is not susceptible to it.

Acceptance of the call and the taking of the first step do not miraculously enable the hero to complete the journey. The path is an ordeal of the "deepening of the first threshold and the question is still in balance. Can the ego put itself to death?" (109, Hero). Campbell says further: "The original departure into the land of trials represented only the beginning of the long and really perilous path of initiatory conquests and moments of illumination. Dragons have now to be slain and surprising barriers passed--again, again, and again. Meanwhile there will be a multitude of preliminary victories, unretainable ecstasies, and momentary glimpses of the wonderful land." (109, Hero)

Manolios rushes to complete his journey. He happily seizes the first opportunity to do so. Youssoufaki, the Agha's beloved, is murdered. The Agha, furiously bereft, demands blood in return, thinking the assissination of his boy to be the work of some Greek over whom he rules. Manolios, wishing to spare any innocent, has a dream which shows him the way:

> Christ came. When, at daybreak, Manolios awoke and crossed himself, the dream blazed in his mind . . . it seemed to him he was walking at the tip of a lake of celestial blue. Impatiently he parted the reeds and the willow leaves and pressed forward in all haste. As he went forward the reeds

> and willows became men and women who followed him in thousands. A wind blew and they all began to cry out: "Kill him! Kill him!"
>
> He tried to escape. A hand touched him on the shoulder and a voice was heard: "Do you believe?" "I believe, Lord " replied Manolios. Immediately the wind fell, the men and women became once more reeds and willows. A plane tree full of swallows rose before him, melodious. From one of its branches a hanged body was swinging. Manolios stopped, appalled, but a voice rang out afresh: "Don't stop, march!" (254, GP)

Manolios will sacrifice himself to appease the Agha's passion.

The decision made, Manolios awakens and follows Christ's footsteps down the mountain, becoming lighter with each step, and "as his body became lighter, he felt pricklings all over his face; scabs began falling one by one from his cheeks and mouth" (236, GP). This miracle is the external form of Manolios' having annihilated ego claims, even to the final ego claim, that of life.

He is, however, not to be allowed the pleasure of sacrificing himself. The true murderer is found to be a member of the Turk's household. Before that Manolios' "sister," Katerina, has assumed the guilt and has been slain, giving her life to be only superficially mourned by all save

Manolios and his friends who have been cast as the apostles.

The road of trials is still to be traversed. Manolios' help in doing so comes from the friendship of the apostles, and from Priest Fotis, a refugee with a flock of refugees under his wing. Fotis is aligned with Elijah and with St. George--both formidable alignments and indications of the strength of Fotis and his determination: a militant spirit, if nothing else. It is Fotis who guides the study of Manolios and his friends, and who tells Manolios of the role of suffering: "Blessed," he said, "are those who suffer, because they will feel how great is the mercy of God. While those who do not suffer will never experience that celestial joy. See what a divine benefit suffering is." (207, GP) Through Fotis' help and example, Manolios is able to guide his apostles with words which indicate his own attitude towards his struggles:

> "Brothers," he said at last, "every resolution a man makes is like the fruit of a tree. Slowly, patiently, thanks to the sun, the rain, and the wind, the fruit ripens and falls. Be patient, brothers, don't question anyone. The blessed hour will come to you, too--and then you won't have to question any more. Calmly, without it hurting at all, you'll leave wife, children, relatives and business. You'll free yourselves of all these small pearls,

and find the great pearl, Christ." (278, GP)

Manolios, having rid himself of all but the pearl of Christ, finds that the tests which loom in front of him now are tests of a rather different nature than heretofore. He has achieved the objectives of the hero-God relationship: he has found freedom of spirit in self-denial. Now his role becomes one of a more social nature. It is necessary to care for those weaker than himself and to provide a social order which is consciencable. To do this, one must change men's actions: Manolios must make the powerful of Lycovrissi, literally "wolf's fountain," act upon an awareness of their responsibilities to the refugees of the Sarakina under Fotis' care. This is indeed an amalgamation of the saint of spiritual knowledge and the hero of action in the world.

Fully half of the novel is devoted to Manolios' struggle in this regard. In the space of four months time, the villagers have accepted Manolios with open arms as being of stature to play the Christ. He has, after all, once offered his life for the villagers. When he asks aid for the Sarakina, however, he is quickly rejected. The irony of this is fully exposed through the words of the priest, Grigoris:

> "Hey, my sons of Lycovrissi," he shouted, "listen to me; don't fall into the snare of this wheedler, take care! The world, remember, rests on four pillars. Along with faith, country and honor, the

> fourth great pillar is property: don't lay hands on it! God distributes wealth in accordance with hidden laws which are His own. The justice of God is one thing, that of men is another. God has made the rich and the poor. Woe to him who dares disturb order; he is infringing the will of God! Impertinent Manolios, I repent of having given you permission to speak. Come down from there! Go and look after your sheep. That is the place God has assigned to you; do not try to go higher. Do not grow where you were not sown. All this nonsense you have talked is against the will of God. He it is who decides, and all that happens in the world happens because He wills it." (309-10, GP)

In the face of such "hold-fast" priorities, Fotis assumes an even larger role as the guide of Manolios. He tells Manolios of his own life, ending with a declaration of the hopelessness of life without the promise of Heaven. Through Fotis, it is apparent to Manolios that the man of spirit cannot isolate himself but must perform in the world of action.

Manolios begins to act and is accused of being a Bolshevik by Panayotaros, the plaster-eater who was cast--albeit unwillingly--as Judas, a necessary character for all that no one wants to play his role, for, as the priest Grigoris says, Judas is "the one that's most necessary, after Christ" (33, GP).

The necessity of a Judas to clarify right from wrong is heightened in the novel by offering us a Judas who by his own hand kills the "Christ," feeling only righteousness in doing so. Christ is identified as a Bolshevik, also, and the battle lines are drawn. Grigoris excommunicates Manolios, an action that precipitates the final withdrawing of the apostles from family and the world of possessions. They will now devote themselves to the following of Manolios.

Shortly thereafter, Fotis abandons his cap, letting his hair fly like Elijah, the Biblical prophet of fire and light. In a vision, the icon of Elijah speaks to Fotis, and Fotis informs his congregation that December 22, the birthday of the Prophet, will mark the day of the coming of militancy to the Sarakina. The people of the Sarakina become martial: Manolios carves a new mask, this time one "hard, sad, wrathful. A deep weal gashed it from the right temple to the chin; it had a drooping mustache and bushy eyebrows" (464, GP). Now, the work of Christ is to be conducted with petrol. Christ has become War.

The outcome of these decisions is the expansion of Manolios' soul. Because a prophet is perhaps better articulated by those who follow him than he is himself, it is an apostle, Kostandis, who perceives this growth:

> "Dear Manolios," he said, "it's not for me to give you advice. My soul can reach as far as Kostandis

> and his family; at the very most, as far as a few friends; father she can't go; your soul stretches to a whole people. What you run to meet, I tremble as I see it coming. You can follow in the footsteps of Christ: do as God inspires you, my Manolios!" (494, GP)

More sure of the Christ identification now, when Manolios is murdered on Christmas day by Panayotaros, his face in death is the face of the warring Christ. But his death is in vain: the hoped for results are not to be attained. Fotis assembles his people and resumes his march, knowing that not only were Manolios' actions in vain, but also that Christ himself was crucified in vain.

This is somehow confused and an unsatisfactory ending. It is undeniably believable and dramatic: but altogether a surface summary, facile and without depth. It is a commonplace that the "historical" Christ would be crucified willingly and almost gleefully should he reappear today.

The force of the Christ myth is indebted to the transfiguration of the Christ. As Campbell says, "Here is the whole myth in a moment: Jesus the guide, the way, the vision, and the companion of the return" (230, Hero). In The Greek Passion, the crucifixion of the hero is posited as the crucial act, whereas the mythic hero is a sustaining figure and not a martyr who serves his end, like Manolios,

merely by removing himself in an ultimate act of self-annihilation. Not even Fotis can believe that ultimately anything was won or proven or shown. His thoughts are in the nature of regret as at a worthy friend's death: and this in spite of his oft-repeated assertion that the deeds of a good man, even though not known and not efficacious, are in some way a justification of belief in growth of spirit.

Mythically speaking, the novel is one of reportage: the Manichean struggle of light and dark is dramatized for us narratively through the use of well-known associations indebted to the mythological cycle of Christ. It can also be viewed as the first stages of the novelist's working out of the amalgamation of the saint and the hero.

This amalgamation is perhaps not possible within the terms of The Greek Passion, and more importantly, within the terms which Kazantzakis determined to set for himself--the manufacture of a new myth. The basis of mythic efficacy is changing men's actions, through the inward change of men by truth. Failing the latter and proceeding by cramming truth down a goose's neck with the nozzle of a petrol can can only lead to a great many angrey geese, however well fed. It is as though Kazantzakis, in attempting to show both the growth of the man of spirit and the road the man of spirit must follow today in the world of action, has attempted too much too soon. If a Christ of today must burn,

why did not a Christ of before need to burn? Man does not change miraculously from one age to another: the tendency to good or bad is an inherent part of man's nature, and the expression of that tendency can differ only in degree or direction. If a Christ of today need a different face, why then use a myth of Christ at all? It is not necessary to proffer another pastoral Christlike figure, at any rate, if the intent is to state something about the fall of man from pastoral virtures. To do so is simple-mindedness and is directionless in the extreme: more importantly, it is redundant.

On a different level, the difficulty of using such a well known structure as the Christ myth is, as Alexander Karanikas points out, the difficulty inherent in "motivating . . . characters so that their allegorical significance seems accidental and not contrived."[1] Manolios "suffers by too rigid an adherence to the allegorical demands of the plot."[2] This seems to be the narrative fault of the novel. Instead of acceding to questions concerning the high matters of freedom and choice, justice and injustice, The Greek Passion remains a beautifully and artistically written novel of a hero who feels not the fate of a humanly heroic being, but rather the strictures of a "found" plot.

[1] Karanikas, "Kazantzakis and His Heroes," p. 8.

[2] Ibid.

C. N. Stavrou finds The Greek Passion to be "a work of art . . . engrossing . . . engaging," superior to The Last Temptation of Christ. He finds Manolios' recognition of freedom to be Kierkegaardian rather than Nietzschian, and seems to feel that this somehow elevates the artistic stature of Manolios:

> For Manolios accepts the discontinuity between faith and reason. Instead of trembling on the edge of the abyss and endeavoring to tell himself he is unafraid, nay, that he really rejoices in his peril, Manolios vaults the abyss and finds his rest in the certainty of the impossible's fulfillment and in the incomprehensible logic of divine injustice. Manolios' actions are performed almost autonomously with an assurance of their necessity and their redemptive efficacy their consequences seem to belie.[1]

Examination of the novel will show that the element of autonomy in Manolios' actions is negligible. Shortly thereafter, Stavrou states that Manolios "appears unaware that, unless one chooses faith, instead of waiting to be

[1] C. N. Stavrou, "Some Notes on Nikos Kazantzakis," Colorado Quarterly, XII (Winter, 1964), 333.

chosen by it, one forfeits both freedom and faith."[1] It is questionable that Stavrou has carried his argument to a forcible conclusion. The forcefulness of choice in attaining freedom and faith is indeed Kierkegaardian. Manolios, however, is not seized with anything so intellectual as the making of a choice. He is, rather, enabled to have faith because of other things: primarily, the crucifixion of light, a mystic seizure or experience which gives him the ability to feel trust and loyalty. As Jung says, "People call faith the true religious experience, but they do not stop to think that actually it is a secondary phenomenon arising from the fact that something happened to us in the first place which instilled . . . [trust and loyalty] into us."[2]

Throughout the novel, after the crucifixion by light, Manolios places utmost importance upon the miraculous call which will result in faith, an attitude which has nothing to do with choice. Manolios also posits great importance upon the possession of belief as opposed to reason. Manolios speaks of experiences which have greater numinous value, more

[1] Stavrou, "Notes," p. 331.

[2] C. G. Jung, The Undiscovered Self, trans. R. F. C. Hull (NY: Mentor, 1959), p. 48.

subconscious content, than those spoken of by Kierkegaard, for whom man is limited to the making of himself without recourse to spiritual or mythic interference. Manolios shows himself to be a hero of rather more Nietzschean spirit in his dependence upon numinous experience, and in his willingness to live for the day, an injuction which carries with it a greater sense of precarious imbalance and adaptation than Stavrou's "trembling on the edge of the abyss and endeavoring to tell himself he is unafraid."[1]

Stavrou finds the novel another example of the Kazantzakian theme (a theme which is Nietzschean in the extreme) that "agony and sacrifice are conditions of salvation or reintegration. . . . They bear witness to the earnest struggle man wages to wed his opposing selves."[1] It is true that this is a Kazantzakian theme: it might be said that the theme of Kazantzakis <u>is</u> the struggle. But if we look at the entire novel in this light, we find that only the first struggle in the novel, that in which Manolios attempts to reconcile his spiritual and earthly matter, is a fulfillment of this theme. The carving of the masks provides us with a clue as to the course of the struggle, since it is the struggle's outward manifestation. The carving of the first

[1] Stavrou, "Notes," p. 333.

mask, the face which includes in one face both joy and suffering and resigned equanimity is an outgrowth of the inward struggle of Manolios to ascertain the qualities of the Christ so that he can identify himself with them--so that he can play his role with assuredness. In this case, the carving is motivated by the desire and need of Manolios: he carves by his own choice with the help of an undefined spiritual force, either God or the devil. The spiritual force, is, however, primary in strength to Manolios.

The carving of the second mask is taken on in despair and under the martial tutelage of Fotis. Only after Fotis received his vision, his certainty, does Manolios take up knife and wood once more. Instead of being grazed upon by a great beast, Manolios allows himself to find no escape from petty vermin.[1] It is the mask of a savior who, conjuring by the sword, dies by it. If the synthesis of the redemptive qualities of the New Testament Christ and the vengeful qualities of the Old Testament Jehovah is to be a reversion to the latter, then that synthesis, however new in date or unique in artistic expression, is an atavism and

[1] Helen Kazantzakis, Biography, p. 245. Spiritual demands were spoken of by Kazantzakis as being great beasts. Fotis, in seeking economic and this-wordly justice, does not qualify as a great beast, but remains a roaring mouse.

one not qualified by the presence of darkness in the Christ nor light in the Jehovah. Roles have merely been exchanged by opposites, without any true recognition of the numinous qualities of either.

The Greek Passion, then, performs the function of experimentation within the progression of Kazantzakis' myth. It was necessary to do it and get it out of the way, to clear the underbrush from the path.

Stavrou feels that the teaching of Kazantzakis in this novel is that "frequently, sacrifice of one's life for a temporarily lost cause is desirable, because frequently martyrdom is the price for ultimate freedom and because, without hope of ultimate freedom, life is empty and worthless."[1] It is here that we finally arive at the primary reason for what can be called the mythic failure of The Greek Passion. Stavrou's statement evokes the feeling of the kind of spiritual evolution of which Kazantzakis speaks. It does not, however, show any kind of understanding of it. Stavrou has taken the social cause of Manolios for the meaning, the effect, rather than seeing it as the narrative framework for something larger. It is more reasonable that Kazantzakis wrote of a Manolios whose "passion for justice leads him into social revolution, but . . . [whose] essential pattern of . . .

[1] Stavrou, "Notes," p. 333.

behavior is a spiritual identification with Christ rather than a political or economic action."[1] The identification of Manolios' struggle with and for a cause is false, yet it is that struggle which receives half the novel's attention and which itself is caused by Kazantzakis' confusion regarding the value of action.[2]

Having recognized the fact that he was himself one of the "half-helpings," one of the schoolmasters which Cretan patriarchs turned their weak sons into, Kazantzakis attempted at length to discover the social action which such a half-helping could participate in. It is as though he did not wish to allow himself the calmness of realizing that which he must have known: that the cause is always second to the man, integration and strength of the single unit--the man--is antecedent to any purposeful social activity.[3]

[1] Michael A. Anthonakes, "Christ, Freedom and Kazantzakis," Dissertation Abstracts, XXVII (1966), 1331A (New York University).

[2] Kazantzakis, Report, p. 293, et passim.

[3] C. G. Jung, The Undiscovered Self, Chapter I.

The Last Temptation of Christ is a rather more mature handling of this material, and one more mythically pertinent because in it one is taken from the world of cause and effect--the world of action, into a world of the microcosm of Christ's mind.[1] The limitations on the narrative form thereby imposed allow both the expansion of the novel's message, on the basis that less is more, and the concentration of mythic knowledge in an appropriate arena.

This novel more carefully and intricately approaches the issues inherent in its specific hero-trek: those of freedom and necessity and of spirit and flesh. The pattern again is one of the inward journey: the annihilation of the ego in order to integrate the self. It is perhaps necessary to reiterate that self is here being used in the Jungian sense. It represents the "total personality which, though present, cannot be fully known."[2] The ego is that portion of the self which, broadly speaking, attempts to limit within the field of consciousness only those things which it wills be there:

[1] Nikos Kazantzakis, The Last Temptation of Christ, trans. P. A. Bien (1960; rpt. NY: Bantam, 1961). Hereinafter citations refer to this edition and are denoted by Temp.

[2] C. G. Jung, "Five Chapters from: Aion: Contributions to the Symbolism of the Self," trans. R. F. C. Hull, from Psyche and Symbol: A Selection from the Writings of C. G. Jung, ed. Violet S. deLaszlo (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor, 1958), p. 4. Hereinafter citations from this edition and denoted by Aion.

> Inside the field of consciousness it [the ego] has . . . free will. By this I do not mean anything philosophical, only the well-known psychological fact of "free choice", or rather the subjective feeling of freedom. But just as our free will clashes with necessity in the outside world, so also it finds its limits outside the field of consciousness in the subjective inner world, where it comes into conflict with the facts of the self. And just as circumstances or outside events happen to us and limit our freedom, so the self acts upon the ego like an objective occurrence which free will can do very little to alter. It is, indeed, well known that the ego not only can do nothing against the self, but is sometimes actually assimilated by unconscious components of the personality that are in the process of development and is greatly altered by them. (4, Aion)

This is not a particularly cosmogonic application as expressed, but the myths of cosmogonic nature have recourse to the same structures as those of an individual and psychological nature.

It is warranted to take recourse to the Jungian psychodrama on the basis of Kazantzakis' experience in writing The Last Temptation of Christ; an experience itself almost

classically Jungian. He writes in a letter, referring to the Last Temptation:

> I am now in the birth pangs of the new book, which requires much effort because it falls outside my usual pattern. The old antimonies are beginning to become organized into an organic synthesis. . . . In the book I'm writing, perhaps I shall be able to formulate this organic resolution of contradictions. . . . I've found the solution I have outside the realm of intellect and analysis.[1]

In the Prologue to the novel, Kazantzakis further expresses his point of view: "Every man partakes of the divine nature in both his spirit and flesh. That is why the mystery of Christ is not simply a mystery for a particular creed: it is universal." (1, Temp.) He points to the image of Christ in a manner identical to that of Jung, when he posits Christ as an archetypal image: "In order to mount to the Cross, the summit of sacrifice, and to God, the summit of immateriality, Christ passed through all the stages which the man who struggles passes through. That is why his suffering is so familiar to us; that is why we share it, and why his final victory seems to us so much our own future victory." (2, Temp.) That is to say, the archetypal image of Christ which is implanted in man as a means of becoming like God (36, Aion). The totality of self which Christ

[1] Helen Kazantzakis, Biography, p. 548-49.

achieves is a restoration of an original thing and is not a renewal in the sense of making a new thing (38, Aion). This view is indispensible to the understanding of Kazantzakis' Christ's final words and also of the role which suffering plays in the making of the self.

This sets us on a rather complicated path, and perhaps it is wise to note that the narrative mythic steps of Christ in the novel will be mentioned in a manner coherent with our purposes, if a manner at times seemingly incoherent as the explanation of the hero cycle in the novel.

The first chapter of the novel is an objectification of Israel's need through the means of Christ's dreams. It is insisted upon that the dream (unconscious knowledge) is equal to and interchangeable with reality (conscious knowledge). The dreamer is aware of his father's agonized attempts to call for the redeemer of the wasteland which is Israel: "He toiled, sweated, driveled at the mouth, and now and then after a terrible contest he managed to put together one word by voicing each syllable separately, desperately--one word, one only, always the same: a-do-na-i, Adonai." (12, Temp.) The father, Joseph, was privy to intercession from Jehovah on the event of his engagement to Mary; he now thinks of it: "He riveted his eyes upon the air, and suddenly his whole life passed before him: his father's staff which had blossomed on the day of his engagement, then the lightning flash which

struck the engaged man and paralyzed him." (13, Temp.) Now paralyzed, for Jehovah is indeed a jealous god, Joseph is yet the manifest father who voices the call to Jesus. Mary, too, calls upon God and asks pity for herself as a mother, for her son, for her husband, for the world: "And while she stood there, fixed and speechless, hearing every vein in her body tremble, there was a wild, triumphant cry. The tongue of the paralyzed man had been loosed and the entire word had issued at last from his contorted mouth, syllable by syllable, and reverberated throughout the house: A-DO-NA-I!" (63, Temp.).

This is the mythic call to adventure. It is after this that Jesus sets out on his journey, one which will end with his union with his unmanifest father in a momentary and highly instable atonement. Joseph's cry is articulated only after the recognition of Jesus as the Messiah by Judas, the redbeard who furiously stomps through Jesus' dreams and who prophecies the immolation by fire of Jesus; and after JEsus has taken the first step toward conquering his remaining devil, fear, by carrying the cross he has made for another to the hill of crucifixion: an assumption of the role he must play later, but this time a testing of his strength.

Also preparatory to answering the call is the recognition of the place of suffering: God torments those he loves, the Rabbi tells Mary, for "Man cannot sprout wings unless he has first reached the brink of the abyss!" (41, Temp.). The

abyss is here to be understood as the chaos attendant upon the disintegration and/or reintegration of the self.

The Rabbi is Jesus' uncle and the father of Mary Magdalene, with whom Jesus shares a recognition dating from childhood:

> What deep, unrevealable joy they had experienced, what unspeakable sweetness! For the first time they had both sensed the deep dark fact that one was a man and the other a woman: two bodies which seemed once upon a time to have been one, but some merciless God separated them, and now the pieces had found each other again and were trying to join, to reunite. The older they grew, the more clearly they felt what a miracle it was that one should be a man and the other a woman, and they looked at each other in mute terror. (40, Temp.)

The perception of their unity is denied actualization because of the intervention of God: "But then, one evening at a festival in Cana when her beloved held out his hand to give her the rose and seal their engagement, merciless God had rushed down upon them and separated them once more. And ever since." (40, Temp.) The denial thus tendered is not so easily managed. The Magdalene, even as a child, has threatened to usurp God's place, and Magdalene reminds Jesus of this as he struggles with his decision to forgo the path

of man: "Jesus," the woman said again, "you were three and I was one year older. There were three steps leading to the door of our house and I used to sit on the highest one and watch you struggle for hours, unable to mount the first step. You fell, you got up again, and I did not even lift my little finger to help you. I wanted you to come to me, but not before you suffered greatly." (91, Temp.) The Magdalene's attitude here is the same as God's attitude: both evidence their attainability, but do not actively aid the seeker in their attainment of them.

God has no intention of allowing his Church's bridegroom another bride. The Magdalene's love of Jesus is transmuted into a more matronly love when she sees him returned from the desert, the first battleground of the mythic hero:

> "I must look at you, because woman issued from the body of man and still cannot detach her body from his. But you must look at heaven, because you are a man, and man was created by God. Allow me to look at you, therefore, my child."
>
> She pronounced these momentous words, "My child," in such a low voice that not even Jesus heard her. But her own breast filled out and stirred as though she were giving suck to her son. (323, Temp.)

The true nature of the Magdalene character becomes apparent during the moments before the last temptation. The Evening Star, aptly enough, whispers these words to Jesus:

> "Be patient . . . submit, do not despair. Only one woman exists in the world, one woman with countless faces. This one falls; the next rises. Mary Magdalene died. Mary sister of Lazarus lives and waits for us, waits for you. She is Magdalene herself, but with another face". . . . In the humid half darkness the face of Mary Magdalene and Mary sister of Lazarus were mixing, becoming one. (449, Temp.)

Mary sister of Lazarus was the first whose soul recognized Jesus. The face of woman is the essence of the temptations and trials through which Jesus must go in order to accede to totality of spirit and self: she is all normalcy and all matter.

Jesus answers the call by leaving home. Happiness now is the fulfillment of his duty: to align his desires with those of God. It is difficult to ascertain what it is that God desires, Jesus finds, for there are at least two paths to God: one is domestic and peoples God's world with strong sons and the other is monastic in nature. This, the latter, is the path chosen by Jesus at this point in his journey. He

will wander the deserts seeking his God, but not without interruption by a figure of terrible power, who shows herself "inside his eyes." She is not the bereaved mother who calls "down her curse upon him"; rather she flashes before him in the "savage body of a woman covered head to foot with interlocking scales of thick bronze armor. But the head was not a human head; it was an eagle's, with yellow eyes and a crooked beak which grasped a mouthful of flesh. She looked tranquilly, mercilessly, at the son of Mary." (77, Temp). She is called by Jesus the Curse.

Enigmatically, the Curse attends upon all the crucial moments in the journey of Christ. After Jesus' confrontation with Judas during which Jesus understands that the crucifier suffers more than the crucified, she stands quietly near, and Jesus calls her his "faithful fellow voyager," his sister (154, Temp.). When he finally enters the desert, Jesus realizes that this figure is not so much the Curse as his Mother. And as he leaves the desert, having ascertained his future path and reconciled himself with it, the footsteps which before dogged him now lead him on, rapidly, heavily, and decisively: they now guide him. The figure leads him into darkness, but darkness in which appears a tiny red skiff bravely voyaging, and the skiff is his heart, a source of knowledge in direct opposition to the knowledge of the mind. The figure leads Jesus to the cross: "Since the day I quit

my mother's house, a shadow had followed me like a dog or at times has run in front to show me the road. What road? The Cross!" (379-80, Temp.) She attends the crucifixion, and here is Jesus truly reconciled with her: "'Welcome, faithful fellow voyager,' he murmured. 'Here the journey ends. What you wanted has been accomplished; what I wanted has also been accomplished. All my life I toiled to turn the Curse into a blessing. I've done it, and we are friends now. Farewell, Mother!' He waved his hand languidly at the savage shade." (434, Temp.)

The answering of the call then, is followed by trials of a human and sexual nature, all named Mary, and typified by a dream in which "two insects as large as men emerged from the ground and at once began to embrace on the springtime grass. They rolled from one end of the meadow to the other, coupled, separated, coupled again, laughed indecently, scoffed at the shepherd boy, and hissed" (79, Temp.).

Jesus is urged on and aided by the strange and unequivocal figure of the Curse. She, ironically enough, is the embodiment of fear and can be seen to function mythologically in the way of the Cosmic Mother, a figure of frightening mein who nonetheless supports and aids the hero, for she represents "the benign, protecting power of destiny. The fantasy is a reassurance--a promise that the peace of Paradise . . . is

not to be lost" (71, Hero).

Jesus crosses the first threshold at his Baptism. The appearance of the dove occasions a deep knowledge within Christ. The dove appears and "Jesus tensed his whole body, trying to hear. He had a presentiment that here was his true name, but he could not distinguish what it was. All he heard were many waves breaking within him, many wings, and great, bitter words" (234, Temp.). This knowledge is not to be intellectually gained. The Baptist has heard and understood the words of the dove, but when Jesus asks him for an explanation, he replies that "The day will come when you shall hear the words it pronounced. But until then, they will hang over you like swords" (236, Temp.). Christ has not heard his name; rather he has heard the meaning of his name, an experience of more emotional depth and autonomous force.[1] It is after this experience that Jesus physically enters the desert.

One of the greatest issues which confronts him there on his road of trials is the discovery of the particular method which God wishes him to employ, whether the methods of war or those of peace. This debate begins with Jesus' entry into a monastery preparatory to the desert. The Abbot there

[1] Jung, Aion, p. 30-31.

offers an interesting point of view. He speaks to God without giving an inch:

> "Well, where is the son of man?" he shouted, gazing into the blackness. "He isn't your any more, seeing that you promised him to us--he's ours! Well, where is he? Why don't you give him dominion, glory and the kingdom so that your people, the people of Israel, can govern the whole universe? Our necks are stiff from watching the sky and waiting for it to open. When, when? Yes--why do you harp on it--we know well enough that one second for you is a thousand years for man. All right, but if you're just, Lord, you'll measure the time with man's measure, not with yours. That's what justice means!" (98-99, Temp.)

It is not justice that is demanded by this fiery Abbot; it is God's mercy. It is not God's law and God's time which is used as the measure; it is man's. And it is not God's kingdom which is desired; it is the temporal kingdom of might.

The Baptist, too, wishes these things. He counsels the recognized Christ thus:

> "Change your expression, strengthen your arms, make firm your heart. Your life is a heavy one. I see blood and thorns on your brow. Endure, my brother and superior, courage! Two roads open up in front

> of you: the road of man, which is level, and the road of God, which ascends. Take the more difficult road. Farewell! . . . Your duty is not to weep; it is to strike. . . . That is your road. Both ways are the daughters of God, do not forget that. But Fire was born first and Love afterward. Let us begin therefore with Fire." (236, Temp.)

Judas also urges the path of war; he, however, is told by Jesus to abide by the law of God which is Time. The claims of the war path are refuted finally by Christ as he is taken on Golgotha by the soldiers, when he orders Peter to return his knife to its sheath.

Another great struggle is centered around the place of Judas. He is the first to see in Christ answer of the prophecies. He goads Christ throughout the novel; the red and abundant hair aligning him with the strong arm of Cain and bloodshed. He reserves to himself a right of judgement over Christ's actions not wished for by the other disciples:

> The companions raced toward the lake of Gennesaret like aching, hungry horses returning to the beloved stable. Judas the redbeard was again in the lead. . . . He had not felt his heart so contented for years. The teacher's face, voice and fierceness since his return from the desert pleased him immensely. . . .

> Can the Messiah be lamb as well as lion, like the ancient monsters? . . . One of these nights before we reach the lake, he will open his mouth and speak. . . . Then I shall judge. (290, Temp.)

It is for Judas to follow the ax, an ax not altogether the sword of the spirit, and yet a necessary and indespensible companion of it.

But, in the end, Judas follows Christ more strongly than the others. His prophecy is fulfilled that said "One day every single one of you will forsake him--mark my words--while I alone shall not betray him" (279, Temp.). Christ feels the strange kinship of the two, for of all his disciples, this Judas is the one that Christ "felt . . . the closest to . . . and yet the furthest away. It seemed that he need explain himself to none other, only to him" (291, Temp.). Christ chooses Judas to enact the role of treason. Judas asks why this is so and Christ replies, "You know you're the strongest. The others don't bear up" (404, Temp.). This is the sort of flattery that sometimes puts unbearable responsibility upon unwilling shoulders. Judas finds it difficult, and Christ finds it necessary to explain that the denial is part of what is demanded and that in any case he will rise again in three days from the dead. Judas' response is telling: "You tell me this in order to comfort me and make me able to betray you without rendering my own heart. . . . No, Rabbi, I won't

be able to endure!" (413, Temp.)

It is necessary, however, and in the days that follow, Christ comes to depend more and more upon the certainty that Judas will be able to bear up. In the midst of wailing companions, who sing the dirge of Christ's incipient death, it is Judas to whom Christ turns to find the strength to continue. Judas "had devined what was happening inside the master and how easily love could paralyze his strength" (418, Temp.). Thus it is that Judas can come to understand the paradox of the crucifier suffering more than the crucified. Judas in his relationship to Christ is a personal corollary to the war/peace polarity which Christ struggles with. The issue involved is the place on a personal affective level of the forces of love and hate, the dark and the light.

These issues and characters provide the struggles of Christ on his road of trials. We might see the events surrounding Christ's return from the desert as that portion of the journey which Campbell calls the second stage of the way, in which the sense and the ego claims must be purified and focused on transcendental things (101, Hero). As such, and due to the focusing on transcendental things, the return of Christ to the world of action is sharply different from the turning of Manolios to the world of action. Both, it is true, do think of higher things, but in the case of Christ, a model is provided who fulfills his destiny more truly

than does Manolios. It is still the struggle within himself which has societal ramifications with which Christ concerns himself. Manolios, as we have seen, leaves himself and attempts to tell the society around him the path they should take.

The issues and characters herewith set forth contain within themselves the aid and succor implied in any "two-edged truth." The presence of the Curse assumes the role of life-line, of nurturing Mother. The appearance of the scapegoat on the desert causes Christ momentary hesitation, but the serpents of the desert, one being marriage and the other monastic life, are vanquished and along with them, the hesitation occasioned by the scapgoat. Christ comes to a perception of the place of time in God's law:

> Time, within him, had become as small as a heart-beat, as large as death. He was no longer hungry or thirsty; he no longer desired children and a wife. His whole soul had squeezed into his eyes. He saw--that was all: he saw. But at precisely noon his sight grew dim; the world vanished and a gigantic mouth gaped somewhere in front of him, its lower jaw the earth, its upper jaw the skies. Trembling, he dragged himself slowly forward toward the opened mouth, his neck stretched forward. (253, Temp.)

The perception of God's law as an irrevocable and implacable time, which God elucidates for anyone only after his prior and proper preparation, enables Christ to deny the path of war to Judas with assurance. The principal means of supernatural authority behind this denial comes from the intercession of Gabriel. The confinement of linear time with its emphasis on the possibility of man's conforming the world to his own demands is broken.

Pride, too, is overcome by a merciful command and Christ rises to bring to man the day of the Lord. He has labored long to become God and is now promised fruition of those labors.

This moment is the nadir of Christ's mythological round. Christ is atoned with the unmanifest father made manifest. Recognition of that atonement, as Campbell puts it literally, "at-one-ment," leads in turn to the apotheosis of the hero. The apotheosis enables the hero to successfully extend his erstwhile individual ego to all-inclusiveness, thereby annihilating not only his personal ego but also all claims to an identity group, which in turn enables the hero to understand the place of love and hate as merely names put upon ego claims of the individual or that identity group. More specifically, the hero becomes conscious that all are "reflexes of the image of the . . . [divine]. The sufferer within us is that divine being. We and that protecting

father are one. This is the redeeming insight. That protecting father is every man we meet. . . . [even] the enemy . . . is the God" (161, Hero).

Godlike now, Christ has still another road of trials to traverse in his return to mankind. He returns willingly, with a certainty of the events which will meet his return in a world in which only Judas of the disciples recognizes him as the Messiah. He travels on his missions, nonetheless, and spreads his message. The message is one not completely understood or accepted by man.

It is a message of which Jehovah is the master craftsman, but which is accomplished through mankind. The relationship between God and man is made clear in the following:

> Man's heart was crushed under the six hundred thirteen written commandments of the Hebrew law, plus the thousands of unwritten ones--yet it did not stir; under Genesis, Leviticus, Numbers, Judges and Kings--yet it did not stir. And then suddenly at the most unexpected moment a light breeze blew, not from heaven, but from below, on earth, and all the chambers of man's heart were shaken. Straightway Judges, Kings, the prophecies, anathemas, Pharisees, Sadducees and the stones which men call Jerusalem cracked, tottered and began to tumble down--at first within the heart, then in the mind

> and finally upon the earth itself. Haughty Jehovah once again tied on his leather master craftsman's apron, once again took up his level and rule, went down to earth and personally began to help demolish the past and build the future along with men. But before anything else, he began the Temple of the Jews at Jerusalem. (357, Temp.)

This is an evolutionary Jehovah, a God who forges man's souls, rather than waiting passively and in majesty for man to come up to him. And it is this sort of God who relishes Jesus' new-found blasphemy:

> "When I say 'I,'" Jesus [said]. . ., "I do not speak of this body--which is dust; I do not speak of the son of Mary--he too is dust, with just a tiny, tiny spark of fire. 'I' from my mouth, Rabbi, means God."
>
> "That is a still more terrible blasphemy!" cried the rabbi, covering his face.
>
> "I am Saint Blasphemer, and don't forget it," Jesus replied with a laugh. (357-58, Temp.)

And with that, Jesus scourges the temple, a necessary action for "the weight of perdition or salvation [falls] upon the shoulders of mankind; the borders of God and man join . . ." (364, Temp.). Further, the message of Jehovah now is dependent upon abolition of the Law of Moses. Christ won't

"go to meet God at the top in Sinai; he'll meet him in his own heart!" (369, Temp.).

This is perhaps the most telling moment in the novel. Kazantzakis has confined himself to his proper duty when using the novelistic form: that of telling a story using a narrative framework. It is left to us to understand the larger and contributory framework in back of that narrative framework. In other words, it is left to the reader to determine why something was done by Christ here in conjunction with the events as described by the New Testament versions of the passion of Christ and here at sharp variance to them. Rather than shout about heresies with honorable piousness as do many reviewers of the novel, or, on the other hand, smile smugly about the confusion inherent in the religious view of life to begin with as would the equally righteous nay-sayer, let us look at what this statement implies in a world view.

It has been mentioned here often (and without apparent reason) the place that time has in not only God's law, but also in the perception of that law. The mention of time in this regard in Kazantzakis' novels can be no mere mystic device. He was deeply immersed in problems of perception of time, as can be evidenced by the writing of a dissertation on Bergson, who formalized problems concerning time in his own writing. Nietzsche, also, devoted much thought to time: the

Eternal Recurrance theory was a cuase of suffering and internal tension.[1] Remember also that science and Marxism--which has its own peculiar approach to time, but peculiar only because the western world is feeling the effects of being buried by latter day adherents to that notion[2]--have deleterious effects upon the understanding of the numinous value of the moment. Science in particular treats of time as a finite and logical quantity which may be manipulated or controlled to suit the purposes of a finite and logical equation, and it was science that Kazantzakis castigated most frequently as being the cause of the most serious inroads upon the value of the spiritual man.

The passion of Christ takes place in a Hebrew world view, a view which has been credited with the invention of history. The heilegeschicte concept is an important one in the understanding of the alliance of the history of the Jews with the vision of an armed Jehovah interceding on all sides, historically, for his chosen people. It is indeed a holy

[1] The reader is referred to Peter Bien, "Kazantzakis' Nietzschianism," and Andreas K. Poulakidas, "Kazantzakis and Bergson; Metaphysic Aestheticians," both in Journal of Modern Literature, II (November, 1971).

[2] Berdyaev, The Meaning of History, loc. cit.

history, this one of the Jewish people in which Jehovah renders them slave or master according to His whim, in the name of forging a race worthy of Him.

It is this view of time, of history, that is offered to Jesus at the monastery in the desert by the Abbot: it is this view which is offered by Judas as justification for his terrorist activities; it is this view which is held by the disciples as they envision themselves seated in power and majesty on the hands of Jesus in a landscape that looks suspiciously that of temporal time. To all these, Jesus offers a denial of the armed path to God because of God's law, which is time. It is a denial which would not have been necessary in any society other than a monotheistic, progressively-minded, linearly-directed society.

For primitive man, temporal and limiting time is rejected each time an action is performed; the primitive's mind-set is that he is re-enacting those things which were done by the gods before him. In so doing, primitive man becomes a god. If the outcome of the action be good or ill, it makes no difference. The man, in the case of ill outcome, simply was not up to the demands of fulfilling the action rightly. The hero, on the other hand, succeeds because he is capable of being godlike.

Traditional man, however, and here we include those captured by the law of the Old Testament and the law of societies based upon it--that is, all societies who seek out and employ the war mythology--finds himself trapped by historical time, the time of the wrist-watch, and the idea of progress. The prophets of Yahweh, the god of wrath, for the first time, "placed a value on history, succeeded in transcending the traditional vision of the cycle (the conception that ensures all things will be repeated forever), and discovered a one-way time. . . . for the first time, we find affirmed, and increasingly accepted, the idea that historical events have a value in themselves, insofar as they are determined by the will of God. This God of the Jewish people is no longer an Oriental divinity, creator of archetypal gestures, but a personality who ceaselessly intervenes in history, who reveals his will through events."[1] Mircea Eliade makes this point, and continues to ask if "monotheism, based upon the direct and personal revelation of the divinity, does not necessarily entail the 'salvation' of time, its value within the frame of history" (104, Cosmos).

In a traditional society, man's actions take place in a

[1] Mircea Eliade, Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return, trans. Willard R. Trask (1954; rpt. NY: Harper and Row, 1959), p. 104. Hereinafter citations refer to this edition and will be denoted by Cosmos.

different light. Instead of seeing everything as occuring in mythical time, "at the extratemporal instant of the beginning . . . /so that/ everything in a certain sense coincide/s/with the beginning of the world, with the cosmogony" (105, Cosmos), man's actions in a traditional monotheistic society "take place in time, in historical duration" (105, Cosmos). Moses received the law in a specific place at a specific time and is thus limited. Since the receiving of the law "also represents a theophany, it . . . acquires a new dimension: it becomes precious inasmuch as it is no longer reversible, as it is a historical event" (105, Cosmos). Thus, the moment becomes precious and any attempt to enlarge the illumination of the moment in accordance with man's growth in ability to perceive increased illumination becomes blasphemy.

The idea of the Messiah im this framework becomes one of future certification that the society's present beliefs are valid. But this validation can only occur in the future, the future which will recall also the beginning; the Messiah becomes one component of a philosophic framework which does not lend itself to actualization. Eliade explains it thus:

> Yet Messianism hardly succeeds in accomplishing the eschatological valorization of time: the future will regenerate time; that is, will restore its original purity and integrity. Thus, in illo

> tempore is situated not only at the beginning of time but also at its end. In these spacious Messianic visions it is also easy to discern the very old scenario of annual regeneration of the cosmos by repetition of the Creation and by the drama of the suffering king. The Messiah--on a higher plane, of course--assumes the eschatological role of the king as god, or as representing the divinity on earth, whose chief mission was the periodical regeneration of all nature. His sufferings recalled those of the king, but, as in the ancient scenarios, the victory was always finally the king's. The only difference is that this victory over the forces of darkness and chaos no longer occurs regularly every year but is projected into a future and Messianic illud tempus. (105-06, Cosmos)

Eliade states that it was difficult for the religious elite to enforce this view of a future regeneration of time upon the people; the heated energy of the religious leaders in seeking to destroy Christ might be due in part to reaction from past difficulties in obtaining and then keeping power.

Jesus' statement that he will meet God in his own heart has implications of a shattering nature for a society which looks forward to the receiving of the new law in a new historical time and place. The concession of the religious

leaders to the cyclic perception of time which the idea of Christ embodies, is now being personified and that is dangerous. Kazantzakis' Christ offers a synthesis of two views of time and is of the highest order: the lineally necessary Christ who will offer a legitimate means of acceding to another and newer cycle view of time is evolutionary. It partakes of the archetypal force of the cyclic view of time, and also becomes a new archetype of the means to avoiding the pitfalls and depressions of that view of time. In so doing, this embodiment of time perceptions called Christ makes of himself a cross:

> The old rabbi, sitting as he was next to Jesus, so close that their knees touched, felt an unbearable fiery force spurt out of Jesus' body; and as a strong wind suddenly blew through the opened window and extinguished the lamp, the rabbi saw in the darkness, all splendor like a column of fire, the son of Mary standing erect in the center of the room. . . . Just as the old rabbi was about to scream, Jesus stretched out his arms. He had become a cross now and was being licked by the flames. (387, Temp.)

The cross is, of course, a pictoral representation or symbol of the coincidence of opposites, of the order and serenity of oneness at the very center of the chaos of all

diversity. Christ, as the cross himself on a cosmological level, and as crucified on the cross on a personal, psychological level, is an archetype of the momentary and balanced stasis of forces, a stasis involved with and dependent upon linear time, but outside it and with the numinous value of cyclic time.

As such, Christ is the efficacious representation of the force of God. That the god is evolutionary, a new god who is only the old God made pertinent and living, and thus a mythic reality is demonstrated by the shift from the primitive to the traditional to the modern--a modern god supra to those before it only because it depends on, but also is, those before it. The numinous god is all things and all times--past, present, and future.

Campbell sees the cross as "the most telling symbol of the mythological passage into the abyss of death" (213, Hero). In this case, however, the abyss is not of death but rather of rebirth, for Christ has no fear of death. This, too, is a commonly recurring Kazantzakian concept, and one which now finds its mature, although somewhat hidden as are all things mystic, expression. One does not go into an abyss at death; rather one returns to the chaotic perfection of the oneness of God. The old Rabbi knows his own death will be a sure sign of Jesus' Messiahship. Likewise, Jesus hopes his death will lead to his freedom: "Friends, here is the

final word I wish to say to you tonight. When you find yourselves in front of a beloved tomb, do not being to weep. Keep ever in your minds this great consolation: Death is the door to immortality; there is no other door. Your beloved did not die--he became immortal." (393, Temp.) His death will also lead to the freedom of others: "This is the way. For the world to be saved, I, of my own free will, must die." (379, Temp.) In what manner this death will lead to others' salvation will be left until later: suffice it to say that the manner is dependent upon the right understanding on the part of the people of the force of the mythological hero's meaning, of his path. Death is freedom on both a psychological and a cosmological level.

Aside from the place of death and the evolutionary nature of Jehovah, Jesus' message offers access to the power necessary to understand these things: "That is the way man begins his campaign--with visions. Little by little the shade thickens and solidifies, the spirit dons flesh and descends to earth. The prophet Daniel had his vision, and because he had it: that's that!" (374, Temp.). The power of creative imagery is not to be scoffed.

During the last temptation, as Jesus is beset by the vision of peaceful and normal life, a scornful Paul demands that the crucifixion and the suffering continue. The truth, Paul thunders, is that which makes mankind grow: truth is a

creating image. "I don't give a hoot about what's true and what's false, or whether I saw him or didn't see him, or whether he was crucified or wasn't crucified," Paul says to Jesus as Jesus begs release from his suffering on the grounds that to rise above oneself is Faustian, the wings of the spirit becoming the wings of Lucifer (469, Temp.). Paul objects:

> "I create the truth, create it out of obstinacy and longing and faith. I don't struggle to find it--I build it. I build it taller than man and thus I make man grow. If the world is to be saved, it is necessary--do you hear--absolutely necessary for you to be crucified, and I shall crucify you, like it or not; it is necessary for you to be resurrected, and I shall resurrect you, like it or not. For all I care you can sit here in your miserable village . . . I shall compel the air to take your shape. . . . The whole works is now part of the machinery of salvation--everything is indispensable. And in every corner of the earth, innumerable eyes will look up and see you in the air--crucified." (469, Temp.)[1]

[1] Priestley, Man and Time, p. 142-43. The missionary genius of Paul, indebted to his ability to find creating images, is here postulated as the primary reason for the ascendancy of the Christ myth over other myths of the time which incorporated many of the same ideas and attitudes.

The message of Jesus depends upon his crucifixion now, even though without it he has provided a transcendent image. It is a crucifixion which must be self-willed, else why should Paul argue with Christ at all. The ego has indeed been annihilated; and all questions of the historical Christ, or the megalomania of one who called himself Christ, have effectively been dealt with. They are not important.

The matter of self-willing the crucifixion becomes important on the psychological mythic level. Christ as a mythological hero must perform as would a mythological hero. The last temptation of Christ is of the nature of the familiar mythological testing of the hero to ensure candidacy. Campbell speaks of the initiatory tests of the hero thus: "When a student approaches a teacher to ask the secret of immortal life, he is first put off with a description of the joys of the mortal. . . . Only if he persists is he admitted to the next initiation." (186, Hero) For Kazantzakis and Christ and modern man in search of a soul, all life is but initiation, and thus, even in the last minute can Kazantzakis' Christ be tempted and tested. The last temptation is played out in Christ's mind in the temporal time of seconds and it consists of one last debate of the rectitude of the path Christ has taken to God. In imagination surrounded by proofs of his fecundity in life and honor, it is not until Judas reviles Christ for giving

himself over to the earthly and the material that Christ recalls himself to the cross, crying LAMA SABACTHANI and at the same moment feeling a "wild, indomitable joy . . . /in/ possession of him" (487, Temp.):

> The joys, marriages and children were lies; the decrepit, degraded old men who shouted coward, deserter, traitor at him were lies. All--all were illusions sent by the Devil. His disciples were alive and thriving. They had gone over sea and land and were proclaiming the Good News. Everything had turned out as it should, glory be to God! (487, Temp.)

The disciples carry his myth forward for him; the elixir will be given to the people. Christ cries, "IT IS ACCOMPLISHED! And it was as though he had said: Everything has begun" (487, Temp.). Christ has found freedom in necessity and discovered the spiritual without fanatically denying the claims of the flesh.

The singular thing about this hero-trek--aside from the breathtaking beauty and frightening intensity of its expression--is the final view of Christ we are left with. No room here for resurrection and transfiguration, for this is a new myth pertinent to each individual. It is left to the disciples, Matthew the scribbler and Paul the missionary, to modify

and clarify Christ's experience. We are left with the immediate picture of Christ crucified. A Greek Orthodox icon comes to mind. A resurrection icon, it seemingly betrays its own terms, for it shows Christ on the cross.[1] The Last Temptation of Christ is a strong statement of the condition of all "men who struggle." It is not written; it is hewn, and as the axiom goes: "For one work hewn out of granite, you can forgive a lot of crap."[2]

Having said that, it is necessary to deal with some crap. This is a particularly apt time to deal with crap, not only because it is so obviously crap in comparison to the intensity of the novel which occasioned it, but also as a refutation of the critical axiom that one must deal with others' crap before one can provender one's own crap. As Phoebe Adams says of the novel: "This Jesus is not the assured son of God following a prearranged path but a man who . . . connives with Judas to arrange his own execution and in doing so assumes something of the character of those epic heroes who choose their deaths."[3] Phoebe Adams takes as

[1] Benz, The Eastern Orthodox Church, p. 17.

[2] A. D. Gustafson, Critical Axioms (n.p., n.d.), p. 1.

[3] Phoebe Adams, rev. of The Last Temptation of Christ, by Nikos Kazantzakis, Atlantic, 206 (1960), 114.

the basis of her reasoning that "those epic heroes" choose their death, and thus one would assume that by choosing one's death, one becomes more than something of those epic heroes. If choosing death is a means of becoming an epic hero, then Christ is more than something of an epic hero.

Here's one from an Edward Wagenknecht:

> There is much brilliant writing in this novel, and there is much that is unconvincing from any point of view. The change in Jesus at the beginning of his mission, for example, is unbelievable. Kazantzakis sometimes achieves illumination by putting old stores into new settings. He changes parables whenever he chooses and even invents new ones. Many readers will find blasphemy in the book; others will be disgusted by such passages as that in which Lazarus is resurrected with a decayed body. On the whole, it seems highly doubtful that either believers or unbelievers will be satisfied with this book.[1]

Well! I am satisfied with the book. I am therefore neither believer nor unbeliever. Perhaps I am something of an epic reader who chooses her own bad taste.

[1] Edward Wagenknecht, rev. of The Last Temptation of Christ, by Nikos Kazantzakis, Chicago Sunday Tribune, August 21, 1960, p. 2.

A Mr. Kyle Haselden, writing in Christian Century and very probably a respectable man, finds that Kazantzakis had an unusual problem, in that "he could not decide what to do with Jesus of Nazareth--whether to keep him the man or let him be God."[1] Kazantzakis does indeed have an unusual problem. He couldn't keep his Christ out of Mr. Haselden's christian century.

The funniest one, however, is an article by Everett T. Moore in the Bulletin of the ALA.[2] It is entitled "A City in Torment Over Kazantzakis," which sounds like a surrealist painting. But one finds one's expectations sorely disappointed; the report is factual. The article has to do with a group of people in Southern California (yes) who wish clean books. They call themselves the Citizens Committee for Clean Books and they stand in mighty array against the local library. The crux is the removal of The Last Temptation of Christ from the library shelves. At the head of the library forces is a librarian named Fletcher. The two groups are kept from ideological bloodshed by the intervention of the City Council.

[1] Kyle Haselden, rev. of The Last Temptation of Christ, by Nikos Kazantzakis, Christian Century, 77 (October 5, 1960), 1149.

[2] Everett T. Moore, "A City in Torment Over Kazantzakis," Bulletin of the American Library Association, LVII (April, 1963), p. 305-06.

The City Council tells everybody to go home and enjoy the Christmas holidays, for this is the Christmas holiday time in Southern California. Everybody does. At the time of writing, the author of the article says, the issue is not settled. But he ends with a spirited dash in the honor of freedom: "The library board showed no signs of relaxing its firms support of Librarian Fletcher, and made abundantly clear its determination to preserve the library's freedom of action in selecting books for its readers."[1] Well! Anybody who misses the irony of this hasn't yet realized that the issue of freedom is one constantly to be fought. They also haven't realized the significance of the initials ALA.

This is fun. But one does have to control oneself. Or else oneself will find oneself telling funny but warm-hearted stories about Virginia Woolf.[2] But it is necessary at times not to control oneself. I think the point is perfectly clear.

The confusion over the book is clear even in nominally more qualified circles. C. N. Stavrou finds the book to be "still another retelling of the life of Christ" in which

[1] Moore, "City in Torment," p. 306.

[2] It is hard to quit cold-turkey. I think the nicest Virginia Woolf story I've heard lately, one which warmed even mine own tepid heart, is the one in which she, talking to two ladies, upon the one leaving the room, turned to the other and said, "She thinks she looks like Shelley, but actually she looks like a sugar mouse."

the theme is patently and solely that martyrdom is the price of freedom, without which life is empty and worthless.[1] We have mentioned this analysis before in connection with The Greek Passion; it is, however, warranted to reiterate it now because the superficiality of the argument becomes more apparent. Rather more to the point, again, is Anthonakes' capsule: "In The Last Temptation Christ has man's capacity to sin and must then evolve into his role as the Messiah. He has limited inner freedom and must struggle with God to discover the tasks he must perform."[2]

This view is reinforced by Adèle Bloch's comments in "Kazantzakis and the Image of Christ".[3] The creator of divinity, she says, is "the all-powerful human soul, which can smash all terrestrial fetters, but is also endowed with the might of hell."[4] The Christ image is seen to evolve from the "Divine Child" archetype as expressed in the Odyssey to the "truest reincarnation" of Christ in The Last Temptation.[5] Bloch rightly sees importance in the "Mother" figure in the novel. Unfortunately her comments are confined to the interplay

[1] Stavrou, "Notes," p. 333.

[2] Anthonakes, "Christ, Freedom and Kazantzakis," p. 1331A.

[3] Adèle Bloch, "Kazantzakis and the Image of Christ," Literature and Psychology, XV (Winter, 1965), 2-11.

[4] Bloch, p. 3.

[5] Bloch, p. 4-5.

of this figure, which she wrongly terms Christ's "shadow side, the female manifestation of the unconscious" and the Christ figure.[1]

Since the meaning of the novel as we see it is to be understood in Jungian terms, we must begin with this shadow side of Christ. Jung clearly states that the shadow is the obverse side of the bright coin we all like to think ourselves to be, and it therefore is always of the same sex. The shadow of Jesus in The Last Temptation is Judas, and as we have seen, it is a shadow of an evolutionary sort, for Judas as a character dogs darkly Christ's steps, but evolves into a force of light when he performs the function of recalling an erstwhile "shadowy" human Christ back to spirituality and the cross during the last temptation.

The "Mother" is the anima, and Bloch correctly traces her development within the perceptions of Christ as her archetypal function is fulfilled.[2] Erroneous, however, is her statement of Christ's mission as being "to forsake the archaic matriarchal order. He must conquer, or at least transmute, his Dionysian side in favor of the Apollonian principium individuationis, if we view his dilemma from a

[1] Bloch, p. 4.

[2] Bloch, p. 6-9.

Nietzschean angle."[1] This is patently not Christ's mission: further, the Birth of Tragedy which provides the Nietzschean angle is nothing if not negative toward the role which Apollonian order played in giving rise to Socratic man, who destroyed the fertility of the Dionysian chaos.

Bloch finds further that the essence of temptation is "the wish to sink into the norm of common humanity, thus forsaking the thorny path of self-denial and immolation."[2] This, too, is not quite the temptation Christ suffers, save only on a very literal level. On a larger level, the temptation of Christ can be seen to be an attempt to regress to the status of pre-creation individual, an interpretation based on the following.

Jung develops the thesis that Christ is an archetype of the self (36, Aion). As an archetype, Christ is an image implanted in man as a means of becoming like God. Again, the totality of the self is a restoration of an original state, not a newly made state. The self as an individual is unique; the archetypal symbol is universal. By using the archetypal symbol of Christ in the manner which Kazantzakis

[1] Bloch, p. 7.

[2] Bloch, p. 9.

did, he has offered what he hoped to be a guide to the individual in the pursuing of the individual's myth, i.e., his soul or self.

In order for the possibility of totality, the ego, the personal consciousness; the shadow, the personal unconscious; the anima (in Christ's case, since he is male); and the fourth element, the Wise Old Man archetype (in Christ's case, again because he is male), must achieve a harmony in what Jung terms the quaternio (21, Aion). The shadow, novelistically, is Judas and we have spoken of his role. The anima, novelistically, is the complex of the various Marys, three in number, and in novelistic function corresponding to those functions described by Robert Graves in The White Goddess.[1] At one time or another in the novel, these three figures attempt to ensnare Christ in the time-honored manner of run-away animas: Mary, the mother of Christ, in the manner of the Mother Imago; Mary Magdalene in the manner of temptress; and Mary, sister of Lazarus, as temptress and attendant upon death. All three figures interchange these roles and identities, and all three of them blend into the one face of woman, as we have shown. Thus, they can be identified with the novelistic figure of the

[1] Robert Graves, The White Goddess: A Historical Grammar of Poetic Myth, rev. ed. (1948; rpt. NY: Noonday Press, 1966).

Curse, who performs on the level of archetype within the novel.

Jung defines the archetype as having autonomous power, insofar as "the contents of anima and animus can be integrated, /but/ they themselves cannot, since they are archetypes" (19, Aion). Thus, the figure of the Curse can attend the crucifixion independently of the integration of her contents into the self of Christ.

The fourth archetype, the Wise Old Man, is novelistically present in characters such as Joseph, who attempts with so much difficulty to call his son Adonai, and the Rabbi, who also wishes to sustain and yet prod Jesus. Actually, however, the Wise Old Man is Jehovah, and the manner in which he functions as this archetype is that described by Campbell in his discussion of the atonement with the father, which nadir of the mythological round applies to Christ's experience. In the Jungean taxonomy, incomplete recognition of this archetype leads to the fallacy of the enkekalymnenos. This fallacy, in short, is as follows: "Can you recognize your father? Yes. Can you recognize this veiled one? No. This veiled one is your father. Hence you can recognize your father and yet not recognize him." (17, Aion)

Jung states that the archetypes serve also as functions. That is to say, they are capable of arising independently and confronting the self, just as the perception of totality or

wholeness can. Although the archetypes may safely be ignored by anyone who has not sought them out and who merely abides by an old law in comfort, they must be balanced by any who steps onto the path of heroes, a path which by definition takes one away from the comfort of herd living. Altogether, these four archetypes are called the syzygy, a word akin to a sneeze in several ways. The eruption of the syzygy into the field of consciousness is sometimes called paranoid schizophrenia (32, Aion). Campbell has with great care and insight explained for us the relationship of that illness and the hero's struggles.[1]

We must, says Jung, in this christian century, be aware of the importance of the shadow, if for no other reason than the simple one of the ability of cognition (50, Aion). The act of cognition is, after all, the thing which is said to be uniquely human. To deny the dark is to make one, for example, Christ, perfect, but the archetype of Christ rather more complete than perfect (58, Aion). Therefore, Jung continues,

> the realization of the self, which would logically follow from a recognition of its [that is, the archetypes, and therefore the incomplete, less perfected form of the symbol Christ, and yet the form which has force and function] supremacy, leads to a fundamental conflict, to a real suspension

[1] Campbell, Myths to Live By, p. 201-32.

between opposites (reminiscent of the crucified Christ hanging between two thieves), and to an approximate state of wholeness that lacks perfection. To strive after teleiosis--completion--in this sense is not only legitimate but is inborn in man as a peculiarity which provides civilization with one of its strongest roots. This striving is so powerful, even, that it can turn into a passion that draws everything into its service. Natural as it is to seek perfection in one way or another, the archetype fulfills itself in completeness, and this is a teleiosis of quite another kind. Where the archetype predominates, completeness if forced upon us against all our conscious strivings. (58, Aion)

The place of the Christian myth in this process is as follows: Whenever the archetype of the self predominates, the inevitable psychological consequence is a state of conflict vividly exemplified by the Christian symbol of crucifixion--that actue state of unredeemedness which comes to an end only with the words consummatum est. Recognition of the archetype, therefore, does not in any way circumvent the Christian mystery; rather, it creates the psychological preconditions without which "redemption"

would appear meaningless. (60, Aion)

This, then, is the nature of Christ's suffering in The Last Temptation and the goal is the cross of the mandala. The essence of the temptation is not regression into the norm of common humanity in any sense other than an attempt to regress into a pre-created individual, one whose proper place is in common humanity--a goal not in keeping with the hero's goal.

It is not true that Christ gains freedom "at the price of self-immolation": it is that he gains freedom at the price of self-integration, a process which we are assured is equal in terms of suffering to the most henious of tortures. The novelistic cross is the fictional appearance of the cross which has manifested itself in many ways to many people; the alchemical conjunction of opposites, which in its intersection produces variously Eliot's "still center" or Joyce's "epiphany" or Woolf's "moment" or the tantric centers of contemplation.

The "it is finished" which equals "it is begun" which ends the novel is not merely a poetic embellishment in after-thought. Kazantzakis' Christ is a worthy creating image, an image of the stature of the God he strove to become, and the nature of which is only to be found in the suffering inherent to the synthetic attempt. It is in this sense that

Doulis may state that "the main search in Kazantzakis' fiction is for the value and meaning of human suffering."[1] If cruelty constituted the joy and delight of ancient man as Nietzsche declared, perhaps Nietzsche's leonine possession of Kazantzakis' soul led Kazantzakis to offer the synthesis that cruelty turned inward is suffering, and it is from this that modern heroes must rise.

Saint Francis shows us a character whose cruelty has indeed turned inward.[2] Suffering mightily in order to turn his flesh and material longings into spirit, while at the same time knowing it to be necessary to care for the "donkey" of the body so it can physically carry the spirit, Francis traverses the hero's path which leads to atonement with the father, then continues into the transformation of the saint. Francis is an extension of the Christ figure into the more specialized hero, the saint: Kazantzakis' thought and purpose seek a more perfected amalgamation of the hero of action and the saint.

[1] Tom Doulis, "Kazantzakis and the Meaning of Suffering," Northwest Review, VI (Winter, 1963), p.44.

[2] Nikos Kazantzakis, Saint Francis, trans. P. A. Bien (1962; rpt. NY: Ballantine, 1966). Hereinafter citations refer to this edition and are denoted by Fran.

The story is told through the persona of Brother Leo, and we may see the novel ultimately as one of search on the author's part for a living spiritual model. The persona was used in only one other of Kazantzakis' novels, Zorba the Greek; a novel wherein we are told by Kazantzakis in his Report that the figure of Zorba so captured his loyalty that he extended that figure into the master model, Odysseus.[1] In Zorba, the title character provides Kazantzakis with a physical model, a model of action. The body/soul duality of Kazantzakis again urges itself upon our attention.

The persona, Leo, is perceptive to the point of feeling spiritual intervention upon the matter of Saint Francis' body and that of his surroundings. The hero trek he narrates begins with his perception of Francis' incipient conversion to Christ, as evidenced by supernatural events occuring in the place of that conversion, Assisi.Leo, embued with such life force that hair grows even on his tongue, approaches the city of Assisi as a gentle revivifying rain falls.[2] He

[1] Nikos Kazantzakis, Report, pp. 430-43.

[2] Heinrich Zimmer, Myths and Symbols in Indian Art and Civilization, ed. Joseph Campbell (1946; rpt. NY: Harper Torchbooks, 1962), p. 157. Leo is endowed with a hairy tongue as an outgrowth of his asking many questions about God, an indication of the fecundity of God, who is here to be understood as identical with the search for God.

The mythic situation of the revivifying effects of rain is ubiquitous and requires no further explanation save that for Kazantzakis the event of rainfall became one of symbolic duality: God being identified with the rain and the soul of man with the reception of it here, and in other novels, particularly The Last Temptation, the identification of rain and its reception with sexual polarities.

senses a transformation of the city:

> I had already enjoyed this noble city many times, glory be to God, but that night Assisi was something else entirely: it was unrecognizable. What miracle was this? Where was I? Houses, citadel, churches, towers: all were hovering in the air, floating in a pure white sea, beneath a purple sky. It was dinnertime when I entered the city through the newly built Saint Peter's gate. The moon was just rising--full, brilliantly red. It was gentle, like a kindly sun: and from high up on the citadel, the Rocca, a serene waterfall spilled down onto the bell towers and housetops, filling the ditches with milk until they overflowed, flooding the narrow lanes, which ran like brooks, and making the faces of the inhabitants so radiant that everyone seemed to be thinking of God. I stopped, swept away by the sight before me. Is this Assisi? I kept asking myself, making the sign of the cross. Can these be houses and people and bell towers, or is it possible that while still alive, I have entered Paradise? I held out my hands; the moon filled my palms, a moon sweet and gelatinous, like honey. I felt the grace of God running over my lips, my temples--

> and then I understood. I uttered a cry. Some saint--yes, without a doubt some saint had come this way. His smell was in the air! (10-11, Fran.)

Because possessed of great life force, and yearning at the same time towards spirituality, Leo is vulnerable to suffering in his attempted reconciliation of the two opposed forces. He is an apt companion of Francis, for all that Francis is indeed the hero and the one who must lead the way.

Francis smells of ainthood, but is not yet aware of the manner in which he must fulfill his potential, nor even that his potential must be fulfilled. He is, at this point, merely another man who possesses the possibility of becoming a militant Christian; the requisite tension of good and evil for that struggle obtains within him. As Kazantzakis, through Leo, puts it: "The militant Christian's greatest worth is not his virtue, but his struggle to transform into virtue the impusdence, dishonor, unfaithfulness, and malice within him. One day Lucifer will be the most glorious archangel standing next to God; not Michael, Gabriel, or Raphael--but Lucifer, after he has finally transubstantiated his terrible darkness into light." (18-19, Fran.)

The call to fulfill his potential is received by Francis in the midst of a life of darkness: "My life until now has been nothing but banquets, revels, lutes, red plumes, clothes of silk. All day long--business. I gave short measure,

cheated the customers, amassed money and then squandered it with both hands--which is why I came to be called 'Leaky Palms.' Business by day, wine and singing by night: that was my life." (39, Fran.) The call is received when, after a walk of the streets alone after a night's carousing with Leo, Francis approaches the church door and sits on a lion who guards the doors.[1] He calls upon God as he perceives chasms opening about him. Later, Francis tells Leo of God's answer:

> "I couldn't make out the words. No, it wasn't a voice; it was the bellowing of a wild beast--a lion. Could it have been the marble man-eating lion I was sitting on? . . . Soon I was running, and, while I was running, I found myself suddenly bathed in a cold sweat. I heard someone behind me calling: 'Where are you running, Francis? . . . You cannot escape!' I turned, but saw no one. I began to run again. After a moment I heard the voice onee more: 'Francis, Francis, is this why you were born--to sing, make merry, and entice the

[1] Zimmer, Indian Art and Civilization, p. 182. Temple guardians serve as warnings for man to order themselves before approaching the rather less formidable images within the temple. The lions here provide not only that meaning, but also identify further the role of Brother Leo as a part not only of God's love, but also God's demands. The prophet does indeed make the saint.

girls?'

. . . . . .

"My hair stood on end. I ran and ran, but the voice ran with me. And then at last I understood clearly: the voice was not outside me. No matter how much I ran I would never escape it, because it came from within. . . . Not Bernardone's son, the libertine; no, not me, but someone else--someone inside me, better than me.

. . . . . .

"Someone within me began to speak again. . . . 'Francis, Francis,' I heard, 'your soul is the dove; the hawk pursuing you is Satan. Come into my bosom.'" (40-41, Fran.)

As Francis speaks, his mother, the gentle Pica, comes from mass to his bedside and gives a sprig of basil to her son, along with greetings from the Virgin: both are to be "a comfort and bolster" to Francis' soul (43, Fran.). This calm gift is a mute recognition of Francis' kingship, basil being the herbal which is a symbol of the king. Thus begins Francis' journey.

Pica, like the soul, is identified with the dove; her gift of basil is in keeping with the indication of the saint's path of the soul which Francis will follow: "I've made the decision; inside me my mother's blood is crying

out," he announces to Leo (59, Fran.). Signor Bernardone, the earthly father of Francis, is a hawk, and Francis has fought a battle between the two forces which he describes thus:

> "The two of them have been wrestling inside me for ages. This struggle has lasted my whole life--I want you to realize that. They may take on different names--God and Satan, spirit and flesh, good and bad, light and darkness--but they always remain my mother and father. My father cries within me: 'Earn money, get rich, use your gold to buy a coat of arms, become a nobleman. Only the rich and the nobility deserve to live in the world. Don't be good; once good, you're finished! If someone chips one tooth in your mouth, break his whole jaw in return. Do not try to make people love you; try to make them fear you. Do not forgive: strike!' . . . And my mother, her voice trembling within me, says to me softly, fearfully, lest my father hear her: 'Be good, dear Francis, and you shall have my blessing. You must love the poor, the humble, the oppressed. If someone injures you, forgive him!'" (30, Fran.)

In following his mother's blood, Francis chooses to become dovelike. He declares that the soul is all that exists.

The role of Brother Leo in precipitating this choice must be understood, for it, too, is an understood philosophical premise of the novel. Although Leo is dependent upon Francis to lead him, he is also a driving force in Francis' recognition of the necessity of making a choice and then following the path dictated by that choice. The sight of Leo on the guardian lion pushes Francis into the confession of his call. Leo sits where Francis had sat the previous evening at the time of the call. In a sense, the apostle makes the saint, a point of view which we have seen expostulated in The Last Temptation. It is Leo who introduces Francis into the spiritual good of a social evil: begging: "Piety requires laziness, you know. It requires leisure. . . . The laborer. . . . Where can he find time for God?" (34, Fran.) On another level, Leo is aware of the cosmic time which is God's law: he is incapable, moreover, of measuring linear time. The importance of time is more apparent when we consider Francis' words as he awakes from the dreaming sickness into which he had fallen after his confession of the call to Leo, a sickness within which he sees the path he must take: "I have time," he murmured again, carried away with emotion. "Praise the Lord! I have time!" (46, Fran.) Having gained this understanding, Francis answers the call and undertakes his journey.

Leo, as the precipitor of this recognition and yet dependent upon Francis as leader, is in keeping with the Kazantzakian dictum that says that man guides God and that spiritual evolution is dependent solely upon man. Lady Pica, too, plays an important role in fulfilling this dictum, although it is a sublimation of her original desires to find the father, God, to which end she followed a mad monk from the protection of her family home as a girl. She is followed and brought back by her family and hurriedly married. Francis tells this to Leo and concludes that "they shut her in the house, married her off, and she had a son and forgot about everything. You see, she was looking for a son, and not for God" (48, Fran.). Although forced into this position through societal and biological necessities, Pica painfully tells her story as an encouragement to her son to travel the path dictated in him by her blood: the path of the soul. She becomes a Cosmic Mother, with this encouragement, and evidences that figure's mythic demands and solaces.

The awakening from the dream marks the first of the narrative re-births of Francis. He sits up in bed and looks around him "as though seeing the world for the first time" (46, Fran.). Such re-births are common throughout the novel, but they are sufficiently hard-won to render them something more than self-consciousness and cloying mysticism. The re-birth motif becomes one of the major themes of the novel:

the figure of St. Francis is the model which will bring us out of the middle ages which beset modern man in the same manner as did his historical prototype:

> Francis was one of the first, the first consummate flower to rise out of the discord-tilled winter of the Middle Ages. . . . After so many centuries, Francis was the first to see the world with virgin eyes. All the heavy, unwieldy scholastic armor of the Middle Ages fell away, and body and soul remained naked, delivered over to all the shivers of spring.[1]

The dependence of re-birth upon paternity is obvious, and the question of paternity is also a major question of the novel, partaking as the novel does of the pattern of the mythic hero finding atonement with the manifest face of the transcendent Father.

The decision made, Francis steps onto the road of trials. His first duty will be to rebuild the Chapel of St. Damiano. While doing so, his betrothed, Clara, comes to picnic. Francis sends her from him and as he watches her leave him, breathes "We're saved" (69, Fran.). Clara is the threshold guardian. The call of her flesh troubles Francis throughout his life, even after she has herself been transubstantiated into a force of a more transcendent love. Leo recalls this

[1] Nikos Kazantzakis, Report, p. 361.

fact about his master:

> I am the only one, also, who knows about your carnal love for . . . Clara. All the others, because they are afraid of their own shadows, think you loved only her soul. But it was her body that you loved earliest of all; it was from there that you set out, got your start. Then, after struggle . . . you were able with God's help to reach her soul. . . . So, you fought the flesh, vanquished it mercilessly, then kneaded it with your blood and tears and after a terrible struggle which lasted for many years, transformed it into spirit. (19, Fran.)

Francis watches Clara bind up her hair and leave him, and turns again to his chapel singing songs of love, troubadour songs remembered from childhood, sanctioned by God because "all love is one; it is exactly the same whether it be for wife, son, mother, fatherland, or for an ideal, or God" (19, Fran.).

This recognition won, the lifelong road of trials wherein divine reason and order is seen as an inversion of man's reason and order is begun. Love is the new madness; within the divine order of chaos there must be a place for divine lunacy and childlikeness. Shame before men precludes and obliviates the possibility of shame before God.

The road of trials involves principally the understanding of love, but also centers on questions of paternity and maternity, of the place of lunacy and learnedness; and all these issues are merely faces for the basic questions which confront Francis: those of freedom and necessity and of spirit and flesh. Through the trials, Francis comes to see freedom in necessity, a resolution of the two seemingly diametrically opposed states through the employment of self-will. If it is necessary to seek god by the most precipitous paths, then Francis wills it so and thus is freed of necessity. If the flesh hounds one, then the same drives can be made to serve spirit, for the two after all are the same kind of drive in degree. There are, however, objective encumbrances that Francis must rid himself of and it is upon these that the novel makes clear its meaning.

Always the preliminary mental struggle before any of Francis' decisions takes place within a cave or cave-like structure.[1] The earth or the earth womb concept obtains here, and each time Francis is revivified so that he may return to the world of man and fight out each individual

[1] Cirlot, Dictionary of Symbols, p. 38-9. The cave may be seen in a medieval sense as "the human heart as the spiritual centre," and in a Jungian sense as "the security and the impregnability of the unconscious." Both interpretations of this symbol support the seeing of the cave as a place of re-birth, since both are explanations dependent upon the acquaintantship with different sources of knowledge than those that obtain intellectually.

battle, another example of the re-birth motif. The perennial child, Francis is akin to the infantile medicine men described by Campbell as providing the unseen libidinal ties without which human groups cannot exist; who "fight the demons so that others can hunt the prey and in general fight reality."[1]

The battles begin with one with the established church. Bernardone asks the bishop's aid in recalling his son from his chosen path. Francis appears before the bishop naked and leaves the bishop with the statement that one must find God through overdoing things. The first step to God is the smashing of the chains of God forged by man; lunatic and saint become the same thing.

The next battle is the mortifying of the flesh in order to make clear to it the supremacy of the spirit. The embracing of a leper is required by another dream in another cave. Leo begins to see that all men become Christ with love; a lunacy made reasonable.

Now again the battle of denying the claims of earthly mother, father, and wife. Clara's feelings in this matter are clear:

[1] Dr. Geza Roheim, The Origin and Function of Culture (Nervous and Mental Disease Monographs, No. 69), pp. 38-39, 51, quoted by Campbell, Hero, pp. 100-01.

> "Accursed is he who acts contrary to the will of God . . . who preaches that we should not marry, should not have children and build a home; who preaches that men should not be real men, loving war, wine, women, glory; that women should not be real women, loving love, fine clothes, all the comforts of life. . . . that is what it means to be a true human being." (127, Fran.)

Francis knows a true human being "is someone who has surpassed what is human" (128, Fran.), but he nonetheless returns to his cave and for three days struggles with this question. He emerges with eyes enflamed by angels and phantoms within their depths. God has directed him to suffer more, to surpass human suffering. Francis enters a new phase in which he will preach to save others and will no longer be concerned with himself.

Leo clings to Francis' robe as he sees the abyss beginning to yawn wider because of this attitude on the part of his leader. Francis will go to the shop of his father and give away his earthly stock, an objective way to deny the claims of Clara and to show his new concern for his fellow man. As he passes out his goods, the first of the followers comes to Francis. Leo suddenly apprehends the true meaning of spring: "How many times in my life had I seen the arrival of spring! This, however, was the first time I realized its

true meaning. This year, for the first time, I knew (Francis had taught me) that all things are one, that the tree and the soul of man--all things--follow the same law of God. The soul has its springtime like the tree, and unfolds." (147, Fran.) Re-birth can be achieved by removing from oneself the trappings of one's old life.

In the springtime of the soul, intellect is a frosty breath. Immediate following of the promptings of an innocent heart must not be frozen beneath a blizzard of exegesis and reason. Spiritual concepts assume the shape of living, breathing beings. Poverty is born; Christ's widow, she is wed by Francis.

Francis returns to the cave and in his vigil determines another struggle's outcome. He will not proselytize for followers: struggle, too, has two faces and the innocence of his sight leads him to an understanding of the way of struggle for others than himself: "We go by way of poverty and chastity; they by way of food in abundance, and copulation. . . . . .Yes, this was a fine day; we saw the other face of the man who struggles. May it too be blessed." (183, Fran.) But, since answers to questions merely beget other questions, Francis finds God's will importunate. "Not enough," God cries, and poverty becomes Poverty. Francis explains the difference to Leo thus: "Our poverty is opulent--opulent, because it keeps heaven concealed deep down at the

bottom of its coffer. True Poverty, Brother Leo, means that the coffer is entirely empty right down to the bottom; it contains nothing, not even heaven, not even immortality. Nothing, nothing, nothing!" (186, Fran.) In like manner, the other words of Francis' life, Chastity and Love, are gained.

The re-birth motif gains force of expression and number of mention. Clara comes to Francis now spiritually and founds an order of nuns in his pattern of Poverty, Chastity, and Love. Out of such a conjunction, the spiritual love of Clara and Francis, a pre-lapsarian world is made in our time:

> "Father Francis, when I look at you I feel that Adam never sinned."
>
> Francis allowed his hand to rest lightly on her white whimple. "And I, when I look at you, Sister Clara," he replied, "feel that Eve never sinned." (295, Fran.)

But also within our time is the world of man's order. One of the greatest struggles of Francis is in showing his followers that they must not found an order upon him, that each man must live to himself or lose himself. He is driven away from those who follow him. Blind, with an inner sight, Francis continues his road of trials, and each night falls into sleep of embryonic renewal: Leo finds "Francis seated

in front of the doorway with his head wedged between his knees, as was his custom, and his arms and legs squeezed into a ball. He was sleeping" (283, Fran.). Francis finds real freedom, which is that of opposing the times in which he lives.

The crucifixion, before to be understood as the end point in the Kazantzakian theogony and posited narratively as such, evolves into another cry of "Not enough" (373, Fran.). One must go beyond the crucifixion: Francis does, and is beatified. The progress of the soul now adds another step: it is now skull, cross and star.

At this point occurs Francis' greatest struggle. Again in a cave, the Christmas play is re-enacted. Francis desires this, he casts it and performs himself the part of a lamb, circling "the crib on all fours, bleating like a lamb" (395, Fran.). The peasants come, see, and are taken above themselves. It is the force of Francis' faith made manifest, however, and without that faith to build on, a vision is lost sight of by the peasants.

> The peasants bellowed and waved their torches insanely, while we all fell prone on the ground, unable to bear the miracle. I raised my head for an instant and saw the infant extend its tiny hands and stroke Francis' beard and cheeks, then smile at him, moving its diminutive feet. Francis,

> raising the child above his head, held him in front of the burning torches and cried: "Brothers, behold the Savior of the world!"
>
> The peasants were beside themselves. They charged forward to touch the holy infant, but suddenly the blue radiance vanished, darkness spread over the manger, and no one saw Francis any longer. He had fled, taking the infant with him." (396, Fran.)

The power thus achieved is strong, but the shadow of it is strong within Francis also. He falls into the sin of eating twice, and suffers feverishly thereby.

Objectively, Francis loses many of his struggles: an order is founded, the number of those who will give all up and follow truly the call of Poverty, Chastity and Love is small. But he has become what he desired, a lamb, and as he puts it, whoever dwells among wolves must be a lamb and not care if others eat him. He has traveled his path, achieved atonement with his God, achieved apotheosis in the beatification, achieved the ultimate boon of understanding the source of indestructible life. He refuses to return to mankind's path with a formulation of the elixir of the hero. His refusal is based not on the inability to do so, however; rather it is based on the wish not to shake from himself the wings of the spirit, to pull himself from the ecstasy of the saint. He has gone beyond that point and the "not enough"

of God is never to be fulfilled save in continual struggle with it. The formulation of rule of action is left to Brother Wolf and the order; the telling of his story in art is left to Brother Leo. It is enough for Francis to have lived with "not enough," and to have followed with childlike steps the path of the Resurrection.

Francis is the hero as Saint, and as Campbell explains it, this transformation of the hero wishes "not the paradox of the dual perspective, but the ultimate claim of the unseen" (354, Hero). Saint Francis, who is so possessed by love for all things that he will not push away a rodent who nibbles on his toes as he lies on his deathbed, but merely asks it to stop, has indeed become "a dead leaf in a breeze": his body "continues to move about the earth, but the soul has dissolved already in the ocean of bliss" (354, Hero). The hero of this transformation is beyond life, beyond myth. They no longer are part of either life or myth, which is a form of life. They have "stepped away from the realm of forms" and discovered not the manifest profile of the father, but the hidden profile: silence becomes the ultimate word. As Campbell says, "The moment the spirit passes to the hidden, silence alone remains" (355, Hero).

Not only is this sort of hero beyond myth, it is also beyond Kazantzakis' purpose, a new myth for modern man, for

few men can live the life of a saint. The elixir offered by this hero is one of life-long suffering not of the flesh and the spirit which will lead to their wholeness and integration. It is, rather, a life-long struggle caused by the entrapment of the spirit in the flesh which leads to struggles the required end of which is disintegration. The mere fact of life, itself the necessary basis of spirit, is, at the same time, the cross; and the door of the cross opens only on the void. This is in keeping, however, with the last of Kazantzakis' spiritual exercises.[1]

This transformation of the hero is necessary and is almost a foregone conclusion of the development of Kazantzakis' thought. It is a worthy conclusion; but one not easily sustained nor lived with. It is beyond modern man, perhaps, and perhaps this is why no one yet has devoted himself to academically analyzing Saint Francis.

For all that, Kazantzakis seemed to feel a possibility of the novel's fulfilling his mythic purpose: he not only dedicated the book to one whom he felt had evidenced the kind

[1] Nikos Kazantzakis, Saviors of God: Spiritual Exercises, trans. Kimon Friar (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p. 131. The "proud and magical incantation" which Kazantzakis formulates for use as one hangs over the Abyss and with these three confessions:

> Blessed be all those who heard and rush to free you,
> Lord, and who say: "Only you and I exist."
> Blessed be all those who free you and become united
> with you, Lord, and who say: "You and I are one."
> And thrice blessed be those who bear on their shoulders
> and do not buckle under this great, sublime, and
> terrifying secret: That even this one does not exist!

of re-birth of which he speaks in the novel, but he also attributed to Saint Francis apocrypha gained from his own personal friendship with that man, Albert Schweitzer.[1]

C. The First Man and the Last

If we are correct in seeing in these hero stories the searching of the man Kazantzakis for a path for himself, we can with assurance postulate that with Zorba the Greek and the Report to Greco, Kazantzakis answers and decisions come to earth, to specificity in the individual awareness of Kazantzakis. To do wo sill perhaps allow us insight into the complexes of ideas and key concepts with which Kazantzakis worked, or perhaps more correctly, was bedeviled. Prevelakis

[1] Kazantzakis makes his feeling in this regard quite clear in his Report to Greco. Upon meeting Schweitzer, Kazantzakis "was convinced that Saint Francis's life had not been a fairy tale; I felt certain thereafter that man could still bring miracles down to earth. I had seen the miracle, touched it, spoken with it; we had laughed and kept silence together." The two, Saint and Francis and Albert Schweitzer, became in his mind identified with each other, like two brothers "closely united in eternity" (369, Report).

One discovers the intensity of this feeling in Kazantzakis' appropriating events from his association with Schweitzer to the life of Saint Francis, for example the injunction not to pick flowers is offered on page 369 of the Report, and on page 72 of the novel.

The affection was not unrequited. Schweitzer says, "Since I was a young boy, no author has made such a deep impression upon me as Nikos Kazantzakis. His work has depth and durable value." Quoted in Twentieth Century Authors, First Supplement, ed. Stanley J. Kunitz (NY: Wilson, 1955), p. 515.

tells us that Kazantzakis turned his back on all he had written up to 1948 save Zorba.[1] This novel, published in 1943, is mentioned as the last influence of value on the writer because of the title character. Thus, the first to be published of Kazantzakis' novels, it became the last of living importance to him. The position of its mention in the Report is telling, for that book is the autobiography not of events in the strict order of dates, but rather of events in order of importance and continuing influence. The interdependence of material from Zorba and the Report is obvious: both literally are the stories of the writer himself, Zorba making use of a thinly veiled persona for the writer. The persona of Zorba is one of this world, a sensory, material mask for Kazantzakis; that of Saint Francis is Kazantzakis' spiritual mask. Different here, also, is the place of the persona within the framework of the novel, because the persona of Zorba is the questing hero. The Report will therefore be used as substantiation for remarks made about the persona of Zorba, rather than being considered as a separate work.

The hero of Zorba is of the type described by Campbell

[1] Pandelis Prevelakis, Nikos Kazantzakis and His Odyssey: A Study of the Poet and the Poem, trans. Philip Sherrard, preface Kimon Friar (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1961), p. 168.

as being self-willed and driven:

> Willed introversion, in fact, is one of the classic implements of creative genius and can be employed as a deliberate device. It drives the psychic energies into depth and activates the lost continent of unconscious infantile and archetypal images. The result, of course, may be a disintegration of consciousness more or less complete . . . but on the other hand, if the personality is able to absorb and integrate the new forces, there will be experienced an almost superhuman degree of self-consciousness and masterful control. This is a basic principle of the Indian disciplines of yoga. It has been the way, also, of many creative spirits in the West. It cannot be described, quite, as an answer to any specific call. Rather, it is a deliberate, terrific refusal to respond to anything but the deepest, highest, richest answer to the as yet unknown demand of some waiting void within: a kind of total strike, or rejection of the offered terms of life, as a result of which some power of transformation carries the problem to a plane of new magnitudes, where it is suddenly and finally resolved. (65, Hero)

Prevelakis, Kazantzakis' friend and biographer, supports this

view: "Kazantzakis' life was motivated mainly from within; by a fever and loftiness of spirit, by a willfulness and an introverted frenzy."[1] If Kazantzakis was self-called and self-driven, he was not final creator of the final resolution of which Campbell speaks, or at least, creator of so dramatic and clear-cut a resolution. The issues with which Kazantzakis is involved in Zorba are, however, those of the hero questing for identity: the place of thought as opposed to action, and the question of becoming rather than being.

Using the narrative framework of the opening of a lignite mine, Kazantzakis gives us the struggle of the hero between being one of the last men as personified by Buddha or becoming one of the first men as personified by Zorba. The call to the struggle is not refused, indeed, it is never overtly given. The call is, however, pinioned for us in time by the advent of Zorba, an elderly gentleman who proposes to help the narrator in dealing with the mine. The hero-trek in this novel is that concerned with the wordly path, the outward journey, rather than the secluded journey inward which belongs to the saints. The path leads into the heart of the material world in an attempt to deny the ephemeral and discover the real rather than an attempt to travel within and

[1] Prevelakis, p. 14.

annihilate the ego totally.

Zorba assumes the role of the supernatural guide. He is satyr-like in his possession of life force, and this is necessary in order to set up the proper tension between himself and the ethereal world of the opposition forces, the Buddha. The Buddha's rejection of all ephemera ironically becomes the ephemera with which the hero of Zorba must do battle. The two attitudes are delineated in these two conversations: the first with Zorba and the second from The Dialogue of Buddha and the Shepherd.

> "It reminds me of the ascetic who, according to the Golden Legend, once saw a woman who disturbed him physically, so he took an axe . . ."
>
> "The devil he didn't!" Zorba interposed, guessing what I was going to say. "Cut that off! To hell with the fool! The poor, benighted innocent, that's never an obstacle!"
>
> "But," I insisted, "it can be a very great obstacle!"
>
> "To what?"
>
> "To your entry into the kingdom of heaven."
>
> Zorba glanced sideways at me, with a mocking air, and said: "But, you fool, that is the key to paradise!"

> He raised his head, looked at me closely, as if he wanted to see what was going on in my mind. . . . But he did not seem to be able to gather much. He shook his great grey head guardedly.
>
> "The maimed don't get into paradise," he said, and then fell silent.[1]

The Dialogue, is, aptly enough, read by the narrator in solitude, immediately after speaking with Zorba.

> THE SHEPHERD: My meal is ready, I have milked my ewes. The door of my hut is bolted, my fire is alight. And you, sky, can rain as much as you please!
>
> BUDDHA: I no longer need food or milk. The winds are my shelter, my fire is out. And you, sky, can rain as much as you please!
>
> THE SHEPHERD: I have oxen, I have cows. I have my father's meadows and a bull who covers my cows. And you, sky, can rain as much as you please!
>
> BUDDHA: I have neither oxen, nor cows, I have no meadows. I have nothing. I fear nothing. And you, sky, can rain as much as you please!

[1] Nikos Kazantzakis, Zorba the Greek, trans. Carl Wildman (1952; rpt. NY: Ballantine, 1964), p. 23. Hereinafter citations are taken from this edition and denoted by Zorba.

THE SHEPHERD: I have a docile and faithful shepherdess. For years she has been my wife; I am happy when I play with her at night. And you, sky, you can rain as much as you please!

BUDDHA: I have a free and docile soul. For years I have trained it and I have taught it to play with me. And you, sky, can rain as much as you please!

(23-24, Zorba)

This dialectic concerning the path to freedom is the basis of the novel. It is by no means as clearly defined a dialectic as would seem on first glance. Zorba, who points the path to paradise as being one which goes by way of sensuality, is himself maimed, having cut off a finger while making an earthen pot because the finger got in hiw way: further, he does not even wish a paradise which is not rooted in this-worldly terrain. The call of the spiritual is not easily ignored by him, however, and we find the this-wordly and sensate aspiration to paradise tinged with the spiritual: it is almost with regret that Zorba lives as he must, as fully as he must in each moment. Zorba is not nearly so stolid in his world view as is the shepherd in the Buddha dialogue. The Buddha, however, remains a mockingly serene and impenetrable figure throughout the novel. The dynamics of character which belong to Zorba is antithetical to the essence of the Buddha. Thus, Zorba is able to function as guide: he holds a perception

of access to both worlds and also what that access means in terms of living. He knows both worlds, but he has chosen one. He understands the struggle.

Although the novel is one of dialectic, the mythic hero-cycle is expostulated through the dialectic. The hero, hereinafter called K, undertakes a journey, for which he prepares excitedly, "as if this journey had a mysterious significance" (13, Zorba). It is the beginning point of what he has decided to be a change in his mode of life: "Till now," I told myself, "you have only seen the shadow and been well content with it; now, I am going to lead you to the substance." (13, Zorba) He will go to Crete, where "bygone necessity dictate/s/ the rhythm of . . . movements" (39, Zorba), and will begin working an abandoned lignite mine. His traveling companion is a volume of Dante.

As K sits on the boat, he bends over his volume choosing verses to read which "would impart their rhythm to the whole of the day" (14, Zorba). He rejoices in his freedom to do so, but the next moment something comes between Dante and himself: "Somehow, I felt as if two eyes were boring into the top of my skull; I quickly looked behind me in the direction of the glass door. A mad hope flashed through my brain: 'I'm going to see my friend again.' I was prepared for the miracle, but the miracle did not happen." (14, Zorba)

The friend, who has identified K's malaise by the word bookworm, does not appear. It is Zorba instead, supernaturally breaking into and interrupting K's "freedom," demanding to be included in K's life. One does not politely refuse a demand from one like Zorba, not even if one is a bookworm. They continue the journey together, and from the first their conversations set up the dialectic of first and last men.

The first threshold of the adventure is K's meeting with the widow. As she chases her escaped goat past the tavern where Zorba and K relax, Zorba, noting the interest of K councils him to act upon it:

> "Boss," he said, "this is where I count on you. Now, don't dishonor the male species! The god-devil sends you this choice morsel. You've got teeth. All right, get 'em into it. Stretch out your arm and take her!" . . . . . .
>
> "I don't want any trouble!" I replied angrily.
>
> (115, Zorba)

The trouble is not only to be understood in terms of the patriarchal Cretan mores: we have seen that the threshold is the zone of the unleashing of "dangerous" libidinal drives. K realizes this, and understands his anger to be in part irritation: "I was irritated because in my heart of hearts I also had desired that all-powerful body which had passed by me like a wild animal in heat, distilling musk." (115, Zorba).

The rejection of this kind of trouble is totally alien to Zorba. He is stupified, and explodes: "Life is trouble," Zorba continued. "Death, no. To live--do you know what that means? To undo your belt and look for trouble!" (116, Zorba) K sullenly examines his heart: "I still said nothing. I knew Zorba was right, I knew it, and I did not care. My life had got on the wrong track, and my contact with men had become now a mere coliloquy. I had fallen so low that, if I had had to choose between falling in love with a woman and reading a book about love, I should have chosen the book." (116, Zorba)

In the subsequent trials of the widow's presence, which K associates with Mara, the web-spinner of illusion, K is guided by Zorba into a reconciliation with his body, heretofore denied. The road of trials is littered with renunciations of the body by K. "I had despised the pleasures of the flesh for years, and, if possible, I would have eaten secretly, as if committing a shameful act," he says (41, Zorba). Zorba's role is to teach K acceptance of the flesh, for to deny it is a mortal sin in Zorba's view: "My boy, if a woman calls you to share her bed and you don't go, your soul will be destroyed! That woman will sigh before God on judgement day, and that woman's sigh, whoever you may be and whatever your fine deeds, will cast you into Hell!" (118, Zorba) Zorba instructs K by means of example through his relationship

with Madame Hortense; by means of parable; and by means of other forms of action which accede to the same breaking of the bonds of overstrong intellectuality, such as the dance.

K's trek is dependent upon the mythic pattern of the meeting with the goddess. The widow sends oranges and Zorba strews them voluptuously upon K's bed, so that their scent fills the hut. It is a dizzying moment. This occurs on Christmas. On Easter, K goes to the widow, drawn unconsciously to her garden. There he sees her under her orange tree: "It took my breath away. She's a wild beast, I thought, and she knows it. What poor, vain, absurd, defenselsss creatures men are to her! She is fat and voracious, just like some female insects--the praying mantis, the grasshopper, the spider--and she too must devour the males at dawn." (264, Zorba) He enters.

At dawn he goes home.

Zorba greets him and, having scented the widow, gives K his blessing. K goes to bed, for he is tired, and dreams:

> I saw, as it were, a giant Negress crouching on the ground, and she looked to me like a gigantic old temple in granite. I was going around and round her desperately trying to find the entrance. I was scarcely as big as her little toe. Suddenly, as I rounded her heel, I saw a dark opening, rather like a cave. A great voice commanded: "Enter!"
>
> (265, Zorba)

He enters.

Seemingly successfully traversed, the problems of K's road of trials loom up again when the widow is murdered by the people of the island. Being stymied through the intercession of others, K proceeds into what can be called an intellectual experiencing of the remainder of the mythological round. The widow, who had posed such threat to his equilibrium is disposed of rather cavalierly:

> A few hours later the widow was at rest in my memory, calm and serene, changed into a symbol. She was encased in wax in my heart; she could no longer spread panic inside me and paralyze my brain. The terrible events of that one day broadened, extended into time and space, and became one with great past civilizations; the civilizations became one with the earth's destiny; the earth with the destiny of the universe--and thus, returning to the widow, I found her subject to the great laws of existence, reconciled with her murderers, immobile and serene. (278, Zorba)

K will no longer deny the force of what the widow has unleashed. He will transmute that force into something more amenable to his control: an intellectual concept. K becomes one who is of this time, but not with it, to slaughter a phrase. As he puts it, "For me time had found its real meaning: the widow had died thousands of years before, in the

epoch of the Aegean civilization, and the young girls of Cnossos with their curly hair had died that very morning on the shores of this pleasant sea" (278, Zorba).

In contrast to K, Zorba shows his sorrow. He is "a real man . . . who lets real tears run down his cheeks when he is suffering; and when he is happy he does not spoil the freshness of his joy by running it through the fine sieve of metaphysics" (279, Zorba). It is the metaphysician which K is destined to be, and the resolution of his conflicts is achieved in intellectual terms. Even though he learns to dance, even though he meets the goddess and is not eaten, even though he becomes vulnerable to the frightening richness of the unconscious, his rise to a syncretic level of existence is not a consistent one. That way of life has not become his own, nor will it.

K determines to sublimate his sporadic stabs at life into art. He will write of his intellectual understanding of life and of the integrity of the self. He cannot live in action with such knowledge, but he can speak of it through the use of such characters as Zorba. Although not able to follow the hero's path in the reality of the world, the hero K will create a model for others to follow. This is how he will effect the hero's successful return with the elixir. K flees from the living return posited as the mythic ideal, and in so doing, he flees also from his guide, Zorba.

Campbell speaks of such flight from the knowledge gained through the mythic cycle as being the stuff of folk-tales with a comic overtone. K has acquired his trophy through Zorba's guidance, but in rejecting the full treasure of the trophy, K incurs Zorba's disgusted confusion. Thus, because of the inferred attitude of superiority on K's part, Zorba becomes a figure from a folk tale rather than the potent mythic guide he is. As the hero flees in the classic magic flight, Campbell says, he tosses behind him magic objects to delay the angry guardian of the trophy: "protective interpretations, principles, symbols, rationalizations, anything" which serves to blur the clear-cut chase (203, Hero). K's flight, inversion and irony that it is, consists of the same obfuscation of the issue: the hero, K, attempts to flee from those who would help him. Thus, the handling of the guardian of the trophy as a comic figure inverts into the handling of the guide to the trophy as a comic figure.

Zorba the Greek is a myth of failure. Zorba, however, does not deny his role as guide even when rejected. Although K rejects the hero's path in the novel, he gives narrative importance to the continued attempts of Zorba to guide him through the inclusion of Zorba's letters. The traditional pattern of magic flight, Campbell says, is that the hero makes an effort to hold to and save the ego. Rescue from

without becomes necessary, in which the hero's ego is lost and through grace, returned. In Zorba, the letters offering another go at it serve as attempts at rescue from without. The letters are read and pondered but not replied to in the necessary manner. The hero, intellectual to the last, understands his state, chooses to continue with its ambivalence, and thereby completes the synthesis in mind only.

Of such stuff is the hero of Zorba, the stuff of the artist. Master of the two worlds in mind though he might be, he is not in reality and action master of them, and remains a servant. Instead of freedom to live, he finds freedom to create. Although this is a personal failure, it is artistic success. Since this hero can show, but not do, his purpose is in one sense doomed to be failed: a prophet is not a God although he may wish it. A prophet is always a last man even though he may point the way to the first man.

The journey of Zorba is dependent upon the dialectic of the first and last men. The tension between them occupied Kazantzakis in this specific novel and for the remainder of his life. Finley Campbell and Arthur Banks point out that this tension is a tragic one, yet one which is basic to the Kazantzakian vision:

> In the vision of Kazantzakis, the flesh and its symbol, the Negro, have no original pollution. The flesh is good and not evil; it is innocent,

> though it is the source of passion; it is the humanity of man, being the source of all his emotions. Furthermore, without the dynamics of sensuality . . . there can be no evolution. . . . Yet the flesh is the obstacle to freedom, and to Being. It blurs and distracts the movement which God is making toward self-knowledge, and which man is making toward sophia, God-knowledge.
>
> Now, how is this related to tragedy? . . . To the man acting as hero, there is tragedy. For, though he must submit to the demands of the flesh, it cannot console him. Now there is tension; now there is the dialectic of choice. For him, the flesh-spirit paradox is most wracking. He must go through the flesh to find God.[1]

Kazantzakis states in the Report that, having answered his personal call to determine with whom to align his soul, one of his first actions is to deny Homer, who counsels action and zest in life, in favor of Christ. On his journey to the desert of Sinai, he understands that the path to Christ includes traversing the lower desires, and that to conquer temptation, one must embrace it, for the true Christ includes one's dark shadow (289-90, Report). This perception of Christ sets Kazantzakis up nicely for the meeting with

[1] Arthur C. Banks, Jr., and Finley C. Campbell, "The Vision of the Negro in the Kazantzakian Universe," Phylon, XXV (Summer, 1964), 257.

Nietzsche's works in Paris: Nietzsche whom he calls the Antichrist (306, Report). The next journey brings him to Vienna and thoughts of the Buddha and Kazantzakis terms the Buddha's eye the abyss wherein lurk renunciation and extreme awareness (344, Report). The mask of Christ covers the mask of the Buddha (353, Report). Thus, even the tension of Christ and Antichrist is matched with another tension, that of Christ and Buddha. A hope of a model beside which to ease these tensions is afforded through St. Francis, who lived also in the midst of uncertainty. But that St. Francis, to whom the essence of life was the rejection of it, is placed in opposition to the force of Zorba. The tension arises again, this time on home soil where the ascent to God is most easily and best seen (420, Report). Kazantzakis becomes aware of what he terms his "fatal intellectual Golgotha" on the shores of Crete where he felt the questions first and last. His final attempt at resolution is the character of Odysseus in his Odyssey, a character which is itself subject to the same questions and whose attributes shift in the course of the epic from Homeric importunity and zest to those more in line with Buddhistic renunciation.[1] The "fatal intellectual Golgotha" arose at each step of the path Kazantzakis chose to follow. The initial duality, which gave rise to the suffering

[1] Stanford, Ulysses Theme, p. 232.

Kazantzakis felt particularly prone to, the suffering engendered by the perverse ability of answers to spawn more questions (353, Report), is the duality of the first man and the last.

The first man is identifiable with the Cosmic Man, and according to M.-L. von Franz, this figure at the beginning of life "gave heaven and earth their form" and at the same time represents life's final goal.[1] The first man can be seen as the "archetypal symbol of the Self."[2] This point of view makes Christ one of the manifestations of that archetypal symbol. In the realm of Kazantzakis' novels, Saint Francis is another manifestation of the archetype, and so also is Zorba. Such seemingly divergent figures as Francis and Zorba share the attitude toward and perception of life which is necessary to such a manifestation, for both are enchanted by life and see even the smallest thing or the shortest moment as a microcosm of the great sweep of life; a stone or a second in time both partake and mirror something larger than themselves, which is life itself. We have spoken of the importance of re-birth in Saint Francis, but since Kazantzakis returned to Zorba as being pre-eminent in value

[1] M.-L. von Franz, "The Process of Individuation," Man and His Symbols, C. G. Jung, etal. (1964; rpt. NY: Dell, 1969), p. 211.

[2] von Franz, p. 215.

of all his influences, it is to Zorba that we shall turn in order to understand the meaning of the first man more fully.

Von Franz declares that "man's main purpose is to be human."[1] Zorba, of all Kazantzakis' characters, is the most human. Not only through explicit references in the novel, but also by implicit symbolic alliances with the figure of the first man, Kazantzakis shows us the humanity of the first men: a fullness of humanity to such degree that it becomes supra-human.

Zorba is aligned with the first men on earth, those for whom the universe was "a weighty, intense vision [because] the stars glided over him, the sea broke against his temple. He lived the earth, water, the animals and God, without the distorting intervention of reason" (156, Zorba). The first men were sensate fibers of the universal fabric, in whom the flux of life ran without detour. The heart is the seat of power in the first men, the heart which perceives things which cannot be rationally known; things which perception by the reasoning faculties would kill. The first men knew things through the intervention of a strange certainty, the "same certainty which some beasts . . . feel before an earthquake" (330, Zorba). The soul of the first man is that

[1] von Franz, p. 215.

soul which preceeds the becoming "totally detached from the universe, when it still /feels/ the truth directly, without the distorting influence of reason" (330, Zorba). The soul of the first man is the soul of the Cosmic Man, who can perceive things in this manner because although he is part of them, he yet contains within himself the elements of those things in separation.

Thus, the Cosmic Man is pre-creation and yet sustained through creation: further, reconciliation of the separation of elements which occurs in creation through the synthesis of them results in an end product which is itself pre-creation. Zorba is, for example, cognizant through his heart of the pre-creation state. He is also highly aware of the presence of dualities. His thoughts about the place of women and men in the world are a sufficient example of this awareness. Further, he is capable of uniting within himself numerous dualities, in essence of returning and immersing himself in the pre-creation world--an indication of the totality of the first men.

The manner in which he evidences this totality is dependent upon his activities. He is a musician, and as such is aware of the intermediate zone of music, a zone "between the differentiated or material world, and the undifferentiated realm of the 'pure Will' of Schopenhauer."[1] Zorba is capable

[1] Cirlot, Dictionary, p. 215.

only at certain times of making music, times during which he sinks into a trance-like state, from which he unites the dualities of material and immaterial world. He became a musician at the age of twenty, an age which is to the primitive mind the end of the first cycle of human life.[1] Physical maturation demands different necessities of life than before. Zorba, in strongly desiring to become a musician at this time of his life, indicates a need to ameliorate those necessities with a unifying device, the making of music.

In explaining this age to K, Zorba shows an understanding of the place of time in his life: "I began doing wild things when I was twenty. Oh, nothing special, just the same as other fellows at that age. When I was forty I began to feel really young and went off on the saddest escapades. And now I'm over sixty--sixty-five, boss, but keep that dark--well, now I'm over sixty, how can I explain? Honestly, the world's grown too small for me." (146, Zorba) Two opposing perceptions of time, the linear and the cyclic, are thus synthesized in Zorba's mind. Within his life, time assumes linear cycles, the activities of each cycle being essentially the same, but linearly progressive in expression.

[1] Joseph Campbell, The Masks of God: Primitive Mythology (NY: Viking, 1969), p. 60.

Most notably, however, the method by which Zorba unites duality within himself is dancing, which is "the corporeal image of a given process, or of becoming, or of the passage of time. . . . Its function is . . . cosmogonic."[1] Zorba can say the unsayable things about human existance properly only through dance. The wordless content of life is not only more immediate through dance, but also more dynamic and more individual than that which is structured with words. Zorba's attempt to communicate with a Russian with words once evoked a shout, "Stop!" from Zorba. He, released by this command, leapt up and began a dance. The Russian, Zorba says, "listened to me from head to foot," and "dense as he was, could understand everything, everything. . . .When I had finished, the great blockhead hugged me in his arms" (86, Zorba). Dancing, for Zorba, is a method of communication and oneness with his fellow man, a unifying force in social structures.

It is this value of the dance that Zorba understands and seeks: the value of the ritual dance which is merely re-enacted and not understood spiritually by the dancers is rejected by him. The widow is murdered at such a ritual dance performed at Easter to celebrate the re-birth of life. It is lead by a dancer who is always twenty and may, according to the novel,

[1] Cirlot, Dictionary, p. 72.

have a thousand faces, but who remains always the same (272, Zorba). The ritual dance has a life of its own and lends its life to the dancer. The sacrifice of the widow is in keeping with the innate rhythms and understandings of the people who perform it. The sacrifice is not in keeping with Zorba's understanding of the value of the dance. He rejects the sacrifice and mourns for the widow. He alone attempts to defend her.

His defense of the widow allows us to understand the difference between Zorba as First Man and the Cretan villagers as primitives closer in time to the time of the first men. For Zorba, the dance is a method of speaking to people which grew out of a developmental process in which he has become truly individual. Zorba has, like K, been in danger of falling into a well of words: that is to say, of allowing himself to be defined from without rather than from within. He managed to save himself from his word, country: "Rescued from my country, from priests, and from money, I began sifting things, sifting more and more things out. I lighten my burden that way. I--how shall I put it?--I find my own deliverance, I become a man." (253, Zorba)

Before this rescue, however, Zorba had been in his country's army and had woven out of his hair a medallion of St. Sophia, the symbol of wisdom, to wear as a talisman. One day he killed a priest in an escape from a village. The

next he returned to the village and found the priest's children starving. Zorba threw them his provisions and tore off his medallion. He dates his rescue from this point; Zorba's rescue was, in essence, a return to an existence and a life-view antecedant to the claims of nationalism. On one side, this manifests itself as a return to sensory existence. On the other, Zorba's erstwhile recognition of the spiritual existence colors and deepens his presently sensate experiences.

His relationship with Dame Hortense is described in sexual metaphor which is strongly tinged with the spiritual. Hortense details Zorba's metaphors to K with laughter: "Wings. . . . That's what he calls feet, the rascal. That's the name he gives them when we're alone. May our wings be united. . . . Ha! Ha!" (177, Zorba) Within the context of their relationship, the feet are not the portions of the human anatomy one would expect to be united, but as a symbol of the soul (cf. wings on Mercury's feet) the feet mean spiritual elevation.[1] The choice of the metaphor, then, is dependent upon something outside physical reality, something "comparable in essence with cosmic evolution."[2] Zorba's life-view, his recognition of his self, thus seem to be a

[1] Cirlot, Dictionary, p. 355.

[2] Ibid.

sensuousness tempered by spirituality and aided by it. Although not a beast, Zorba is a human animal who is grateful for and receptive to the sensory means to a higher truth. In this, then, there is a balancing unity between the dualities of reason and emotion or sensate reaction.

Zorba exhibits a further element of unification in the androgynous social roles accorded him in the novel. It is his duty to run the mine--a duty he fulfills with strength and understanding if not creative imagination. It is also his duty to prepare the meals and fulfill the function of arbiter in the household. The Cosmic or First Man, it will be recalled, unifies the male/female duality in totality; Zorba achieves this unification insofar as social roles are concerned.

One particular duty in Zorba's social role as female housekeeper is that of builder of the cooking fire. The lighting of the fire achieves an importance only through the record of his success in doing so. At times Zorba is incapable of lighting the fire because the wood is damp. Because these times coincide with the times K has refused Zorba's wisdom and advice, Zorba thereby becomes aligned with the bearer of the immaterial fire of the spirit which he attempts to kindle in K.

Harold Bayley's discussion of the symbolism of the pyramid throws additional light on Zorba's role as firebearer. He

states that "the pyramid or cone was apparently at one time a universal symbol of the Primal Fire."[1] He quotes Plutarch as observing that the pyramid is the first of all forms and Plato as observing that the only first form is the pyramid. The letter A is representative of the pyramid. In the Mayan alphabet the letter A was expressed by the pyramidal form Λ and by the Egyptians A was expressed by Akhoom, the 'eagle.' Bayley feels that it is easy to conceive the emotions with which primitive and poetic man viewed what we call a volcano, for it became a symbol of the Primal Force.[2] Zorba first began doing "wild things" at the foot of Mr. Olympus, a volcano. He is also spoken of as a bird of prey--an eagle. Zorba, then, shows marked symbolic alliances with the bearer of the Primal Force, a further identification of him as Cosmic Man, the beginning of all life.

Apparently contradicting the concept of himself as Cosmic Man, Zorba seems to have adopted by preference only sensory means to the understanding of the universe, rather than supplementing those means with rational, intellectual

[1] Harold Bayley, The Lost Language of Symbolism, p. 161.

[2] Bayley, p. 161-64.

means. At one point, K can see Zorba as an expression of a unique formation of body and soul into "one harmonious whole," which exists in an extraordinary "friendly accord [with] the universe" (151, Zorba). Seconds later, however, K witnesses Zorba's furious destruction of a model railway, a clear example of frustration in the face of a purely intellectual demand. But the contradiction is resolved by K's recognition of Zorba as the Cosmic Man as opposed to the last man:

> All these things which had formerly so fascinated me appeared this morning to be no more than cerebral acrobatics and refined charlatanism! That is how it always is at the decline of a civilization. That is how man's anguish ends--in masterly conjuring tricks; pure poetry, pure music, pure thought. The last man--who has freed himself from all belief, from all illusions and has nothing more to expect or to fear--sees the clay of which he is made reduced to spirit, and this spirit has no soil left for its roots, from which to draw its sap. The last man has emptied himself; no more seed, no more excrement, no more blood. Everything having turned into words, every set of words into musical jugglery, the last man goes even further; he sits in utter solitude and decomposes the

> music into mute, mathematical equations.
>
> I started. "Buddha is that last man!" I cried. That is his secret and terrible significance. Buddha is the "pure" soul which has emptied itself; in him is the void, he is the Void. "Empty your body, empty your spirit, empty your heart!" he cries. Wherever he sets his foot, water no longer flows, no grass can grow, no child be born.
>
> (153-54, Zorba)

Buddha as the last man absorbs and nullifies life. Even writing about the Buddha is "a life-and-death struggle against a tremendous force of destruction lurking within, a duel with a great NO which was consuming [K's] heart, and on the result of this duel depended the salvation" of K's soul (154, Zorba). Only through association with a man of soul--Zorba--can K return to and incorporate this into his total personality: the opulence of soul he possessed as a child, before he reached the maturity of mind only.

The divergent paths of the last man and the first man lead essentially to the same understanding of life; it is the question of paths, of the rightness of action, that Kazantzakis wished to elucidate in Zorba. The struggle with which the novel concerns itself is this question of the path. A Hindu myth speaks of the same struggle. Vishnu, the Primeval Being, speaks with a deep-booming voice to Markandaya:

> Know me as Him who manifests, yet whose manifesting

> magic remains unmanifested and not to be grasped. I am beyond the goals of human life--gratification of the sense, pursuit of prosperity, and pious fulfillment of sacred duties--yet I point these three goals as the proper aims of earthly existence.[1]

This Hindu myth neatly summarizes the struggle and points to the role of the first men as being the following of the proper aims of earthly existence and the role of the last men as being the negating of these aims.

Zorba the Greek must be read on the level of man making his myth, of determination of path. It has been pointed out by Del E. Presley that the important thing is "to focus upon not Zorba but the narrator's discovery of Zorba's significance."[2] We have spoken of the hero cycle enacted by the narrator and of Zorba's significance as a Cosmic Man. The butterfly is seen by Presley as a metaphor for the narrator's "transition from the limited wisdom of Buddha to the unlimited life of Zorba."[3] Since we do not see any evidence in the novel to support the statement that the narrator made a transition, it is

[1] Zimmer, Indian Art and Civilization, p. 47.

[2] Del E. Presley, "Buddha and the Butterfly: Unifying Motifs in Kazantzakis' Zorba," Notes on Contemporary Literature, II (January, 1972), 2.

[3] Presley, p. 3.

a moot question if the butterfly is indeed a motif of the greatest importance in understanding the novel. One recalls the story, often repeated by Kazantzakis, of the chrysallis placed in the sun. Warmed by the sun's rays, the butterfly breaks from his shell too soon, the diaphonous wings not yet grown to the point of supporting life. So, too, in Zorba. The narrator, too young in emotional life, is placed in the sun by Zorba, breaks his shell open, and finds the wings that begin to sprout, wings this time to the unconscious, too weak to aid him in developing his conscious. The narrator will substitute art for living, but already art has been mentioned as degradation: "All those who actually live the mysteries of life haven't the time to write, and all those who have the time don't live them!" Zorba tells the narrator (244, Zorba).

But writing, Kazantzakis feels, is Godlike. As he wrote his first novel, he felt himself overcome by feelings of omnipotence:

> I swaggered as I wrote. Was I not God, doing as I pleased, transubstantiating reality, fashioning it as I should have liked it to be--as it should have been? I was joining truth and falsehood indissolubly together. No, there were no longer any such things as truth and falsehood; everything was a soft dough which I kneaded and rolled freely, according to the dictates of whim, without securing permission from

> anyone. Evidently there is an uncertainty which is more certain than certitude itself. But one of these is to be found a full story higher than that ground-level construction of humanity's which goes by the name of truth. (136, Report)

By the time the mature Kazantzakis met Schweitzer and felt that a spiritual man could live in the world and lead others, it was too late. Kazantzakis speaks now of writing less glowingly:

> When I viewed the human miracle in his tiny Alsatian hamlet, my fingers were already smudged with ink; I had been carried away by the profane mania to convert life into words, similes, and rhymes, had degenerated (I still don't know how) into a pen-pusher. What befell me was precisely what I most scorned: to satisfy my hunger with paper, like a nanny goat. (371, Report)

Zorba, too, changes his attitude toward art, but only in degree. From being a degeneration, art becomes a mortal fault:

> You are a pen-pusher, boss, if you'll allow me to say so. You too could have seen a beautiful green stone at least once in your life, you poor soul, and you didn't see it. My God, sometimes when I had no work, I asked myself the question: Is there

> or isn't there any hell? But yesterday, when your letter came, I said: There surely must be a hell for a few pen-pushers like the boss! (340, Zorba)

Peter A. Bien sees in Zorba the Dionysiac satry who provides material for the Apollonian narrator to work upon in the manner described by Nietzsche. Zorba was necessary, Bien says, to aid the narrator in exorcising the "devil of Western action," which Bien identifies with Socratic optimism.[1] He was also necessary to free the narrator from Buddhistic renunciation.[2] The narrator does not become Zorbatic at the book's end, rather his "Apollonian sophrosyne soon reasserts itself, as when the 'moderating, cold, human voice of logic' keeps him from traveling to see Zorba's wonderful green stone."[3] One wonders that Zorba could be seen as the voice of Dionysiac revelry alone, for his message does not consist of a call for everyone to become a satyr. It is a message more in keeping with the Socratic injunction to know thyself, if examined in the light of the mythic hero cycle and the dialectic of the first man and the last, which injunction, notwithstanding Nietzsche's castigations, does not deny either Dionysus or Apollo. It is sufficiently condemnatory of the narrator to say that he would agree with Bien. Intellectually.

[1] Peter A. Bien, "Zorba the Greek, Nietzche, and the Perennial Greek Predicament," Antioch Review, XXV (Spring, 1965), 162.

[2] Bien, p. 162.

[3] Bien, pp. 162-63.

Chapter III

Symbols of Failure

Nikos Kazantzakis' seven major novels can be seen as the fruit of his life-long struggle to find a viable modern hero. Because his heroes are indebted to the monomyth, the mythic hero cycle, it is possible to analyze not only the paths taken by each hero, but also to determine the success of each. Joseph Campbell assures us that the symbols and activities associated with the mythic hero provide us with a numinous and therefore socially cohesive basis for rituals and social processes for groups. The hero provides a religion for a society because religion is a system of beliefs upon which a group of people structure and order the chaos of their individual existences.

Groups are changeable and evolutionary by nature: their actuating idealistic needs are mutable in the face of growth of consciousness: the cosmogeny of the Old Testament, for example, does not provide a basis for a conscious loyalty of belief in an age of space travel. Because this is so, the mythic hero in his journey must seek the understandings that can be viable in a changing group level of consciousness. One of the important facets of this process is the discovery of

words of description which will either recharge older symbols or make completely new ones. Mankind is evolutionary only in what he will accept in explanation of his fundamental human baggage: mutable only in how he perceives the immutable.

Campbell sees the hero performing his duty of illuminating the unity of existence in two diametrically opposed ways. The first is the primitive's way: that of duty. The hero joins and identifies with a group: "As the individual is an organ of society, so is the tribe or city--so is humanity entire--only a phase of the mighty organism of the cosmos." (384, Hero) The truly modern world, is, however, no longer tribal; one no longer ideally identifies himself with a group.[1]

The second way of the hero is that of exile from the community, the exile being "the first step of the quest" (385, Hero). The understanding sought by this quest is the same as that sought by the first way of the hero:

[1] The changing relationship of the individual to the group is well documented. Such diverse fields as economics, sociology and theology have provided insightful analysis of it. Kenneth E. Boulding, The Meaning of the 20th Century: The Great Transition (1964; rpt. NY: Harper Colophon, 1965), explores the second great transition of mankind, that from civilized to post-civilized humanity, in social and economic terms, and concludes that an "invisible college" of individuals of spirit is necessary for such a transition. Harvey Cox's books come to mind, particularly The Secular City, Rev. ed. (NY: Macmillan, 1965), and Alvin Toffler's best-selling Future Shock (1970; rpt. NY: Bantam, 1971) is concerned with the transcience of modern man, a transcience which includes relationships as well as those of places and things.

> Thus, just as the way of social participation may lead in the end to a realization of the All in the individual, so that of exile brings the hero to the Self in all.
>
> Contered in this hub-point, the question of selfishness or altruism disappears. The individual has lost himself in the law and been reborn in identity with the whole meaning of the universe. For Him, by Him, the world was made. (386, Hero).

Formerly the way of exile was the way of the medieval saint, of the Indian yoga, and of the Hellenistic mystery initiations--of all the ancient philosophies of the East and the West (385, Hero).

Today, since the symbols which actuated those formerly following the path of the exile are dead, the fruit of the hero-trek is, while still in the individual, now to be found in the unconscious: "One does not know toward what one moves. One does not know by what one is propelled. The lines of communication between the conscious and the unconscious zones of the human psyche have all been cut, and we have been split in two. . . . The modern hero-deed must be that of questing to bring to light again the lost Atlantis of the co-ordinated soul." (388, Hero)

This quest, because of the darkness in which the wealth of the unconscious is blanketed, is one which it is not

possible to proceed upon in ways amenable with and accessible to the conscious mind:

> Consciousness can no more invent, or even predict, an effective symbol then foretell or control tonight's dream. The whole thing is being worked out on another level, through what is bound to be a long and very frightening process, not only in the depths of every living psyche in the modern world, but also on those titanic battlefields into which the whole planet has lately been converted. (389, Hero)

The hero's path is now starkly individual, and leads to conflict with man's ego, which must be crucified and resurrected so that each man sees others as "Thou." The task of the hero becomes the task of every man; because there are no group symbols, each man must make his own symbols in the "silences of his personal despair" (391, Hero).

This understanding of the hero's role is that which lies beneath each of the Kazantzakian heroes mentioned: the suffering of the heroes of Kazantzakis is the suffering attendant upon integration of the self as understood within a Jungian taxonomy. A restatement of the hero cycles from each of the seven novels shows us a hero cycle in itself and this cycle is that of Kazantzakis himself.

Captain Michales of Freedom or Death denies a call which

would lead him to reconciliation of the warring elements of masculinity and feminity within him. He regresses to the tribal past. He is an anachronism, a father to be surpassed, and Kazantzakis rejects him as a beast. The antithesis of this father is Father Yanaros in The Fratricides. Yanaros, too, reverts to a past figure, but this time not to a tribal one. St. John the Forerunner served his function of preparing the way for the hero, Christ. In so doing, his ultimate act is that of destroying himself: he, too, is part of the underbrush which must be cleared from the path of the hero, and he must be cut out with his own knife. Since this is the last of the novels, it is a tacit recognition of Kazantzakis' own failure: Yanaros and Kazantzakis are St. Johns and not the God to whom obesiance must be done. We are that God, and while one cannot either win or lose for another, an individual can be accounted a failure if he does not provide others with the necessary things for others, in this case with recognizable and living symbols as proof that a hero can be made.

The set of antithetical heroes can be seen as an example of the first man/last man duality. The narrator of Zorba the Greek and the Report to Greco is one of the last men who, like John and Yanaros, attempts to prepare the way for others. The last man, the prophet of spirit, must still be a man of action in the world, however, and the three heroes

of spirit, Manolios, Christ and Francis, attempt to elucidate the amalgamation of the hero of action and the saint of spirituality. Manolios is a crude but necessary first step toward such a hero. Christ is a highly effective amalgamation of action and spirit.[1] The Christ most fully evidences Kazantzakis' message on an intellectual basis, however, the totality of Christ in The Last Temptation is dependent on a previous mythology and does not clearly enough show the way that modern man can take. St. Francis seemingly was to be that figure, a man of the people who rose above the people because of his acceptance of the suffering caused by God's "Not enough!". But in so doing, Francis could no longer be with the people. He becomes a saint, a transformation of the hero which denies the people.

Kazantzakis then turned to Zorba, a figure not tribal and yet not completely modern. Zorba, however, is one of the first men, is Cosmic Man, predating even tribal man and yet postdating him in possibility. In the figure of Zorba, Kazantzakis found a glimmer of what modern man in action could be, for he was both sensuous and spiritual.

Kazantzakis' personal cycle as evidenced in the novels

[1] The Christ of Kazantzakis' Last Temptation is widely acclaimed blasphemous and irresponsible, as Michael A. Anthonakes in "Christ, Freedom and Kazantzakis" points out. Because of the information offered through the hero cycle, however, the Christ is immanently pertinent to the cause of religion in any sense save that of established dogma.

revolves around the first man/last man duality, and he achieves an intellectual understanding of what is necessary to be a hero, although he himself remains one of the last men. This does not make him a failure, for within his terms, he wished merely to discover the means of revivifying symbols: a myth-maker does not need to be a myth, he needs merely to understand the creating of a myth. It is for other people to be the myth. The difference between living and creating a myth are delineated by Zorba, who tells the narrator that he won't have the time to live if he takes the time to create.

Kazantzakis' myth-making is what concerns us, and that myth-making is dependent upon two concepts: God and the ascent: "As I wrote, I saw that two words kept reappearing and refusing to go away, even though I did not want this, indeed tried to avoid it. The words were God and ascent." (465, Report) Therefore, it is to these two concepts which we must turn in order to ascertain the success of Kazantzakis as myth-maker.

God within Kazantzakis' structures is relatively easily understood as chaos. God's face is one's own face, to identify God with something inherent in man (13, Report). To objectify God anthropomorphically, he is the Bull with which the ancient Cretans played "obstinately, respectfully, without hate," in order to transubstantiate their horror at

facing mindless omnipotence into strength (469, Report). The "age-old battle between man and bull (whom today we term God)" is the Cretan Glance (469, Report). The Bull is "dark subterranean power" (469, Report) and is thus equal to the power of the unconscious, and the hero is the Odysseus Kazantzakis created, and having created, must follow (470, Report). Odysseus is the archetypal hero who becomes hero by struggling with God (470, Report).

In this conception of God as a mighty yet indiscriminate force, there is no room for harmony, just as there is no harmony in the world. God becomes the abyss in which the striving hero may achieve a momentary harmony. In choosing Odysseus as the archetypal hero of today, Kazantzakis has thrust the search for harmony into a timeless world, a world in which obtains the primitive's view that to re-enact the hero's tasks and duties makes of one a hero through the process of eternal recurrance. God takes on the face of chaos in which there are seeds of momentary harmony, and the hero of today, just as did the ancient heroes, must find these moments and sing of them.

The singular difference between the duties of the hero of yesterday as opposed to those of the hero of today lies in the perception of this harmony within time. The ancient heroes were "no more or less than Dionysus's scattered limbs, clashing among themselves. . . . Each represented only one

part of the diety; they were not an intact god. Dionysus, the intact god, stood invisible in the center of the tragedy and governed the story's birth, development, and catharsis. For the initiated spectator, the god's scattered limbs, though battling against one another, had already been secretly united and reconciled within him. They had composed the god's intact body and formed a harmony" (435, Report). For the ancients, then, the process of integration, of harmony, was understood to have been accomplished, but the joy of the tragedy was in the telling of the process. Today, Kazantzakis says, the subject of tragedy is the future harmony: "We find outselves in a moment of universal destruction and creation in which even the most valiant individual attempts are in most cases condemned to miscarry. These miscarriages are fertile, however--not for us, but for those yet to come." (436, Report) Here, too, the joy is in the telling of the hero's progress, but it is a progress with a doubtful and uncertain end: evolutionary in the extreme because it is not based on any accepted understanding about the final meaning of the outcome.

The attitude which the hero of today must take is certain, however, and Kazantzakis recounts the story of the artist who comes to understand that the curtain over the picture is the picture itself (451, Report): the chaotic abyss is the face of God, and the hero must yoke himself to

it in order to find true liberty. Kazantzakis describes the attitude needed: "Together with the birds and stars I yoked myself to the eternal wheel and for the first time in my life, I believe, felt what true liberty is: to place oneself beneath God's--in other words harmony's--yoke." (452, Report)

God is both the chaos and the momentary harmony, and the hero's guidance to the harmony in chaos are forces of the material world as opposed to the spiritual, darkness as opposed to light, the loins as opposed to the head. At the same time the guiding forces are not to be understood as anything other than guiding forces: they are not ends in themselves, but means to the end of spirituality, illumination and intellectual grasp of the mystery. Kazantzakis describes this process as it happened to him in the writing of the Odyssey: "I wrote without a mental plan; other forces governed me, forces which had their seat, not in the head, but around the loins. These guided my hand and obliged the brain to follow and establish order." (463, Report)

This view of God as the abyss is understood by Prevelakis to be an outgrowth and a necessity of the times in which Kazantzakis wrote:

> The idea of the mortality of civilizations was the most important intellectual experience in the time between the two World Wars. Western civilization is perhaps the first in history to be conscious of

> its own death. To the descriptive imagination the death of civilizations means overturned thrones and smoking ruins. To the nonpictorial mind it means something less startling but much more terrible: it means the void. . . . Suddenly everything seems 'strange,' 'absurd'. . . . From this 'limit situation,' which puts man face to face with ultimate realities, there is only one release: the creation of a new God.[1]

In the face of such a societally produced void, Kazantzakis' heroes must look with the Cretan glance of familiar respect and sacred awe for their own salvations. The world has become akin to the pre-Homeric abyss of Nietzsche. Into this void Kazantzakis looked and, perceiving the chaos, turned to a Homeric hero, Odysseus, who would, like his predecessor, turn mankind into a harmonious part of the world.

Nietzsche saw the salvation of the pre-Homeric world as being the agon, the contest, wherein Greek ambition was allowed proper arena.[2] The contest is not only a safety valve for the individual, but also a means of preserving the health of the state. The genius in a society must either be

[1] Prevelakis, Nikos Kazantzakis and His Odyssey, p. 62.

[2] Friedrich Nietzsche, "Homer's Contest," The Portable Nietzsche, ed. Walter Kaufmann (NY: Viking, 1954), p. 35

ostracised or balanced with another genius; mankind's essential nature depends upon the stimulation of contests of great men among themselves, else the genius, overstepping his bounds and contesting with the Gods, will become guilty of hybris and bring the wrath of the Gods down on all mankind. This view of the value of the contest becomes in Kazantzakis' writing the value of suffering. If God demands much, it is good, for the finding of God is a contest, in the same manner that the Cretan bull-fighters contested and found their god, the Minotaur. The idea God becomes the activity ascent.

This concept of God is strongly dependent upon the recognition of death; societal death, as Prevelakis has mentioned, being the spur of necessity to Kazantzakis' psychic predisposition toward messianism. Psychologically, death is a function of cosmic rhythm, a spur to forcing the "elements lacking in the totality of self out into the open."[1] Death is deeply disturbing to modern man because "life has lost its deeper meaning for so many people, forcing them to exchange the life-preserving rhythm of the aeons for the dread ticking of the clock."[2]

To recognize the harmony which is God's involves a perception of death which is not fearful. To look death in

[1] Jung, Flying Saucers, p. 70.

[2] Jung, Flying Saucers, p. 71.

the face is freedom, because death is a natural circumscription of mankind's fearful abundance of freedom: "Man is able to bear working only in a fixed, circumscribed arena. I had to submit to this human incapacity if I wished to surpass it." (453, Report) Death becomes one means to freedom which is bearable in scope. It is a syncretic element in the works of Kazantzakis, perhaps the only really viable one. As Prevelakis says: "The death of the modern Odysseus is his only Transfiguration."[1]

Death as a symbol of the integration of Transfiguration is hardly an on-going symbol. Very few people will opt for death as a means of producing quality of life. Death is used by Kazantzakis as a means to immortality if the death be heroic enough, as a means to reconciliation with the chaos of God, but very seldom as a means to signal that the cup of life is full to overflowing and must be emptied in keeping with cosmic rhythm. Kazantzakis at times perceives death as a symbol of something greater than life, rather than a complementary function of life. This perception in one who would be a myth-maker is tantamount to admission of failure of purpose: far more purposeful is Zorba's injunction to live as though one were immortal. Death as a symbol in Kazantzakis' works is a symbol of

[1] Prevelakis, p. 62.

failure.

Turning from this cosmic level, and returning once again to the personal, psychological level of the individual--which is, after all, the level on which the hero of today must work--God can be identified with the power of the unconscious mind; the momentary harmony becomes the achievement of the integration of the self. The activity of ascent on this level is the achievement of selfhood.

In the world of action this ascent is a matter of paths, of existential choices. It is in the choice of paths that Kazantzakis is able to understand the nature of God:

> All my life, however, I was sure of one thing: that one road, and one road only, leads to God--the ascent. Never the descent or the level road, only the ascent. My inability to distinguish the contents of that word God with any clarity, that word so soiled and overused by men, made me hesitate many times, but I never hesitated regarding the road which leads toward God, in other words toward the supreme peak of man's desires. (465, Report)

For Kazantzakis the ascent was always a red line of suffering. For God, the voices and prayers of mankind is not enough: "Where is the blood? The tears, the terror? That is what

matters" to God.[1]

The importance of destruction within this concept of ascent is obvious: the God who cries "Go beyond!" and "Not enough!" to St. Francis is demanding destruction of what obtains, pushing mankind onward to make it grow. The archetypal hero, Odysseus, closes the circle of Homer into what Prevelakis calls an "image of nothing":

> All the values produced by Hellenism from the time when Homer established the form of the Olympians, and to which Christianity added with its message of love and its promise of life eternal, are overthrown in the new Odyssey. And not only the values, but even the content of ordinary human life is traduced in the poem. . . .The reader is led from destruction to destruction until he confronts the head of the Medusa. The circle closes. The gods are dead![2]

The way of ascent is the way of destruction: the path of ascent is strewn with broken things and blood. But ultimately, this path of destruction is one which leads to an increased hunger for life, for new forms which will replace those destroyed. Odysseus came to hunger for new forms, but did not find them.[3] Once again, the symbol is

[1] Nikos Kazantzakis, "Man and God in Dialogue," Saturda Review, August 28, 1965, p. 17.

[2] Prevelakis, p. 116.

[3] Ibid.

one of failure; the red line of ascent leads not to new forms but merely to an increased need for them.

Colin Wilson has said that the novels of Kazantzakis should be read as a whole--as if they were a single novel, like the Odyssey.[1] They are the deliberate projections of different aspects of Kazantzakis himself; an attempt "to create a world that should embody all his conflicts."[2] We have mentioned that the novels evidence a kind of hero-trek belonging to the writer, as well as embodying specific hero-treks within each one. All of the heroes save Zorba are nominally rejected by Kazantzakis: only Zorba provided the writer with material to make into Odysseus. If Zorba was instrumental in giving birth to Odysseus, Kazantzakis finds that his own path of ascent, wandering from enthusiasm to enthusiasm, was equally part of Odysseus:

> Considered separately, each of my intellectual ramblings and sidewise tacks seemed wasted time, the product of an unjelled, disordered mind. But now I saw that considered all together they constituted a straight and unerring line which knew full well that only by sidewise tacks could

[1] Colin Wilson, "Nikos Kazantzakis," Med. Rev., p. 41.

[2] Ibid.

> it advance over this uneven earth. And my infidelities toward the great ideas--I had abandoned them after being succissively fascinated and disillusioned--taken all together these infidelities constituted an unshakable faith in the essence. It seemed that luck . . . had eyes and compassion; it had taken me by the hand and guided me. . . . It expected me to hear the Cry of the future, to exert every effort to divine what that Cry wanted, why it was calling, and where it invited us to go. (453, Report)

The Cry is literally that of the hero, Odysseus, and when Kazantzakis meets him and prepares to follow and chronicle his journey, Kazantzakis is transformed: the pen-pusher becomes the myth-maker. As Kimon Friar points out, the myth of Odysseus is the myth of a man who searches for his soul. Ultimately the myth of Odysseus is a myth dependent upon the process of individuation.

This process assumes that man is not only capable of change and evolution, but is driven to it by the choices he allows room for. It has been pointed out that Kazantzakis was deeply indebted to various existential philosophers: the corps of "bodyguards" includes Bergson and Nietzsche, Dostoevsky has been mentioned as another influence of

great importance.[1] Kazantzakis, however, has reinterpreted these philosophers, making out of their systems his own. Poulakidas explains it thus: "Kazantzakis' existentialism is a synthesis of Nietzsche's atheism and Dostoyevsky's humanism, but this combination leads to a kind of spiritualism that has extremely strong ties with Bergson's mysticism and vitalism."[2]

[1] A partial list of the myriad explanations of Kazantzakis' existentialism indicates the scope of his "borrowings."

Maurice Friedman, "The Modern Vitalist: Bergson and Kazantzakis," To Deny Our Nothingness: Contemporary Images of Man (NY: Delacorte, 1967). Friedman discusses Kazantzakis' Zorba as a vitalist after Bergson's philosophy. He feels Zorba attained Bergsonian spiritual heights because he didn't wish them.

Andreas K. Poulakidas, "Nikos Kazantzakis: Odysseus as Phenomenon," Comparative Literature Studies, VI (June, 1969). This is an overview of all the philosophies which nurtured the formulation of Odysseus and the Odyssian Kazantzakis.

George Scouffas, "Kazantzakis: Odysseus and the 'Cage of Freedom,'" Accent, XIX (1959). This is a discussion of the existential position in psychological terms of modern man searching for a soul.

Andreas K. Poulakidas, "Dostoevsky, Kazantzakis' Unacknowledged Mentor," Comparative Literature, XXI (Fall, 1969). The spiritual perception of God as evidenced by Greek Orthodoxy is found to obtain in both Kazantzakis and Dostoevsky; this perception is essential to the spiritual suffering of the heroes of both.

Frederick J. Hoffman, "The Friends of God: Dostoevsky and Kazantzakis," The Imagination's New Beginning: Theology and Modern Literature (University of Notre Dame Press, 1967). Kazantzakis' Christ is seen as an especially affecting image of existential man.

[2] Andreas K. Poulakidas, "The Novels of Kazantzakis and Their Existential Sources," Dissertation Abstracts, XXVIII (1967), 2260A (Indiana University).

The shock of existentialism left a profound scar on Kazantzakis. Even as a child he railed against the scientific facts of the heliocentrism of the universe and the theory of the descent of man from the apes. The search for a hero, evidenced through his novels, is seemingly an attempt to soothe this shock: to shout with assurance that man is the measure of all things and made in the image of a God of stability and strength. But psychically, the scar remained and Kazantzakis is a prototype of the modern man described by Jung as incapable of controlling affects:

> Should it be granted to [earthly man]. . . to develop into something higher [than the anthropoids], he is reminded that this transformation is not his to command, for he is dependent on factors he cannot influence. He must content himself with a prayerful yearning and "groaning," in the hope that something may carry him upward. . . . Through this attitude he constellates helpful and at the same time dangerous powers in the unconscious; helpful if he understands them, dangerous if he misunderstands them. . . . Nothing can carry us beyond an 'It seems as if' except the perilous leap of faith, which we must leave to those who are gifted or graced for it. Every real or apparent step forward depends on an experience of facts, the

> verification of which is . . . one of the most difficult tasks the human mind has to face.[1]

Evolution is spontaneous and dependent upon the task of individuation.[2] The Jungean process of individuation is a painful process: it is an existential process in its basic perception of man's role in the universe. Ultimately, too, the Jungean perception of freedom is identical to the freedom of the existentialists in the role that suffering and confusion play in both perceptions and also in the constancy of attitude necessary to accede to freedom. Kazantzakis is "the only contemporary writer" who faced the paradox of freedom, i.e., that being free is nothing but becoming free is heaven, and he "spent his life fighting like a demon to solve it."[3]

It is in this light that Kazantzakis is to be understood: the symbols of failure which he fell heir to because of his perception and power of intellect become heroic rather than merely negative. His promethean struggle led him to understand that human will is dependent in a positive sense upon human necessity. Spontaneity of perception and intuition

[1] Jung, Flying Saucers, p. 64-5.

[2] Loc. Cit., p. 81.

[3] Wilson, "Nikos Kazantzakis," Med. Rev., p. 33.

cannot be willed, but on the other hand, to will them is necessitous. Willfulness is a predisposition to spontaneity. Odysseus lives in a cage of freedom because it is necessary to man's evolution that he will to live in so uncomfortable a manner.

The existential position is a major stage in man's psychic evolution. In Irrational Man, William Barrett writes of this paradox and the effect of it upon art. He sees a turning toward an organic expression in Occidental art which is in keeping with that traditionally expressed in Oriental art: time and space are flattened out and relationships transcend the usual western boundaries. This is irrationalism and many early twentieth century movements, i. e., Dadaism, absurdism and vitalism, are valid revolts against the circumscribing retionalism of the century. Nietzsche was almost alone in the nineteenth century in predicting and himself evidencing the eruption of the irrational, and even Nietzsche could not resolve the contradiction of whether the Superman would be starkly individual and dwell on the mountaintop of spirit, or an individual realizing "within the world his own individual capacities for wholeness."[1]

[1] William Barrett, Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy (1958; rpt. NY: Doubleday, 1962), p. 192.

Kazantzakis happily fell heir to the Greek tradition of prose in which the irrational and the rational are not so obviously in tension.[1] But he could not so easily escape the responsibility of the man of thought of his time: he found himself facing the same contradiction as that of his mentor, Nietzsche. In attempting a modern synthesis of this contradiction, Kazantzakis found a resolution of spirit. Scoufflas explains the Kazantzakian vision thus:

> His vision . . . /places/ emphasis on the archetypal and representative I, the sense of the unbroken, upward continuity of creation, the mystic association with all creatures and plants accompanied by a deep feeling of love, all climaxed by the exhilaration of freedom.[2]

The archetypal hero, Odysseus, abandons the world of doing for the world of being, as mentioned by Stanford, and in so doing goes through seven stages of the growth of the soul, leading finally to an immaculateness, of being "drained pure till life turned to immaculate myth."[3] Odysseus becomes art, and art is the exorcism which leads to spiritual evolution.[4]

[1] Doulis, "Suffering," p. 33-35.

[2] Scoufflas, "Cage of Freedom," p. 238.

[3] Ibid., p. 245.

[4] Ibid.

This, then, is Kazantzakis' evolutionary theory. It is a theory of the purity of the last man: Buddha, though not the prototypical Odysseus, is the final product of Zorba's vitalic first man. Through the physical and vital, man evolves to the spiritual.

The synthesis effected by Kazantzakis for modern man in search of a soul is dependent upon this dialectic. Mythically, the first one is pre-creation in regard to the world; he is cosmic. Kazantzakis' first one, too, is pre-creation, but prior to not the world, but the individual. Just as Nietzsche's Dionysus' fertility and chaos is overcome and given form by Apollo, a form called tragic art, so is Kazantzakis' first man, Zorba, vitalic and close to Mother Earth, overcome and given form by Buddha, renunciatory and coldly withdrawn from the illusions of earth, a form called tragic art. Artistic expression of life is the purpose of man, not the living of life.

Christ as an individual is a vision of the separation of elements: he is an archetype of the soul search of modern man. He can also be aligned with Nietzsche's Socratic man, who wrongly and scientifically differentiated himself. Both Christ and Socrates are creators of tragedies of individual life. Spirit, evolutionary spirit based on a Bergsonian love, is the syncretic element for both Christ and Socrates and is evidenced in the freedom allowed others by their

deaths. Socrates' "Know thyself!" becomes Christ's "Know God!"--both end in death.

The usual body/spirit duality is transformed in Kazantzakis' theogony. The first man/last man dialectic enables us to see this duality in terms of spirit (art form)/ body (art lived). This is in keeping not only with Kazantzakis' personal decisions as mentioned in Zorba and the Report, but also with the mythic importance of the hero: the hero lives in an art form so that others may live with art.

The two major concepts of Kazantzakis, i.e., God and the ascent, interrelated as to questions of will, death, freedom and the struggle become one and the same through a syncretic interruption of evolutionary spirit. Intellect is not important save as a secondary codifying, order-making force. It is used properly to determine the responsibility of each man for himself and to will participation in the evolutionary stream of spirit: this assumption of responsibility negates protestations of nihilism and destructivism. The spirit is ascent and is God in evolution: a supreme synthesis.

The synthesis becomes one of failure only in the light of actuated intent. Kazantzakis, feeling himself to have failed to adequately embolden mankind to an assumption of its spiritual responsibility, is failed of his purpose only

if we ignore the evidence of history and assume that an idea dies when does its propagator.

On the other hand, since Kazantzakis provided for himself rationalization as artist in his propounding of the first man/last man dialectic, we can utilize that rationalization in assessment of his worth as a myth-maker. The last man, immaculate through the means of art, is able finally to perceive immutable essence: art is the means of his salvation, and as a myth-maker that art is the means to others' salvation. In order to actuate others, that art must be built with vivid and vivifying symbols, numinous in their ability to move others. This, in spite of Prevelakis' assertaion that it must be culture which provides the symbols: the myth-maker takes responsibility for the revivifying of symbols for society.[1] Kazantzakis did not do this.

Unable to induce the leap of faith within himself, for he was one of the last men, Kazantzakis was also not able to cause others to make the leap. The first men are no longer possible because of man's changed and technological consciousness: the last men are not capable of the strong nihilism necessary to make themselves immaculate. But

[1] Prevelakis, p. 122.

Kazantzakis does become a hero himself, within his own terms, through the act of writing. He himself becomes a symbol, as Colin Wilson points out, "of Camus' Sisyphus pushing a rock uphill knowing that it will immediately roll down again, or of Prometheus, suffering new agonies every day and yet praising man's apirit."[1] Ironically, these, too, are heroic symbols of failure.

[1] Wilson, p. 47.

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